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MONGOLIA, AN OBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST

by

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PREFACE

During two periods in the past Mongolia entered the world picture. The first period was in the 13th-14th century when the Mongol nomads built up, viet armis, a grand Eurasian empire unprecedented in human history, and put under their yoke a great part of the living souls on the earth. However, as a result of the fiasco of their hegemonic power in the 14th century, they reverted to their erstwhile position under the Chinese, and became almost an unknown factor in international affairs. To record the chains of vicissitudes during this period many a good volume has been produced and widely read. Then, with the advent of the 20th century the second period set about running its course. Mongolia once more came into the international spotlight, not in its former role as the master of man's destiny, but in the new role as an object of deadly rivalries between China, Russia and Japan. In the course of the three-cornered struggle, machinations made or marred, fortune waxed and waned; but Mongolia remained as ever a political dynamite. Around the Mongolian problem swivelled many political developments in the Far East, which yielded grave consequences eventually. However, in spite of the great historical significance of these events, systematic accounts thereof have been deplorably lacking. All that has been available is only fragmentary

and uncorrelated informations which give no alpha and omega of the whole story. From the point of view of comprehensive scholarship further explorations into this subject are indeed a necessity. Furthermore, with the end of the insane and inane aggressive war of Japan, the second period of the Mongolian problem came to a close and a third period has been ushered in. It seems all the more urgent for those interested in world affairs to look back into the historical background of the changed situation, so that a clear vista of the future can be had. For this reason I chose this Mongolian problem as the subject of my thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to recapitulate, in a brief yet comprehensive way, the relations between China, Russia and Japan in regard to Mongolia during the period extending from the beginning of the 20th century down to the end of the year 1945. This work of recapitulation cannot be compared with that undertaken by an ordinary raconteur. It was really an uphill one; the mere task of gathering, sifting, verifying, correlating, and synthesizing the reference materials was already a travail which taxed my patience and energy heavily. Furthermore, the unavailability of many important sources added no little to the difficulty in prosecuting my studies. What annoyed and discouraged me most was rather my own unfamiliarity with the Russian language, which actually denied me free access

to the important Russian sources. Fortunately, in spite of these handicapps, I was able to collect and consult some good firsthand materials in Chinese, Japanese, English and French. Also from the Russian sources I drew some, though limited, informations with the aid of those who were versed in that language. However, I intend to make no pretensions to complete originality of my study in view of the fact that many original sources are still inaccessible; although wherever such sources were obtainable I did not hesitate to make proper use thereof.

To Mr. Owen Lattimore I owe great indebtedness. Mr. Lattimore, often called "the best-informed American on Asiatic affairs living today," has a right to his place as the leading American authority on Mongolian affairs by virtue of his admirable command of both the Chinese and the Mongolian languages and his arduous field work in the land of Mongolia. His writings, both in book form and in periodicals, not only provided me with many valuable factual data, but also stimulated my own thought. My obligations are also due to Professor Don B. Leiffer and Dr. Robert P. Benedict, under whose direction the present work was pursued. They made many valuable suggestions in regard to my statements and judgments, and also instructed me on the matter of research methodology. I am also grateful to Mr. T. C. Shen, who read a part of the manuscript and saved me from many

errors in style and form. At last, it should be stated that the usual prefatory absolution to all save the author himself for errors of all kinds applies.

T. C. L.

Boston, Massachusetts,
New Year's Day, 1946.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

TERMINOLOGY AND EXPLANATIONS

In our present study the term "Mongolia" refers to both Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, as the land of Mongolia is conventionally divided by political geographers;[1] and the term "Mongol" or "Mongols" refers to the native people who have from time immemorial inhabited the land of Mongolia or those parts of Chinese territory lying in Mongolia's neighborhood, and who do not ethnologically belong to the other major racial groups of China, i.e., the Hans, the Manchus, the Mohammedans, and the Tibetans. The word "Mongol," used as an adjective, describes something of, or pertaining to, some individual Mongol

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[1] It should be noted that the division of Mongolia into Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia is more often adhered to by the Japanese and the Westerners than the Mongols themselves and the Chinese. Thus, the Outer Mongols named in 1924 their new state the "People's Republic of Mongolia;" and the Inner Mongols named in 1939 their autonomous government the "Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia," both without specifying their territory as "Inner" or "Outer" Mongolia. The reason is that the Mongols are used to regard the whole of Mongolia as a territorial unit as distinguished from Manchuria, China proper, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet. The Chinese originally invented the said division; but since the establishment of the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia in 1928, the term "Inner Mongolia" has been less often mentioned in China than before. The term "Mongolia," therefore, is now often used by the Chinese to mean Outer Mongolia only. In our present study the term "Mongolia" is occasionally used in the sense as interpreted by the Mongols and the Chinese only when such usage is unavoidable or seems more convenient. In such case, the readers may readily determine the exact denotation of the term by the context.

or Mongols, or the Mongols generally as a racial group of China. The word "Mongolian" describes something of, or pertaining to, Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia consists of the three regions of Outer Mongolia proper, Tannu Urianghai, and Kobdo. The Altai district, originally a part of Outer Mongolia, was incorporated into the Sinkiang Province (Chinese Turkestan) in 1919, and should not, then, be considered as a component part of Outer Mongolia posterior to that year.

Inner Mongolia includes the Chinese territories now constituting the Provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, all to the south of the Gobi Desert. There is much confusion as to whether Jehol is a part of Manchuria or Inner Mongolia. Some writers include Jehol as a part of Manchuria owing to its proximity to the Three Northeastern Provinces of Liaoling, Kirin and Heiluhgkiang. Others consider it as a part of Inner Mongolia owing to the natives' propinquity to the Mongols. But, the Chinese usually regard Jehol as a part of Inner Mongolia, since the political problems and administrative difficulties of Jehol are more closely linked with, or similar to, those of Chahar and Suiyuan. For the purpose of this study, Jehol is considered as a part of Inner Mongolia, unless otherwise indicated.

Distinction should be made between the terms "Mongols" and "Mongolian race" or "Mongoloid race." The latter is used

by some ethnologists for one of the three major races of human kind, first discriminated and named by Blumenbach, and afterwards adopted by Cuvier when he reduced Blumenbach's five races to three, i.e., the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the Negro. According to this definition the "Mongolian race" includes most part of the Asiatic peoples, such as (1) the Sinitic peoples, which include the Chinese branch (the Chinese), the Tibetan branch (the Tibetans), the Indo-Chinese branch (the Burmese and the Siamese); and (2) the Sibiric peoples, which include the Tungusic branch (the Manchus and the Tungus), the Mongolic branch (the Mongols), the Tartaric branch (the Turks and the Cossacks), the Finnic branch (the Finns and the Magyars), the Arctic branch (the Chukchis and the Ainos), and the Japanic branch (the Japanese and the Koreans).[1] On the other hand, the "Mongols" constitute only a small fraction of the Mongolian race, as noted above, and, therefore, this term should be applied only in a purely linguistic and national sense to the natives living in Mongolia and its neighboring regions.

It should also be noted that not all the people of the Mongolic branch of the Mongolian race live in China. There are sprinklings of the Mongolic people scattered over other

---

[1] Cf. J. Deniker, "*Les Races et les Peuples de la Terre*;" E. O. James, "*An Introduction to Anthropology*;" M. Schmidt, "*The Primitive Races of Mankind.*"

parts of the world outside China. For instance, in the Buriat Republic of the U.S.S.R. in Siberia some 330,000 Buriat Mongols are living around Lake Baikal.[1] In other parts of Siberia, as well as in Central Asia and Europe, there are also some, though very few, people of the same strain.[2] But an overwhelming majority of this Mongolic people live within the confines of China, numbering about 2,400,000, which forms the object of the international rivalries between China, Russia and Japan. Therefore, for the purpose of our present study the term "Mongols" is used only to refer to those Mongolic people who live in Chinese territory.

However, not all the Mongols of China live in Mongolia. It is true that Mongolia is the cradle and reservoir of this ethnic group, but as a result of their nomadic movements about one-third of the Chinese Mongols now reside, not in Mongolia, but in the lands adjacent to Mongolia. Thus, the Chinese Mongols are often differentiated into four groups on the basis of their geographical distribution:

1. The Outer Mongols -- Those Mongols living in Outer Mongolia. This group consists of three major tribes:

A. The Khalkas -- The Outer Mongols chiefly living in Outer Mongolia proper (the middle and east part of Outer Mongolia).

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1. Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Encyclopedia, vol. IV, p. 419.
2. No accurate figures are available as to the sum total of the Mongolic people throughout the world.

B. The Oleots -- The Outer Mongols living in Kobdo in West Outer Mongolia.

C. The Urianghais -- The Outer Mongols chiefly living in Tannu Urianghai in northwest Outer Mongolia.

2. The Inner Mongols -- Those Mongols living in Inner Mongols.

3. The Eastern or Manchurian Mongols -- Those Mongols chiefly living in the Hulun Buir region along the Hsingan Mountains in Manchuria.

4. The Western Mongols -- Those Mongols living in the Provinces of Sinkiang (often called Dzungaria Mongols) and Chinghai (often called Kokonor Mongols) to the west and southwest of Mongolia.

According to Chinese official data the Mongol population of China as distributed in these four regions is roughly as follows:[1]

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[1] The Chinese Year Book, 1943, pp. 42-45; The Year Book of The National Government of China, 1944, Table II. But widely different figures are given by other sources. For instance, O. Lattimore estimated in 1935 that the Mongol population in Outer Mongolia amounted to from 600,000 to 800,000, or even 1,000,000; that in Manchuria, about 1,000,000; and that in Inner Mongolia, 2,000,000. Cf. China Year Book, 1935, P. 25. In the present study the writer rather adopts the Chinese official figures.

Inner Mongols		718,461
Jehol	458,757	
Chahar	71,295	
Suiyuan	170,959	
Ninghsia	17,450	
Outer Mongols..		831,400
Outer Mongolia proper & Kobdo	761,400	
Tannu Urianghai	70,000	
Manchurian Mongols..................................		420,566
Hulun Buir	20,566	
Heilungkiang	140,100	
Kirin	30,100	
Liaoling	229,800	
Western Mongols.......................................		365,366
Sinkiang	212,000	
Chinghai	153,366	
GRAND TOTAL............	2,335,793..............	2,335,793

Inasmuch as the Western Mongols have not been involved in serious international complications, they do not constitute a topic for discussion, so far as our present study is concerned. Therefore, only the Outer Mongols, the Inner Mongols, and the Manchurian Mongols fall into the scope of our investigation herein. Question may be raised as to the ~~properness~~ propriety of using the term "Mongolia" in the subject of the thesis, in view of the inclusion of the Manchurian Mongols as a topic for treatment. Nevertheless, since the developments of this ticklish Mongol problem have always revolved round the situation in Mongolia, and Mongolia has universally taken

as a symbol of this Far Eastern political caldron, it seems excusable to depart a little from strict logic in our nomenclature.

At last, note should be taken of the terms to be used in referring to the different Chinese major racial groups. As widely acknowledged, there exist five major racial groups in China, viz., the Hans, the Manchus, the Mohammedans, the Tibetans, and the Mongols. The Hans chiefly live in that part of the Chinese territory lying to the south of the Great Wall in Inner Mongolia and to the east of the provinces of Kansu and Chinghai and the Territory of Tibet, and thus constitute the bulk of the Chinese millions. The Manchus were originally a people of a stock (the Tungusic branch) different from the Hans; but after the three hundred years' Manchu rule in China, as well as as a result of the later Manchu policy of encouraging emigration of the Hans into Manchuria, the Manchu people have been almost entirely absorbed and assimilated by the Hans, that nowadays it is even hard to tell the one from the other, except on some characteristic customs. The other three smaller groups have from time to time posed serious problems to the Hans and the Manchus, but they have never been allowed an important part in handling China's political affairs. Therefore, the Han-Manchu group has often been called by the Westerners as "Chinese," as distinguished from the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Mohammedans, who are considered as mere "subject people" residing

in the several outlying Chinese colonies. Viewed from the standpoint of present Chinese political structure, this definition is to some extent erroneous in that it conveys the connotation that all those outlying territories are still Chinese dependencies, and all people living therein are not full-fledged Chinese citizens. But, as a matter of fact, the three frontier peoples have for a long time maintained but a remote and even nominal connection with China and have not infrequently risen as opposing camps against the Hans and the Manchus,-- as the Mongols in our present study. For the sake of convenience, the term "Chinese," representing either the Hans only or the Han-Manchu combination, as the case may be, is used herein to mean "the active core of the Chinese people," and should not be understood to mean the whole of "the Chinese people" or "the people of China." It represents the Hans alone, if used in connection with events happening before the establishment of the Chinese Republic; and represents the Han-Manchu combination, if after.

CHAPTER II

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND MONGOLIA

1. Manchu Conquest of Mongolia

Mongolia has always been a problem to China.[1] In the ancient Chinese annals[2] and ballads[3] frequent references had been made of the barbarians called Yen-Yuen, Hsun-Yu or Shan-Yung who perennially descended upon China proper from the north. Towards the close of the 3rd century B.C., Shih-Hwang-Ti, the first emperor who unified China, was greatly annoyed by such descents and began to build the renowned Great Wall to fend off the invaders. However, in spite of the feat of human labor, the relations between China and Mongolia continued to be unpleasantly vicissitudinous ever since. From time to time, when a strong dynasty rose in China, the Mongols succumbed to the Chinese power. Thus, the Hsiung-Nu nomads in the Han Dynasty, and the Tu-Chueh nomads in the Tang Dynasty, were both put under the rule of Chinese Military Governors, and paid sizable tributes to the Imperial Courts at definite intervals. But, more often than not, the nomadic tribes

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[1] For more detailed account of early Sino-Mongolian relations, see Chang Chin, "Chung Hwa Tung Shih". (A General History of China), passim; E.H. Parker, "A Short History of China", passim.

[2] See Tso Chiu-ming, "Tso Chuan" (A History of the Chou Dynasty, the Ch'un Chiu Age and the Age of Contending Kingdoms, 1027 ~~B.C.~~-221 B.C.), passim.

[3] See Mao ~~Chang~~, "Mao Shih" (The Ancient Odes of China), passim. Heng

broke through the Great Wall and made incursions into China as soon as internal chaos caused the latter vulnerable. Chinese Emperors were taken prisoners, brought to Mongolia, and maltreated. Forays and scalpings were rife. This seesaw struggle between China and Mongolia culminated in the early 13th century when Jengiz Khan, leading his grand Mongol army, overran a large part of both Asia and Europe and established the greatest Empire ever seen in human history. Such stupendous power was wielded by the Mongols that "scarce a dog might bark in the whole of Asia without the permission of the Great Khan,"[1] and even the prayer "Save us from the fury of the Tartars" was introduced into the Christian litany.[2] With the end of the Sung Dynasty in 1278 the whole of China thus passed under the domination of Kublai Khan, who gave the name of Yuan to the Mongol Dynasty in China. For a full century China was at the nadir of her misfortune. Yet, the Mongols refused to be absorbed into the Chinese body system, as other barbarians had been, and, consequently, the culmination of nomadic ascendancy turned out to be its end. So, in 1368 the Chinese Ming Dynasty was established after having driven the Mongol invaders back to their desert home.

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1. Capt. Wilmot P.M. Russell, "From Peking to Mongolia", The National Review, vol. 90, 1927-1928, p. 762.
2. A. Warwick, "The People of the Wilderness", National Geographic Magazine, vol. 39, 1921, p. 507.

When the Ming Dynasty came to grips with the nomadic problem, it found that the Mongol strength was still an element not to be slighted. As a matter of fact, after the Mongols were expelled from China proper, they still held out in Outer Mongolia with occasional raids across the Gobi Desert.[1] This led to Chinese campaigns which lasted for two decades. In the end the Mongol power was crushed, and Chinese Suzerainty was admitted.[2] But after the energetic Emperor Yung-Lo-Ti died, no successor was left equally endowed to carry on his work. Thus left free, the Mongols resumed their incessant raids; and, when the Ming showed signs of decline, they even moved southward on masse to settle in the zone outside the Great Wall, thus again depriving China of her control of the twilight zone of nomadism and civilization so necessary for her security. Therefore, throughout the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the nomadic cares were ever a headache to China, as testified by the large

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[1] After the collapse of the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongols in China resolved into three main groups: (1) Northern Mongols in Outer Mongolia, representing the old Mongol stock and the core of the Mongol nation; (2) the southern Mongols of Inner Mongolia, representing the backwash from China; (3) western Mongols of the Altai region, Chinese Turkestan, and Kokonor, representing what had once been the Mongol hegemony over Central Asia. During the Ming Dynasty these three major groups, except launching occasional raids on China, also fought against one another for supremacy among themselves. As a result of these internecine, fratricidal struggles among the Mongols, their strength was considerably extenuated.

[2] "Ming Shih" (History of the Ming Dynasty), 327/5 l. et seq.; "Fang Yu Chi Yao", 9/20-21.

armies stationed around the extra-mural country to watch the Mongol movements.

As the Ming Dynasty was coping with the Mongol problem, another Nuchen nomadic people, later known as the Manchus, suddenly rose in Liaotung in the early 17th century, and set up a kingdom with Mukden as its capital.[1] The power of the new state grew so rapidly that the Mongols of Manchuria and Mongolia came to accept the Manchu suzerainty by 1636.[2] The Manchu-Mongol allied forces then marched easily into intra-mural China and established the Manchu Dynasty of Ching at Peking in 1644.

Although the Manchus utilized the Mongol help in their conquest of China, yet the importance of controlling the Mongol nomads was not lost sight of. Therefore, soon after its establishment in China, the Ching Dynasty began to attack the Mongol problem. The Manchurian Mongols were already very tractable. So they were only required to appear periodically with nominal tributes at Mukden, the seat of the Military Governor of Shengking, and otherwise left much

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[1] "Sheng Wu Chi", 1/4-6, 18-26

[2] In 1637 the Mongols presented to the Manchu chieftain rare animals, horses, armours, sable skins, Russian rifles and saddles. It was ruled that henceforward one white camel and eight white horses, called "the tribute of nine whites", be paid annually as a symbol of allegiance. Pai Mei-chu, "Wai Mon Koo Shih Mo Chi Yao", (A Brief History of Outer Mongolia), pp. 4-5.

to themselves.[1] The Khalka Mongols both north and south of the Gobi Desert, as well as the Oleot Mongols along the Chinese frontier, were as tractable as the Manchurian Mongols and were then treated similarly. But the Oleot Mongols of Dsungaria in what is now Sinkiang (or Chinese Turkestan) were still defiant, and in 1688 invaded Mongolia with the hope of welding the nomadic forces for a revival of the Mongol power. The Mongols north of the Desert were disastrously routed by the Oleets, and fled en masse southward to the land of what is now Inner Mongolia. The Oleets were so powerful that their long drive reached as far as only 700 li (about 250 miles) from Peking. In 1690 Emperor Kangsi, the greatest ruler produced by the Manchus, personally led his army out of the Great Wall and drove the Oleets back. Thereupon the Emperor formally ordered the Mongol refugees to settle temporarily in Inner Mongolia side by side with the Mongols who originally ranched there.

But the end ~~is~~ was not yet. By that time Outer Mongolia was still held by the Oleets. So in 1697-1698, the Emperor again launched an expedition across the Desert, and succeeded in subduing the recalcitrants. All the Outer Mongolian tribes were then moved back to their home-country, and ever since the whole of Mongolia came into the Chinese orbit until

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[1] "Sheng Ching Tung Chih", 10/4.

the downfall of the Ching Dynasty in 1911.[1]

II. Manchu Policy in Mongolia

As to the Manchu policy towards the desert nomads, the Ching Dynasty found its model in the acts of previous Chinese dynasties, especially the Tang. The basic principle was to weaken the power of the Mongols as a warlike people. The following policies adopted may be observed:

First, division of the Mongols into separate small units. This is basically the divide et impera rule so often adhered to by the colonial powers. Traditionally, the Outer Mongols (the Khalkas) were divided into three khanates, or leagues, i.e., Tuhsehtu, Chechen, and Tsasaktu. In 1732, a part of the territory of the Tuhsehtu Khanate was set aside as the Sayennoyan Khanate.[2] In addition to these four khanates, two other regions were created as separate districts in 1755-1756, - - Kobdo in west Outer Mongolia was set aside as the pastoral land of the Outer Mongolian Oleots, and Tannu Urianghai in northwest Outer Mongolia was prescribed to be the abode and sphere of activities of the Urianghai natives, a people of mixed Mongol and Turkish extraction. The Mongols in the four khanates and two districts were in turn divided into banners each with a specified sphere of jurisdiction.

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[1] Pai Nei-chu, op. cit., pp. 4-5; "Sheng Wu Chi", 3/30-38, 59 1.

[2] Ibid, p. 6.

In each banner there was a hereditary chieftain, or Jassak, and in each khanate there were a captain-general and a deputy captain-general elected by the banners subject to the approval of the Manchu Emperor. The same process was applied to the Inner Mongols and the Manchurian Mongols. The following table shows the division of the Mongols at that time:

A. Outer Mongolia

	Khalkas (Outer Mongolia Proper)	Oleots[1] (Kobdo or West Outer Mongolia)	Urianghais (Tannu Urianghai or Northwest Outer Mongolia)
Leagues	4	2	-
Banners	86	19	5

B. Inner Mongolia

	Inner Mongolia Proper (Chahar and Suiyuan)	Chinghai (or Kokonor)
Leagues	6	-
Banners	49	29

C. Mongol Portion of Manchuria (including Jehol)

Leagues	4
Banners	37

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[1] The Oleots are also called Kalmucks.

Above the banners and leagues, there were also representatives and organs of the central government at Peking. In the central government there was a Department of Colonial Affairs, also called Li Fan Yuan in Chinese. Under the Yuan there were a number of representatives of the central government resident in the Mongol cities to keep oversight of local affairs. In Outer Mongolia a Protector-General was originally stationed at Uliassutai, under whom were three Assistants having charge of Kobdo, Tannu Urianghai and Outer Mongolia Proper respectively. Since 1758 the Protector-General was replaced by a High Commissioner, also called Amban, at Urga, who swayed real political power in Outer Mongolia, after the Hutukhtu had been deprived thereof. In Inner Mongolia three Protectors-Generals of Chahar, Suiyuan and Jehol were appointed to perform the function of supervision.[1] Thus, in the Ching Dynasty the administrative system in regard to Mongolia was as follows:

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[1] The Mongols of Chinghai were put under the control of the Imperial Commissioner at Sining, and those in Sinkiang under the Military Governor of Ili. Hsu Shuhsi, "China and Her Political Entity", p. 43.


Emperor
Li Fan Yuan
High Commissioner for Outer Mongolia
Protectors-Generals for Chahar, Sui-Yuan & Jehol
Assistant Commissioner for Kobdo
Assistant Commissioner for Tannu Urianghai
Assistant Commissioner for Outer Mongolia Proper
Leagues
Leagues
Leagues
Leagues
Banners
Banners
Banners
Banners

According to the Manchu rulings, the Li Fan Yuan had charge of all matters relating to protocol, attended to reports and appeals of the Mongol chiefs submitted through the Commissioners or Protectors-Generals, and also served to execute, through the same channels, the orders of the central government with respect to Mongolian administration.[1] The High Commissioner for Outer Mongolia wielded substantial control in all important matters. But in all other matters, the Outer Mongolian, as well as the Inner Mongolian, leagues and banners enjoyed a large measure of local self-government. The league, in turn, only served as an organ to discuss and

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[1] The Chinese Year Book, 1943, p. 223.

reconcile the differences among the many banners, and its conferences were held only at a certain interval. The real unit of self-government was then the banner. Thus, by dividing the Mongols into more than 200 small units, each with its parochial interests, the Manchu Court was almost assured of Mongol impotence.

Secondly, segregation of the Mongols from the Chinese. The Manchu Court was full aware that the Chinese colonization, if allowed, would irritate and alienate the Mongols, and that the Mongols would become less tractable once they were elevated by the Chinese culture. So, as soon as the Dynasty was established, it prohibited intermarriage between the Chinese and the Mongols, and the use of Chinese name and language by the Mongols. Those who taught Chinese language to Mongols were even declared liable to severe punishment. In the Imperial edict issued in 1683, the Decrees of Li Fan Yuan issued in 1762, and the Code of Tsiatsin of 1801, it was repeatedly and emphatically declared that the Chinese were forbidden to reclaim Mongol land at the expense of Mongol livelihood, and penalties were also prescribed for violation of this rule and for lax enforcement by civil officials. All Chinese merchants desiring to trade in Mongolia were required to secure the permission of the Li Fan Yuan first, then undergo investigations, and the term of residence in Mongolia was restricted to not longer than one

year. The Mongols, of course felt flattered.

Thirdly, leniency toward the Mongol princes. In contrast with the stern treatment received enjoyed by the Chinese, the Mongols were always accorded special and favorable terms. Titles of honor were liberally distributed among the hereditary princes of Mongolia. There were in all six grades of such high honorable titles -- Duke, Count, Beilei, Beitze, Chenkuokung and Fukuokung. Besides, there was also the lower title labelled Taichi, which was again classed into four grades. These princes were now and then called to the Imperial audience at Peking, and large amount of gifts, including stately residence, were freely awarded. In addition, the Manchus also sought to utilize matrimonial ties to keep the Mongols in hold. For instance, during the Ching Dynasty, three Mongol women from the Middle Banner of the Left Wing of the Kershin League in Manchuria were selected as Queens of the Manchu Emperors. Five princesses from the Manchu royal family were married to princes of this Banner. Other Manchu females of noble birth, who became wives of the Mongol dignitaries, might be counted in thousands. As Emperor Kangsi testified himself, "Our Dynasty, by giving lenient treatment to the Khalkas and so making them defenders of the Empire, is actually building up a bulwark even stronger than the Great Wall."[1]

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[1] Inaba Kimiyama, *Shin Chow Zen Shih*, (History of the Ching Dynasty), ch. 45.

Fourthly, promotion of Lamaism. Lamaism had been adopted by Kublai Khan and later introduced into Mongolia in 1576 in the Ming Dynasty, but it did not prosper until the advent of the Manchu rule.[1] The Manchu Emperors, with a view to reducing the Mongols into a docile people by means of religion, advocated with furore the faith of Lamaistic Buddhism. In the reign of Kangsi, the Hutukhtu, or Living Buddha, of Mongolia was welcomed to Peking every year to preach and to receive Imperial entertainment. In 1727, 100,000 taels of silver bullion were appropriated for the

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[1] Lamaism is a form of Buddhism ~~believed~~ followed chiefly by peoples of Tibet and Mongolia. In Tibet, Buddhism was introduced from India in the 7th century. In the course of time it emerged into the Red Sect, which flourished in the Yuan Dynasty; but it soon underwent a period of decline through its association with mysticism and black magic. Under the Ming Dynasty, a saint named Zunkava instituted the order of lamas known as the Yellow Sect and restored the original faith. In addition to the Red and the Yellow Sects, there are the Black and the White Sects, but the Yellow Sect is the most popular and powerful in both Tibet and Mongolia. The first lamas of this Sect after Zunkava were the Dalai Lama, the Panchan Lama and the Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu, who formed the trinity of lama saints. By means of reincarnations, they are said to have existed up to the present. When the last-mentioned Hutukhtu was reincarnated in Mongolia and later went to live at Urga, the influence of the Yellow Sect became all the more far-reaching in Mongolia. These lama leaders are worshipped as deities, so much so that whenever and wherever they pass by, the people always kowtow or lie prone on the ground to pay their obeisance.

The Dalai Lama is the spiritual head of Tibet and next to him is the Panchan Lama, although in religious ranking they are equals. In temporal affairs they are also supreme. The Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu formerly had the same status in Mongolia as the Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama in Tibet. But since the death of the last Hutukhtu in 1924, the succession has been ended by the Mongol revolutionaries, vide infra.

construction of a grandiose lamasery at Urga, ~~and other places~~. Other measures were also taken to exalt the system of Mongol worship. This policy of the Manchus was so successful that prior to 1911 from one half to one third of the Mongol male population used to enter the orders of the Lamaistic churches and were celibate. While the once robust and powerful Mongols were sunk in their religious devotion, naturally their martial spirit tapered out. This is the reason why some writers have ascribed the present Mongol degeneracy to this religious factor.

But, as the Manchu Dynasty declined in power and the Russian and Japanese influence in Mongolia was deeply felt, a reorientation of this policy was seriously considered in the governmental circles. Thus, early in 1897, the Governor of Shansi first made the proposal of reclaiming the Mongol land. In 1901, reconsideration of the Mongol policy was urged by a group of important officials. In 1902, the Manchu Court formally opened the Mongol door to Chinese settlers. Moreover an Imperial Commissioner was sent to organize and direct such settlements. From 1903 on, many Mongol-inhabited regions were reorganized into *hsiens*, or counties, and incorporated into the neighboring provinces. In 1906, the former Li Fan Yuan was raised to the status of a Ministry, with the aim of inaugurating large-scale, systematic colonization in Mongolia. In 1910, all the decrees, regulations, etc., previously promulgated against Chinese reclamation of Mongol land, inter-

marriage between the Chinese and the Mongols, and use of Chinese language were all abrogated. As a result, a huge number of Chinese agriculturalists flooded in, especially the fertile areas in Inner Mongolia and the Mongol portion of Manchuria. This was already enough to leave the Mongols panic-stricken. Furthermore, the Manchu Court had also shown ~~him~~ it self less considerate towards the Mongols. For instance, the political power of Hutukhtu had been taken away early in 1754; in 1824, during the reign of Emperor Taokwang, even an Imperial audience was denied the Hutukhtu. When in 1910 the Dalai Lama of Tibet was deprived of all his titles and honors on charge of complicity with the British, the Mongols, who were also communicating with Russia, were all apprehensive that they would be the next victims. Thus, during the last years of the Ching Dynasty, the Mongols were already gravitating farther and farther away from China, leaving the Manchus' hold on them quite shaken. Being in desperation, they sought Russia's help; and this act ushered in a long period of hatred and strifes. However unwise their tactics might have been, their grievances were indeed real.

PART TWO

RUSSIA AND JAPAN ENTERED THE MONGOLIAN PICTURE

CHAPTER III

RUSSIAN INFILTRATION INTO OUTER MONGOLIA

I. Early Sino-Russian Relations

Although Russia and China had been brought into contact with each other as early as the 13th century by the Mongol conquest, yet with the end of the ephemeral Mongol Empire such contacts became almost non-existent. It was not until the 17th century that they again met each other on the Amur River in Manchuria, not as friends, but as rivals. Roughly speaking, the early Sino-Russian conflicts began when the Russians were just in the heat of their Siberian expansion,[1] and when the Manchu Dynasty of China was at the apex of its power.

In 1643 the Russian *voevoda* (governor) at Yakutsk fitted out an expedition to the banks of the Shilka River, which failed to subdue the natives to Russian control, but was able to discover the fabulous wealth of the land.[2] In 1~~5~~650, a Russian named Kharbarov, with the aid of the *voevoda*, set out on his explorations to the Amur region, built the fortress of Albasin (Yaksa); but at last his advance was ~~put~~ brought to a halt by Chinese troops.[3] A third expedition was launched in 1654

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[1] For accounts of Russian expansion in Siberia, see M. P. Price, "*Siberia*"; Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "*Russia and Asia*; E. J. Harrison, "*Peace or War East of Baikal*"; F. A. Golder, "*Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850*; and Vladimir, "*Russia on the Pacific.*"

[2] F. A. Golder, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-37.

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 43-51; Vladimir, *op. cit.*, p. 111.


ARCTIC OCEAN
SPITZBERGEN
BARENTS SEA
NOVA ZEMBLA
KARA SEA
KARA STRAIT
Kolguev I.
C.Kanin
Varanger Fiord
GULF OF OB OR OBI
C.Sterligov
C.Chelyuskin
C.Stuxberg
C.Verklarungs
LIAKOV ISLANDS OR NEW SIBERIA
Delta of the Lena
Wrangell I.
East Cape
BERING STRAIT
C.Novarin
BERING SEA
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
C.Lopaka
KAMCHATKA
SEA OF OKHOTSK
SAKHALIN I.
SIBERIA
RUSSIA
EUROPE
Tornea
Uleaborg
Vasa
Abo
Kem
WHITE SEA
Onega
L.Onega
ARCHANGEL
Mezen
Pustosersk
Obdorsk
Berezov
Surgut
Tobolsk
Omsk
Narym
Tomsk
Turukhansk
Dudinsk
Borodino
Khatangsk
Khatanga R.
Anabara R.
Olenek R.
Lena R.
Bulun
Allaika
Kresty
Verkhoiansk
Jigansk
Yakutsk
Yamsk
Okhotsk
Udskoi
Nikolaevsk
Amur R.
Yeniseisk
Yenisei R.
Ob R.
Irkutsk
BAIKAL LAKE
Statensk
Sergiopol
L.BALKASH
Ural Mts.
Ural R.
Volga R.
Perm
Orenburg
Saratov
Astrakhan
ARAL SEA
Turkestan
Tashkend
KHIVA
Krsnovodsk
BOKHARA
CASPIAN SEA
Baku
Batum
Azov
St.PETERSBURG
Novgorod
MOSCOW
Vilna
Kaluga
Kursk
Kiev
Revel
Riga
Warsaw
AUSTRIA HUNGARY
Odessa
BLACK SEA
CONSTANTINOPLE
TURKEY
Smyrna
ATHENS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
AFRICA
RED SEA
ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF
ARABIAN SEA
PERSIA
TEHERAN
Bushire
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Calcutta
Himalaya Mts.
Nepal
Bhotan
CHINESE EMPIRE
Urumtsi
Lan-chou
PEKIN
Shanghai
Canton
Hongkong
MANCHURIA
PORT ARTHUR
Yalu R.
COREA
YELLOW SEA
VLADIVOSTOK
JAPAN SEA
YEZO
HONDO
TOKYO
KIUSHIU
EMPIRE OF JAPAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
10TH CENTURY.
10TH TO 13TH CENTURY.
13TH CENTURY TO 1648.
1648 TO 1809.
AFTER 1809.
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HISTORIC RUSSIAN ADVANCE

under the leadership of Stepanov, and again resulted in total defeat in the face of Chinese power.[1] So by 1660 the Amur region was already clear of Russians as far as Nerchinsk, the base founded by Stepanov in 1654.

The Russians, in spite of their initial setbacks, did not relax their efforts in search of land and wealth. Thus from 1683 on a series of skirmishings were recorded, with the routed Russians ever coming back in the wake of the withdrawing Chinese troops. Infuriated by such constant forays, the Chinese Government at Peking decided upon a large-scale punitive campaign against the Russian freebooters. The invaders stampeded away, and the Russian fortress Albazin was besieged. While the siege was under way, a deputation came from St. Petersburg requesting, in the name of the Czar, the Chinese Emperor to stay the siege. The request was granted, and an Imperial rescript was issued ordering that,

> "We had no intention of organizing a massacre; our desire was to let them off easily. Sabsu and his colleagues are hereby ordered to withdraw their troops from before Yaksa....He can at the same time notify the Russians inside the town that they are free to pass in and out, but must not commit any depredations. The rest can stand over until the

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[1] Vladimir, op. cit., pp. 127-129.

Russian envoys arrive."[1]

To bring back peace between the two neighbors, Nerchinsk was designated by the Chinese Emperor as the place of a conference. The resultant Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed on September 9, 1689, contained provisions overwhelmingly in favor of China, and was since then regarded by the Russians as a humiliating unequal treaty.[2]

In 1727 a Russian mission was dispatched by Empress Catherine to China for the purpose of adjusting many frontier and commercial matters, and finally succeeded in concluding the Treaty of Kiakhta on August 27 of the same year.[3] Russian trading caravans were permitted to come to Peking once every three years, and Russian young eleves might also study in China. Thus, from 1689 until the middle of the 19th Century, China and Russia were getting along on very amicable terms, with the former ever on the ascendancy.

However, the peaceful relations did not last long. In 1847 the Czar, Nicholas I, appointed the aggressive Muravev to the governorship of Eastern Siberia and invested him with

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1. E. H. Parker, "China and Russia," *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 3 ser., vol. 11, July 1896, p. 18. For an account of this war, see "*Ping Ting Lo Sha Fang Lueh*," an official record of the Chinese Government.
2. For text of the Treaty, see Sir Edward Hertslet, "*Treaties between Great Britain and China, & Foreign Powers*," vol. I, p. 437 ff.
3. For text of the Treaty, see *ibid*, vol. I, p. 439.

unrestrained viceregal powers. No sooner had the young, intrepid governor taken his office than he proceeded to establish a settlement at the mouth of the Amur River, which he christened Nikolavsk in honor of the Czar.[1] The years of 1850-1858 saw a series of expeditions sent down the Amur River over the Chinese protests; and during the Crimean War he even ordered the occupation of many points along the River on the pretext of self-defense against the Anglo-French naval attack from the Pacific. At this time China had her hands full with the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, and was also smarting in the throes of her war with Britain and France, that little attention could be diverted to the events along her northern frontiers. Muravev, taking advantage of this golden opportunity, was then able to force the Chinese Government to sign the Treaty of Aigun on May 16, 1858, by which a vast territory on the left bank of the Amur River was recognised as Russian.[2] Again in 1860, when a second war between China and the Anglo-French Allies broke out, the Russian Minister at Peking, posing as the friend of the Manchu Dynasty, offered his service as broker to get the

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[1] Apprehension was expressed by the Czarist Government at St. Petersburg that this act might offend the Chinese. But the Czar gave his indorsement to the governor saying that "Once the Russian flag has been hoisted, it must not be lowered." Prince, A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 138.

[2] For text of the Treaty, see Hertslet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 454 ff.

Allied troops out. After the evacuation was effected, Russia came forward for reward. The reward was the Treaty of Peking of November 14, 1860, which provided for the cession to Russia of the territory east of the Ussuri River, later carved out into the present maritime provinces of Siberia. With the conclusion of the Treaties of Aigun and Peking, the former relative positions in Sino-Russian relations were reversed. Henceforth, we shall see an era of Russian supremacy over China.

After reviewing the early relations between China and Russia, it should be noted that during the period the Russians were primarily absorbed in their expansion in Siberia and Manchuria. It was not until they had met with a fatal blow at the hands of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, that Mongolia became an object of their active empire-building career.

II. The Beginning of Russo-Mongolian Intimacy

The intercourse between the Mongols and their Russian neighbors had been increasingly frequent since the advent of the Manchu Dynasty. Most of the Russian embassies to Peking came by way of Mongolia. Russian caravans coming to Peking under the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1727 had also to pass through the Mongol territory. Since the transference of this trade from Peking to the frontier towns of Maimaichen and Kiakhta in 1737, the Russo-Mongol contact became even closer. However, owing to the strict regulations on trans-frontier

traffic, passports, and extradition, the Russians still could not easily infiltrate into the interior of Mongolia at that time.

In spite of China's temporary success to maintain her close-door policy in Mongolia, the fact that as time wore on the Mongols were drawn nearer and nearer the Russians cannot be gainsaid. To account for the rise of such Russo-Mongol intimacy, two major factors have to be considered:

First, economically Outer Mongolia and Siberia were interdependent upon each other. Outer Mongolia alone could supply sufficient meat, wool, skins, etc., to feed and clothe the Siberians; and Siberia was almost the only convenient and profitable market for the Mongolian products. On the other hand, Siberia was also the most desirable source wherefrom the Mongols could import powder, lead, metal products, textile goods and footwear without having to pay an exorbitant price. This economic tie has drawn these two peoples ever nearer each other.

Secondly, since the introduction of Lamaism into the Mongol life, the Mongols had been transformed from a horde of fierce, sturdy warriors into a morbid mass of inactivity and negativeness. When the Mongols were sinking in their degeneracy, the Russians were relatively coming into the ascendancy. Cognizant of their weakness, these Lamaists were naturally more prone to turn to the nearby Russia for protection, rather

than to China, with which the 200,000 square miles of the desolate Gobi Desert was too insuperable to warrant dependable association. Thus, the Khalkas, after being defeated by the Oleots in 1689 (vide supra), had planned to surrender their remaining land to Russia in return for the latter's protection against their adversaries. This proposal was turned down by the Hutukhtu only on the ground that Russia was not a Buddhist country; and only after this proposal was thus turned down did the Kalkhas come to China for aid.

With the way to the Russo-Mongol intimacy thus prepared, it is natural that Russia loomed larger and larger in the eyes of the Mongols. Some examples may be cited here. At the close of the 17th century, the worship of a certain female divinity named Tsagan-Dara-Ekhe, or the White Khan, was in great vogue among the Mongols. In the meantime, Russia, under Empress Catherine II, was at the zenith of her power. So the contemplative denizens of the Mongol monasteries proclaimed Catherine II an incarnation of the goddess Tsagan-Dara-Ekhe, and in virtue of this heavenly distinction, she was duly worshipped by the Mongols. After the death of the Empress, the epithet "white" continued to be used to her successors, as incarnations of the same goddess, from whom they expected life-giving succor.[1] And again in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese

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[1] E. J. Dillon, "The Chinese Pale of Settlement", The English Review, vol. 13, Jan., 1913, pp. 289-290.

War, the Mongols also applied to the Russian Consul at Urga "for advice and protection."[1] Finally, as we shall have occasion to see, the Mongols invariably aligned themselves with the Russians in the former's revolutionary days of 1910-1911 and 1920-1924.

III. Russia's Ambition in Outer Mongolia

Mongolia had been coveted by Russia since the middle of the 18th century, when Muravev, after his successful campaign on the Amur, turned to Mongolia as the next goal of his ambition. For this purpose he sent in 1852 a clever diplomat in the person of Despot Zenovitch to induce the Mongols to rebel against the Chinese authorities. Despot Zenovitch, in an interview with some of the Mongol princes, predicted the downfall of the Manchu Empire, and in such an event, he said to them, Mongolia should form four separate principalities with their own rulers, whom Russia would promise to support. Asked by the Lamas and the princes whether his views were those of the Governor-General, Zenovitch replied,

> "Everything I have been charged to tell you I have transmitted, without adding or curtailing anything, ...The Russian Government will never allow the Chinese to rule Manchuria and Mongolia. Look to Russia. She is your hope."

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[1] Gerard M. Friters, "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence," Pacific Affairs, vol. 10, p. 168.

In 1864, when China was still caught in the scourge of the Taiping Rebellion, the Mohammedans of Chinese Turkestan rose in revolt against the Manchus and succeeded in 1866 to establish an independent Mohammedan government under the leadership of Yakub Beg. Russia, apprehensive that her trade route through this region to China would be cut off, sent troops to the Ili valley on the border between Chinese Turkestan and Russian Central Asia in 1871, assuring the Chinese Government that as soon as the Moslem rebellion was quelled, she would evacuate immediately. By 1878, General Tso Tsung-tang, after one of the most remarkable military exploits in the history of China, had succeeded in stamping out the revolt, and brought the disaffected region back under Chinese control. With a view to effecting the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ili, the Peking Government, upon the request of Russian minister, sent an envoy to St. Petersburg to negotiate the matter. The parley was a protracted and checkered one. It was not until February 1881 that a settlement was finally agreed upon.[1] In addition to clauses providing for Russia's evacuation of the Ili region, and the payment of 9,000,000 metallic rubles by China to defray the costs of Russia's temporary occupation, the Treaty contained many other provisions relating to Mongolia. To sum up, Russia secured the following rights:

1. Russia might appoint consuls to reside in Mongolia;

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[1] For text of the Treaty, see Hertslet, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 486 ff.

2. These consuls would have jurisdiction jointly with the Chinese authorities over all questions arising on Chinese territory with regard to commercial or other matters between the subjects of the two countries;

3. Russian merchants were permitted to buy ground and build for themselves houses and shops and warehouses in cities where Russian consulates should be established;

4. In addition, a zone was established along the frontier between the two countries, 50 versts (100 li) wide on each side of the boundary -- that is, a zone altogether 100 versts or about 66 miles in width -- within which all imports and exports to or from either country were to be entirely free of duty.[1]

Thus, Russia at last knocked open the Mongolian door and secured a legal sanction for her subsequent infiltration. Indeed, this has long been the stereotyped process of modern imperialism, -- first to secure some commercial privileges,

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[1] See Art. I of the "Regulations on Trade by Land" annexed to the Treaty. On September 17, 1912, Russia announced that in order to meet China's wishes expressed in August, 1911, the zone of free trade on the Russian side of the frontier was to be abolished as from January 1, 1913. It was not until May 6, 1914 that a notice was issued by the Maritime Customs of China declaring that the free trade zone on the Chinese side would be abolished as from June 1 of that year. E. T. Williams, "The Relations between China, Russia and Mongolia," American Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 1916, p. 803.

and then use these business interests to further political designs. The same formulae was duly applied to Mongolia.

On April 28, 1899, when the scramble of the Great Powers for concessions in China was just ~~in~~ at its ~~best~~ height, Russia and Great Britain arrived at an agreement by an exchange of identic notes with regard to railway interests in China.[1] It was agreed that,

"1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

"2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtse, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in the region supported by the British Government."

It can readily be understood that the area "to the north of the Great Wall of China" refers to Mongolia as well as Manchuria. This Anglo-Russian deal is significant in that it was the first step taken by Russia to accomplish her design by means of reconciliation and cooperation with other

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[1] J.V.A. MacMurray, "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919," vol. I, p. 204.

potential contenders.

On June 1, 1899, the Tsung Li Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office), under strong Russian pressure, addressed a note to the Russian Minister at Peking in regard to the construction of railways northward and northeastward from Peking, an excerpt of which is given below:

> "We now wish to reiterate in the plainest terms that China agrees that if railways are in future built from Peking to the north or to the northeast towards the Russian border, China reserves the right to construct such roads with Chinese capital and under Chinese supervision, but if it is proposed to have such construction undertaken by any other nation, the proposal shall be first made to the Russian Government or to the Russian syndicate to construct the railway, and on no consideration will any other Government of a syndicate of any other nationality be allowed to construct the railway."[1]

On June 17, 1899, the Russian Minister replied,

> "....The assurances of the Chinese Government have been respectfully noted. While the Russian Government will not at once ask for the construction of a road connecting the main line of the Manchurian

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[1] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Outer Mongolia, Treaties and Agreements," pamphlet No. 41, p. 15.

> Railway with Peking, the demand of Russia for the construction of this road was based on the responsibility assumed by the Chinese Government in its note of the thirteenth day of the sixth moon of last year (July 31, 1898), which is direct and incontrovertible, the failure to fulfil which involves an indemnity. This responsibility cannot therefore be allowed to lapse."[1]

Although the above notes were concerned mainly with the construction of the Manchurian Railway, yet Russia's ambition to reserve to herself privileges of constructing railways in Mongolia is also self-evident.

Again, in 1900 the Boxer Rebellion of China presented an opportunity to Russia. Taking advantage of China's internal chaos Russian troops quickly occupied the whole of the three Manchurian provinces. In the course of subsequent negotiations for Russia's evacuation in 1901, she posed a series of claims, among which the following were related to Mongolia,

1. Non-employment of subjects of other powers in the military and naval services in Northern China, -- naturally including Mongolia;

2. Withholding from other powers and their subjects, pending Russia's consent, of privileges with regard to mines,

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[1] Ibid, pp. 15-16.

railways or other matters in regions co-terminous with Russia such as Mongolia and several sections of Chinese Turkestan;

3. Non-construction of any railway by China herself in the same regions as mentioned in 2, without consulting Russia.[1] Later, as a result of China's refusal to agree, Russia softened her claims -- 1 was dropped, 2 and 3 were to be confined to Manchuria. At last the Convention of April 8, 1902 was signed,[2] by which she agreed to evacuate Manchuria in three periods of six months each. Yet, in April 1903, when the second stage of evacuation was due to end, Russia again presented seven demands as a *sine qua non* for further withdrawal. Among them two are concerned with Mongolia,

1. The existing administrative system in Mongolia was not to be altered;

2. Foreigners other than Russians were not to be employed in administrative matters in Manchuria and Mongolia.[3]

After the rejection of these demands by China the negotiations dragged on without any conclusions being reached, until before long they were abruptly interrupted by the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

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[1] *British Parliamentary Papers*, China, No. 6 (1901), p. 110; cf, Hsu Shuhsi, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-249.
[2] MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 362.
[3] Hsu Shuhsi, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-262.

Another tool at the service of the Russian machinators was the Russo-Chinese Bank[1] established according to the Russo-Chinese Secret Treaty of 1896, known as the Li-Lobanov Treaty, for the purpose of financing the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Even before the Bank got through seeing the Manchurian railway completed, it turned its attention to Mongolia. A branch of the Bank was established at Urga, under the management of a certain Mr. Grot. He succeeded in securing, on behalf of the Bank, the Peking Government's grant to exploit the Mongolian gold mines.[2] And in order to pacify the Mongol opposition, he offered the Hutukhtu a *douceur* of 15,000 roubles, and also judiciously distributed 100,000 roubles among the wretchedly impoverished Mongol noblemen. In this fashion money worked wonders: not only the opposition to gold-mining died down, but four squadrons of Buriat Mongols of the Siberian army were sent to Urga, under the pretext of protecting the Russian Consulate, without being greeted by Mongol resistance.[3]

Except exacting, or trying to exact the above-mentioned concessions from China, Russia took no other notable official steps to infiltrate into Mongolia until 1907.[4] The reason

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1. Later the Russo-Asiatic Bank.
2. The Russian concern undertaking the gold-mining enterprise was called Mongolor, organized in 1900.
3. George Lynch, "*The Path of Empire*," pp. 144-151; Wang Chinyu, "*Mong Ku Wen Ti*" (The Mongol Problem), p.44.
4. Franz Michael, "The Background of the Fight for Mongolia," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 152, 1937, p. 317.

may readily be explained. Russia was deeply involved in her European embroilments; the antagonism of Great Britain and Austria was too grave a situation to be discarded. In the Far East she was also too busied in Manchuria. As a Chinese writer remarked,

> "During the fifty years from the middle of the 19th century down to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was not too positive about her Mongolian expansion, because she was then too deeply absorbed in her Siberian exploitation, her Manchurian and Korean expansion, and her efforts to build up a strong Pacific fleet, to give much thought to Mongolia."[1]

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[1] Yen Shu-tang, "Problems in Russo-Chinese Negotiations," Tai Ping Yang (The Pacific Ocean), vol. 4, No. 7.

CHAPTER IV

JAPANESE DESIGN ON MONGOLIA

I. Early Sino-Japanese Relations

The history of Japan was not dependably recorded until A.D. 461, the record prior to that year being indistinguishable from mythology and legends, and, thus, untrustworthy. According to the Japanese annals the government of Japan was represented as a monarchy inherent in one family of divine descent -- from the Goddess of Sun. Yet, with irregular succession, and subject to frequent usurpation, the royal family was not powerful enough to build up a strong nation. During the period of from A.D. 400-500, Japan came into close contact with Korea. The Japanese chronicles contain many admissions that Japan learned from Korea various arts of life during this period; and we have reason to believe that this is the beginning of Japan's contact with and acceptance of the Chinese civilization, for Korea had long been an outpost of the Chinese Empire, and owed its civilization to China. In A.D. 607 a Japanese envoy was sent to the Chinese Emperor Yang-Ti, of the Sui Dynasty, and next year a return mission sailed to the Japanese islands. However, prior to the period of the Mongol Empire, Japan remained isolated from the outside world, including China, despite the occasional exchange of good-will missions. The Chinese people knew very little of

these still uncivilized islanders.

Once having been blessed with Chinese civilization, the Japanese embarked upon their invasion of Korea. Their frequent interference in Korean internal matters had led to perennial discord and fightings between Japan and China in the last part of the 7th century, with the Japanese invaders ever being badly beaten and driven back to their homelands.[1]

On the part of China, the task of subjugating Japan was also given frequent and serious consideration by her rulers. But Nature and Fortune seemed both in favor of Japan. The sea which separates Japan from the Asiatic mainland provided a natural protection to the Japanese in those days when the art of navigation was still lingering in its primitive stage. Therefore, up to the rising of the Mongol Empire, practically no great ruler of China had been able to bring Japan to submission. In the 13th century the Yuan Dynasty, after having subdued China and Korea, came into contact with Japan, and Kublai Khan, spurred by his hankering to add these eastern islands to his domain, made preparations for a further conquest. In 1268 he sent a letter to the Japanese ruler, beginning with "The Imperial Huang Ti (which in Chinese means Emperor, or King of Kings) of China to the Wang (which means King) of Japan." In the same letter he pointed out what had happened in Korea and asked that a Japanese mission be sent

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[1] N. Yumada Chenoko, "The Mongol Invasion of Japan," chapter on China and Korea.

to China to pay their tribute to the Mongol Court. To this overbearing note Japan made no reply. So in 1274 an expedition was launched, but the Mongols' attempts at landing were successfully repulsed by the Japanese. In 1281 Kublai Khan decided to despatch a large chastising expedition to Japan. But, Nature came to Japan's rescue, for a violent typhoon destroyed Kublai's entire armada of 4,000 ships, which meant the total fiasco of the Mongol seagoing expansion. Since then no single country in the world has been able to conquer the ~~infinitesimal~~ little kingdom of Japan.

The effect of the Mongol expedition upon the Japanese psychology is significant. At the critical hours of Japan's national life, a wave of patriotism swept over the whole country, and through all strata of her feudal society. When the crises had been tided over, the Japanese became conscious of the unpopularity and inefficiency of the Government of Kamakara, and consequently the old evil of independent fiefs, large and small, was revived with the many local aristocrats bent upon strengthening their own power in preparation for defense against future foreign encroachment. What is more important, the Japanese people, encouraged by their feat of resisting the Mongols and spurred by their injured national pride, have ever since regarded the conquest of China as their first aim of expansion. Therefore, in the subsequent centuries, the Japanese ~~became~~ remained a constant pestilence menace to China.

Perennial attacks upon cities along the China Coast, accompanied by maraudings, burnings, and massacres, were recorded year in and year out. In 1542 they tried to invade the Middle Kingdom by the way of Korea. But China was then still powerful enough to smash them back.[1]

During the 17th and 18th centuries the relations between these two countries were marked by long friendliness, except for spasmodic minor frictions on the seas. Culturally, Japan was virtually converted into a vassal of the Chinese civilization. But politically she remained insulated from the outside world. It was not until 1853-1854 that Japan was opened to the Western World, and began to go through a process of westernization. It was not until 1894-1895 that Japan scored her first victory over China and stood out as a potential contestant on the world arena.

II. Japan's Ambition in Mongolia

To understand the Japanese design on Mongolia we have to trace back through a long period of history. But for the purpose of the present study a brief sketch will suffice. In the 16th century when Japanese pirates were constantly infesting the China Coast, one General Hideyoshi, sometimes referred to as the Napoleon of Japan, had laid out a plan for the conquest of China, in which Inner Mongolia and Formosa were listed as goals of his expansion. Again, in the Treaty

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[1] Boulger, "History of China," vol. III, p. 95.

of Shimonoseki, 1895, which ended the Sino-Japanese War, Article II reads:[1]

> "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon: -
>
> (a) The Southern portion of the province of Fengtien within the following boundaries --
> The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the Yalu River and ascends that stream to the mouth of the An Ping River; from thence the line runs to Fen-Huang; from thence to Haicheng; from thence to Ying-Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the Liao River at Ying-Kow, it follows the course of that stream to its mouth where it terminates. The mid-channel of the Liao River shall be taken as the line of demarcation."[2]

Here we must note that the distance between the mouth of the Liao River and Inner Mongolia is not much farther than that from Peking to Mukden, some 400 miles. One of Japan's desires was to exercise a sort of peaceful penetration into Inner Mongolia by the water route of the Liao River. Apparently

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[1] This Article demarcates the territory of the Liaotung Peninsula to be ceded to Japan.

[2] W. W. Rockhill, "Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea," Shimonoseki Treaty, 1895; also see MacMurray, op. cit., vol. I, Shimonoseki Treaty.

it was for this purpose that the mid-channel of the Liao River was made the line of demarcation. But, unfortunate to Japan's scheme, under the joint pressure of France, Germany and Russia, she was forced to retrocede this Liaotung Peninsula to China soon afterwards.

Between 1907 and 1916 Japan signed a series of treaties and conventions, public and secret, with Russia in their conspiracy on Mongolia. These agreements are so important that they deserve more detailed treatment in the following chapter.

For another evidence of Japan's ambition of seizing Mongolia, we have to turn to the obnoxious Twenty-One Demands of 1915. The articles of Group II of these Demands reveal Japan's ambition in Mongolia so vividly that they should be quoted in extenso:

For economic exploitation:

> "Article 3 - Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and trade in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever."
>
> "Article 4 - The Chinese Government agrees to grant Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia."

For territorial expansion:

> "Article 2 - Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the

> right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming."

For paramount influence:

> "Article 5 - The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below, the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:
>
> (a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia;
>
> (b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security."
>
> "Article 6 - The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted."[1]

Finally, in 1927 Baron Giichi Tanaka presented his

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[1] M. J. Bau, "The Foreign Relations of China," pp. 257-260.

famous Memorial to the Japanese Emperor, which formed the backbone of Japan's aggressive policy during the later period. In regard to Mongolia one of the passages runs,

> "Our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia...The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretense of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia."[1]

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[1] Carl Crow, "Japan's Dream of World Empire: The Tanaka Memorial," pp. 32-33.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

I. The Background of the Russo-Japanese Rapprochement

The *Realpolitik* of the imperialist empire-builders would be mere child's play, if they followed a way devious from that beaten by Machiavelli. This Florentine statesman was by no means alien to the Russian and Japanese leaders. Bearing this in mind we shall not be surprised by the fruition of the Russo-Japanese *rapprochement* in 1907-1916. This *rapprochement* was, indeed, a *memento mori* to the Chinese nation. If it had not been for the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, this *memento mori* would surely have been made good and the corpus of China as a nation would have long been exhibited in the international mortuary.

Although the *Rapprochement* was commonly admitted as a child born of the Russo-Japanese War, yet it had been long in embryo even before the war. In both countries, while the more militant elements were preaching the blessings of conquest with a crusader's zeal, reason also appealed to not a few sober-minded people who saw the wisdom of compromise.

First, we may notice some individual, though unorganized, efforts on both sides. On the side of Russia, Baron Rosen, Russian Minister to Japan in 1897-1900, prepared for Count Muravev, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, a memorandum

warning against the danger of alienating Japan, which Muravev indorsed and presented to the Czar. The upshot is that the Russian War Department's plan for the organization of a Korean army under Russian leadership was abandoned.[1] Alexander Iswolsky, Rosen's successor since 1900, also entered in his Memoirs that,

> "My efforts in that (conciliatory) direction had resulted in the mission to Europe of that distinguished statesman, Marquis Ito, with the object of attempting a rapprochement between Russia and Japan."[2]

On the side of Japan, similar efforts were also essayed. Baron Nishi, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Motono, Japanese Chargé d'Affaires under Nishi, were both advocates of a Russo-Japanese understanding. Marquis Ito, when going to Europe in 1901, was with the aim of negotiating a treaty with Russia, as recorded by Iswolsky.

Secondly, the Russo-Japanese war contributed immeasurably to the fruition of the rapprochement. Witte, the foe of the concessionaires, and Rosen, the old friend of Japan, were named to sit at the peace table on Russia's behalf. Their compromising attitude was already discernible in the Portsmouth Conference. After Portsmouth, there arose in both

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[1] E. B. Price, "The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia," p. 18.

[2] Alexander Iswolsky, "Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky," pp. 4-5.

countries a strong conciliatory sentiment. In Russia, a small group of public opinion led by Stolypin was in favor of forming an entente with China against Japan. However, the majority of Russian people were in favor of a rapprochement with Japan on the ground that from a realistic point of view, it would be suicidal to cast in their lot with the weak rather than with the strong. Sazonov, then Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, well expressed such feeling when he remarked, "If we proceed in agreement with Japan, we shall be able to reckon all the sooner upon the fulfillment of our wishes (in China)." On the part of Japan, the awareness that by cooperation with Russia she had practically everything to gain and nothing to lose, at least in the near future, brought about a more chastened spirit. Furthermore, with some proponents of Russo-Japanese friendship in power, e.g., Prince Saionji as Premier, Hayashi as Foreign Minister, and Motono as Minister to Russia, the human material for presenting a conciliatory Japan was already prepared.

Thus, the foundation of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement was laid. Having tasted the bitter pill of war, through defeat in the case of Russia, and through physical exhaustion in the case of Japan, the two former sworn foes suddenly became strange bedfellows. Instead of sticking to the extremes, they moved to meet each other halfway.

II. The First Step -- The Russo-Japanese Conventions of 1907

With desire of cooperation present on both sides, it took just a step to have formal negotiations commenced. The occasion was found set in the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which provided for the conclusion of further treaties concerning commerce and navigation, on fisheries, etc. From June 13 to July 30, 1907, Russia and Japan, with the help of France, signed a series of treaties.[1] Of these, two were of political nature; one made public, the other kept secret.

The public convention was signed on July 30, 1907, by which they agreed, _inter alia_,

1. To respect all the rights accruing to one and the other party from the treaties, conventions and contracts in force between them and China, as well as from the _special conventions_ concluded between Japan and Russia;

2. To sustain and defend the maintenance of the _status quo_ and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach.[2]

This convention, as the other non-political conventions contains in itself nothing too sinister, except, probably, the

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[1] Besides those cited in the text, other treaties signed were a convention concerning the junction of the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria (June 13, 1907), a treaty of commerce and navigation, and a fisheries convention (July 28, 1907).

[2] For text of the Convention, see MacMurray, _op. cit._, vol. I, pp. 657 ff.

reference to the so-called "special conventions," and the uncertain meaning of the term "*status quo.*" The real sinister thing is a separate secret convention, which is germane to our present study.

The secret convention was signed at the same day as the public one. The preamble thereof defines the objective of the rapprochement as

> "To obviate for the future all causes of friction or misunderstanding with respect to certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia."

With regard to Mongolia Article III provided that

> "The Imperial Government of Japan, recognising the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests."

Thus, by this *coup de maître,* the first bargain was consummated. Here we should notice that, except the separation of South Manchuria from North Manchuria by Article I, and the Additional Article attached to the same Convention in which a demarcation line was drawn in detail, another division was made by the absence of any mentioning of Inner Mongolia in the Convention, because while Russia was specifically allowed a free hand in Outer Mongolia, Japan had obviously the understanding that Inner Mongolia would be reserved to herself.

III. The Second Step -- The Russo-Japanese Conventions of 1910

The second step was precipitated by the proposal of the American Secretary of State Knox in regard to the neutralization of Manchurian railways. The two countries, coalesced against the American tampering, signed two conventions on July 4, 1910, again one public and one secret.[1] The public convention reaffirmed the demarcation line as drawn in 1907, provided for the maintenance of status quo in Manchuria, and for mutual consultation in case any menace to the status quo should arise. The secret convention provided more specifically for the maintenance of the status quo in Manchuria. These conventions, although significant in cementing the Russo-Japanese rapprochement, need not be discussed lengthily here, because they were concerned primarily with Manchuria rather than Mongolia.

IV. The Third Step -- The Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty of 1912

The third step was occasioned by the Chinese Revolution in 1911. The Revolution, while resorted to by the Chinese people to free themselves forever from despotism and imperialism,

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[1] For text of the public convention, see MacMurray, op. cit., vol. I, p. 803; for text of the secret convention, see E. B. Price, op. cit., Appendix C.

offered to Russia and Japan, however, an opportunity too good to be discarded. Thus, in a memorandum to the Czar when the abdication of the Manchus was imminent, Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared,

> "Russian and Japanese Governments must use the present favorable moment to fortify their position in China and in this wise prevent the Chinese Government from continually opposing the political interests of Russia and Japan as has been the case during the past few years."[1]

A propitious time such as this made for smooth negotiations. On July 8, 1912 a secret treaty was signed at St. Petersburg.[2] It was agreed that

1. The line of demarcation fixed by the secret Convention of 1907 was to be extended into Mongolia, which was to be divided into Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, the latter subdivided into two parts, West Inner Mongolia, and East Inner Mongolia, with the meridian of Peking as the demarcation line.

2. East Inner Mongolia was to be Japanese sphere of interest, and West Inner Mongolia was to be Russian sphere of interest.

Thus, this treaty, together with the secret convention of 1907, divided Mongolia into two parts: Outer Mongolia and

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[1] E. B. Price, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
[2] For text of the Treaty, see E. B. Price, op. cit., Appendix D.

West Inner Mongolia became Russian sphere of interest; and East Inner Mongolia, Japanese. It should be noted how in the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 the Japanese terms with regard to Eastern Inner Mongolia were in keeping with this delineation of spheres.

V. The Fourth Step -- The Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916

The motives underlying the conclusion of the treaties of 1916 have not yet been full established. Ernest B. Price asserted that "In view of the nature of the agreements either completed or negotiated it is probable that the initiative came from Russia."[1] Continuing, he said,

> "Russia of the old Tsarist regime was at that time in the throes of what we now know to have been her death struggle....Her European Allies were themselves hard put to it for supplies...Under these conditions, Russia, supported by Great Britain, looked to their Far Eastern Ally, Japan, for aid."[2]

However, it might also be that Russia's intention was to prevent Japan and some other suspected Powers from taking advantage of the European War to snatch Russian interests in China. This seems more probable in the light of Japan's presentation

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1. *Ibid*, p. 82.
2. *Ibid*,

of the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915, which Demands must have inspired fear on Russia's part. However, who actually took the initiative and what were the real motives are still a subject for academic explorations.

It is also hard to ascertain how many treaties were actually completed on or after July 3, 1916. All we know ~~h~~now is that there are a public convention, a protocol attached to this convention, and a separate secret convention.

The public convention was signed on July 3, 1916.[1] It provided that Russia and Japan would not be parties to any arrangement or political combination directed against either one of them; and that in the event that the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one party as recognized by the other, should be menaced, they would consult each other for the purpose of mutual aid. Judging from its meagre and purposeless provisions, we can be quite sure that it was used only to veil the accompanied secret alliance.

In the secret convention, signed also on July 3, 1916, we find a definitive defensive alliance beyond any shadow of doubt.[2] By Article I, Russia and Japan recognized that "their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third power hostile to Russia or

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[1] For text of the Convention, see MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1327.

[2] For text of the Convention, see MacMurray, op. cit., Vol. II, P. 1328.

Japan"; and so they should confer with each other whenever circumstances might demand actions. Article II constitutes the heart of the alliance,

> "In the event that, in consequence of the measures taken by mutual agreement as provided in the preceding article, war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the Third Powers contemplated by the preceding article, the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party."

In this fashion, the Russo-Japanese rapprochement came to its acme. If Czarist Russia had survived the war, this cordiale entente would have been a partnership par excellence for the effectuation of their peacetime expansion. But, unfortunately, Russia was prostrated in the war, half by Germany, and half by herself. When the unprecedented holocaust of human lives was ended in 1918, the Japanese statesmen who had fostered so feverishly Russia's friendship could find their ci-devant friend nowhere but in memory.

PART THREE

OUTER MONGOLIA FELL PREY TO RUSSIA

CHAPTER VI

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND OUTER MONGOLIA

1. Situation in Outer Mongolia before the Chinese Revolution

To understand the Outer Mongolian situation before the Chinese Revolution we ought to trace, first of all, the Russian activities during the pre-Revolutionary years. In 1907, when the first Russo-Japanese conventions were being negotiated, there was seen in Mongolia a Russian mercantile mission sent out by some of Russia's business magnates to survey the location of oases in Kiakhta and Kashgar. The report of the mission emphatically warned against the fact that the Chinese colonization in Mongolia had picked up tempo by leaps and bounds. In 1909 a scientific mission was fitted out, which recommended upon its return that a railway between Lake Baikal and Urga be built as early as possible to combat the Chinese influence. In 1911 an official mission proceeded to Mongolia to study its economic matters. Although it has been established by some official documents of the Czarist Government that the annexation of Outer Mongolia was not seriously contemplated by it at that time,[1] yet these private and

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[1] B. de Siebert, "*Entente Diplomacy and the World*", p. 26.

official activities were by no means aimless. The path to empire is laid even, as a rule, by some pioneers' spadework ere the imperial legions can freely traverse; and these loyal Russians were really doing the same spadework.

Secondly, the Chinese colonization in Mongolia under the sponsorship of the Manchu Government formed an important factor in changing the Mongolian situation. During its last years, as we have noted, the Manchu Dynasty, realizing that the huge Russian army stationed along the Siberian border was a most ominous and dreadful thing, which, if not counterbalanced, would bring disastrous result to China, began to carry out measures to strengthen its position. The laws forbidding Chinese colonization and intermarriage between the Chinese and the Mongols had been abolished for some time. A Bureau of Colonization was set up in 1906 to encourage Chinese emigration to Mongolia. It was estimated that prior to the Revolution the Chinese settlers had been able to wrest agricultural lands from the Mongol nomads at the rate of about four miles a year. As for military force in Mongolia the Peking Government planned for the garrisoning of 2,000 more men at Urga by the end of 1911; after that date the number was to be increased to 10,000, which would be detailed to garrison the other key posts in Mongolia. At the same time civil reforms were introduced in a close succession. Soon after the young and energetic Santo, the last Manchu Amban at Urga, assumed office in 1910, a kaleidoscopic cluster of

governmental bureaus sprang up like mushrooms -- such as Bureau of Military Affairs, Headquarters of the Garrison Troops, Board of Internal Revenues, Board of Public Health, Preparatory Board for Constitutional Government, Board of External Affairs, Board of Reclamation, Board of Commercial Survey, Board of Industrial Survey, et al. It was estimated that in all more than twenty new offices came into existence almost overnight. In addition, school of all grades for both sexes were opened. To defray the upkeeps necessary for these new establishments, such heavy taxes were imposed upon the Mongols, that "the Mongols, dreaded by these crushing burdens, escaped from their homes, leaving the several Banners around the capital almost a no-man's land."[1] Anti-Manchu sentiment was ubiquitous. In desperation they sent an emissary to Russia for aid. When Santo, being infuriated by the Mongol insubordination, ordered to take the Mongol princes to task over their reported ingratiating with Russia, the Mongol indignation was also ignited into a blaze.[2]

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1. Chen Chung-tsu, "Wai Mon Ching Shih Shih" (Contemporary History of Outer Mongolia), p. 5.
2. Duke Frans August Larson, "Larson, Duke of Mongolia", p. 221.

Thirdly, the Mongols, though mostly ignorant, were not incognizant of their precarious position. In June,[1] 1911 a meeting was called with many Mongol princes present. A delegation was then dispatched to Russia with the purpose of soliciting the good offices -- but not military aid -- of the Czar to intervene, on their behalf, against the Chinese oppression. Seizing this opportunity to take matters into its own hands, the Russian Government addressed a note to the Chinese Foreign Office protesting the recent reforms in Mongolia with the threat that should the Peking Government fail to rescind those measures already instituted, she would reserve to herself the liberty to take whatever steps she might see fit in order to insure the security of her frontier.[2] Peking, apparently in good temper, soon replied. The Chinese note expressed appreciation of Russia's neighborliness and

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[1] It is hard to ascertain the exact month of the meeting. According to Chang Chung-fu, "Chung Hwa Ming Kuo Wai Chiao Shih" (Diplomatic History of the Republic of China), vol. p. 78, it is June; according to K.S. Weigh, "Russo-Chinese Diplomacy", p. 156, it is May; according to W.W. Willoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China", vol. 1, p. 453, it is July. E. T. Williams, in his article "The Relations between China, Russia and Mongolia", American Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 1916, p. 502, also recorded July.

[2] Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., p. 48. According to the Russian note, "The Princes of the many Khalka Leagues and the Urga Lamas have four times sent emissaries to Russia's aid; but the Russian Government, desirous of maintaining amicable relations between the two countries, has refused the Mongol requests." Ibid, p. 54.

and went on to say that the reforms being introduced were for the benefit of the Mongols, but that in view of the Mongol misgivings instructions had been sent to the Amban at Urga to proceed with caution and to consult the feelings of the native people.[1] But once having started with their first step, the Russians were in no mood to stop where they were. So, early in October a number of Russian troops were already pouring into Outer Mongolia under the pretext of protecting the Russian Consulate at Urga, disregarding the telegram which the Hutukhtu had sent to stop them.[2]

II. The Independence of Outer Mongolia

Immediately after the news of the Chinese Revolution, which broke out on October 10, 1911, was carried to Urga, the Mongols, seeing their opportunity, took to action. On October 30, after a conference was held by the Mongol princes, Santo was escorted out of the Mongolian capital, and an informal declaration of independence issued. Among the resolutions passed were: non-recognition of the Chinese Republic, utmost resistance to the Republic's claim of sovereignty in Mongolia, refusal to pay taxes to the Manchus and the Chinese, expulsion of all Chinese colonization in Mongolia, and so forth.[3]

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[1] E. T. Williams, op. cit., pp. 802-803

[2] Cheng Chung-tsu, op. cit., p. 6.

[3] C. L. Chu, "The Last Ten Years of Russo-Chinese Relations". p. 134; China Year Book, 1919, p. 587.

Later in November independence of Outer Mongolia was formally proclaimed with the new state named "the Empire of Mongolia". On December 28, the Hutukhtu was crowned as Great Khan of the Empire at a pompous ceremony. During this very impressive ceremony the Mongol people flocked to Urga, from all corners of the land, hopefully and hectically, clad in festive robes and parading the streets and alleys of the city on their horses. To express their gratitude to the Living Buddha-Emperor," three hundred white horses with yellow halters, each with a red fox skin tied about its throat, and one hundred camels, each with a sable skin around its neck", were presented to him before the oath of allegiance was taken.[1] The new Emperor "ordered acceptance of the tributes, smiled at the ovation, and specifically praised the new system of a politico-religious combination as the ideal and *dernier cri* of human wisdom."[2] After the ceremony was solemnized, a new Government came to function, with a Premier, a Vice-Premier, and five Ministers -- Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Justice -- constituting the Cabinet, and two Houses -- the Upper and the Lower -- as legislative bodies.[3]

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1. Frans August Larson, "The Lamas of Mongolia", *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 145, March 1930, p. 377.
2. Bernhard Waurick, "In the Home of the Living Buddha", *The Living Age*, vol. 323, 1924, p. 472.
3. Cheng Chung-tsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42; Pai Mei-chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-49.

To make the situation even more unbearable, the secessionists pushed eastward, westward, and southward in January of the next year, taking Hailar on the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Hulun region of Heilungkiang, and Uliassutai in the west part of Outer Mongolia. To the south the Outer Mongols rode across the Gobi Desert, and merged their force with the Inner Mongols'. In the grim grips that ensued the Chinese garrisons were frequently ambushed by the adroit horse-riders, and suffered considerable casualties.

From the point of view of China, the Mongol independence was certainly not to be recognized. Therefore, a mandate, declaring China's five races as the constituent parts of the new Republic, was issued soon after the success of the Revolution, to the following effect,

> "The five races[1] in this country are entitled to equal treatment in the Republic, and the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Mohammedans are all its citizens. There is no more distinction between them, as was the case during the imperial rule. Thus no such name as 'dependencies' shall be used any more. Hereafter, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Mohammedans should live in perfect harmony so as to bring about a real union of the five races into one. The Republican Government

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[1] The Hans, the Manchus, the Mohammedans, the Mongols, and the Tibetans. The Manchus have almost entirely been assimilated by the Hans.

will not establish a department for dependencies, in view of the fact that they are to be treated equally as the other parts of the state, namely, the interior provinces. All matters concerning these places will be included in the Administration of Home Affairs."[1]

Again in February 1912, after Dr. Sun Yat-sen had voluntarily resigned from the Republic's presidency to give the office to Yuan Shih-kai, the new President made strenuous efforts to persuade the Hutukhtu to come back into the orbit of the Republic. But his suasion came to nothing; the Hutukhtu even shunned direct negotiations with Peking,[2] and suggested discussion by proxy through the Russian Minister at Peking. Failing all the methods of a peaceful settlement, the patience of the Chinese Government was exhausted,

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[1] *Far Eastern Review*, February 1920, p. 106.

[2] According to F.A. Larson, a Swede later conferred the title of duke by the Hutukhtu and with wide Mongol popularity, President Yuan had asked him to act as a mediator to bring the Chinese-Mongol hostilities on the Mongolian borders to an end, and later in 1913 he was appointed by the Mongolian Government as a liason officer in dealing with the Chinese Government. He succeeded in persuading Prince Na, a leader of the Mongol fighting army, to go to Peking with his Mongol soldiers, as President Yuan's body guard. F.A. Larson, "*Larson, Duke of Mongolia,*" pp. 227-235.

and an appeal to arms was decided upon.[1] But many obstacles stood in the way. On the one hand, the new Republican Government was not yet recognized by other powers; domestic affairs were still drifting on pell-mell; and the strength of the infant Republic was too feeble to undertake such a campaign. And on the other, Russia, posing as the patron of her protege, came forward to notify the Chinese Government that she could not view with indifference the despatch of any Chinese troops to repress the Mongolian revolution. Diplomatic complications, internal disorders and military weakness thus combined to prevent China from taking any action, no matter what she might have wished. Under such circumstances President Yuan was able only to keep hold of Inner Mongolia, to instruct the Chinese Minister to Russia to negotiate a solution, and to send some representatives to Mongolia to carry on the work of persuading.[2]

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[1] Hsu Shuhsi, op. cit., p. 255. Mr. E. T. Williams, in his article, op. cit., said that he was in Peking in 1911, 1912, and 1913, and had opportunities to notice the poignant feeling of the Chinese people against the Mongolian insurrection and Russian assistance to the Mongols. The Chinese newspapers were particularly active in trying to arouse a warlike sentiment. The situation in Inner Mongolia became indeed quite serious. Additional troops were sent there by the Chinese Government and a number of skirmishes with bands of armed Mongols occurred, but without any noticeable advantage to either side. See also F.A. Larson, op. cit., pp. 224-227. But Larson's accounts are too pre-Mongolian, and lack impartiality.

[2] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., p. 82; C.L. Chu, op. cit., p. 244.

III. The Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912

Having had the Mongolian situation in her firm grasp, Russia continued the work of fishing in the troubled water. On November 3, 1912 she concluded an Agreement with Outer Mongolia. Attached to the Agreement was a Protocol on her trade rights.[1] According to the Agreement,

1. Russia was to assist Outer Mongolia "to maintain the autonomous government, and also the right to have its national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on its soil nor the colonisation by the Chinese therein";

2. No rights not enjoyed by Russian subjects in Outer Mongolia should be granted to the subjects of any third power;

3. If the Mongolian Government concluded a separate treaty with China or any other countries, there should be no infringement upon the provisions of the present Agreement, and no modifications thereof should be made without Russian consent.

By the Protocol, not only were the Russian subjects entitled to all the vested rights they had enjoyed under former Russo-Chinese treaties, but also Outer Mongolia was made a vassal of Russia in the economic respect. Russians could move, reside freely anywhere in Outer Mongolia, engage in every kind of

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[1] For texts, see MacMurray, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 992ff.

business, commercial, industrial, or otherwise; could make contracts of every kind; could export and import goods free of duties, taxes, or other dues; could have allotments on lease, acquire them as private property or for cultivation; could obtain concessions of any kind; and Russian credit institutions could have branches in Mongolia and transact all kinds of businesses, and so forth.

To squeeze while squeezing was possible, Russia signed another Agreement with Mongolia in December 1912, for the establishment of a mining company with practically unlimited rights of exploitation.[1] One of its provisions specified that the necessary capital should be drawn from Russian and Mongol investors only.

On May 25, 1913 an Agreement for a concession regarding the construction of a telegraph line between Kosh Agatch and Kobdo was signed.[2]

Again on September 30, 1914 two more Agreements, one concerning railway construction in Outer Mongolia, and the other on the concession for the construction of a telegraph line from Monda (in Irkutsk) to Uliassutai.[3] By the former, "the Imperial Russian and Mongolian Governments shall jointly deliberate and decide upon the most advantageous direction in which the railways are to extend....as well as upon the

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., vol. I, p. 85; Chang Chung-tsu op. cit., 35-36.

[2] For text of the Agreement, see MacMurray, op. cit., vol. II, p. 1038.

[3] For texts of the Agreements, see ibid, vol. II, pp. 1178-1179.

manner in which the construction of such railways is to be proceeded with." Russia recognized Mongolia's right to build railways within its own boundaries if the funds could be raised there; but Mongolia was pledged to consult Russia before making concessions for railway construction to other nationals. These provisions gave the Russians actual control of the railway policy of Outer Mongolia. Moreover, since the gauge of the Russian railways was different from that adopted in China, these arrangements definitely assured Russia that the new transportation lines would connect with Russian, rather than Chinese, railways. By the latter agreement, the telegraph line between Monda and Uliassuntai would be put under the exclusive control of the Russian Central Postal and Telegraph Department.

Yet, this is not all. On January 11, 1913 Mongolia found a second ally in Tibet. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, China had retained but a nominal suzerainty over Tibet. At the time of the Chinese Revolution, the Tibetans also rose to assert their independence with British aid. It is but natural that these two peoples tried to come nearer each other. So, a Treaty of Alliance was signed between them, by which the Mongols and the Tibetans decided to solidify their friendship by mutually agreeing to recognize each other as master of their respective domains, to aid each other against internal and external dangers, to afford protection and assistance

to each other's subjects traveling in their respective territories, to further mutual trade, and to exchange opinions with a view to upholding Lamaism.[1]

IV. The Russo-Mongolian Secret Military Agreement of 1913

In 1913 (exact date of signature yet unknown) a secret Military Agreement was concluded between Russia and Outer Mongolia, in which the following was provided,[2]

1. On account of the lack in military knowledge on the part of the Mongolian people, the Russians should be entrusted with the management of all military affairs in case Outer Mongolia should be at war with other countries, and the commander-in-chief of the Mongol army must be a Russian officer, with full power of command.

2. In the event of such hostilities, the Russian commander-in-chief should have the right to recruit his army in such a way as he might choose.

3. The Russian Government would contribute, as it saw fit, to the Mongol expenditures incidental to training and equipping the Mongol army.

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1. *China Year Book, 1914*, p. 629; Chang Chung-fu, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 85.
2. Zen Rin Cho Kai (Good Neighbor Association), "*Mo Ko Tai Kang*" (A General View of Mongolia), Appendix II, pp. 532-533. This secret Agreement has been little known in the outside world. There is doubt as to whether it came into effect or not.

4. The Russian Commander-in-chief should be replaced, in case he resigned during his 5 year tenure, by another Russian officer recommended by the Russian Ministry of War.

It is obvious that this secret military agreement was primarily directed against China, because the menace from Japan had been greatly alleviated, at least for the time being, by the Russo-Japanese understandings reached in 1907, 1910 and 1912, and, on the other hand, China's intentions to recover her lost territory were only too patent not to be prepared against.

V. The Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913

On learning of the conclusion of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, 1912, the Chinese Government lodged a protest with the Russian legation on the 7th, and also declared to the Russian Government that inasmuch as Mongolia was but an integral part of China, any treaties concluded between Russia and Mongolia the Chinese Government would not recognize. Simultaneously, troops were sent to Urga to chastise the insolent Hutukhtu and the shepherd princes, but were soon called back by order of the President.[1] Although belligerent sentiments on both Russian and Chinese sides ran high, yet China was too weak after the Revolution, and Russia

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[1] For an account of the Chinese expedition, see E.J. Dillion, "The Chinese Pale of Settlement", The English Review, Jan. 1913, p. 295.

was also having her hands full in the Balkans. So, a political settlement appeared to be the way desirable to both. Negotiations then went on. On May 20, 1913 a protocol consisting of six clauses was agreed upon, which was, however, turned down by the Chinese Senate. It was not until November 5 that a Declaration was signed, together with an exchange of notes.[1] The following was provided,

1. Russia would recognize China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia;

2. China would recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia;

3. Both China and Russia pledged not to intervene in the internal administration of Outer Mongolia, not to send troops there, and to abstain from colonizing the land;

4. China declared herself ready to accept the good offices of Russia for the establishment of relations with Outer Mongolia.

In the notes exchanged, it was agreed that, "as regards questions of a political and territorial nature, the Chinese Government shall come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiations in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take part." Thus, nominally China remained suzerain in Mongolia, but, in reality, Outer Mongolia was put under the joint protection of China and Russia.

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[1] ~~(last page)~~ For texts, see MacMurray, op. cit., vol. II, p. 1066.

On the part of Outer Mongolia, considerable uneasiness was felt as news of the Sino-Russian negotiations were first heard. By the time of the signing of the Declaration, the Sayen Noyan Khan, then Mongol Prime Minister, was in St. Petersburg. He not only delivered a note to Sazonov protesting against the Russo-Chinese Agreement, but addressed similar notes to the diplomatic corps in St. Petersburg, including the Chinese Minister. The notes reaffirmed the "independence" of Outer Mongolia and reserved the right to determine its attitude toward the Declaration.[1] But note-writing proved unavailing; no response came. Even Sayen Noyan Khan's attempt to obtain an audience with the German Minister was balked at by Sazonov. The Mongol delegate then proposed that he would go to Berlin, but the meticulous Wilhelmstrasse thought it inexpedient to receive him at that time.[2]

Deeply disappointed, the Mongols sought to enlist the Japanese help. In a letter dated January 1914, the Hutukhtu bespoke the succor of the Emperor of Japan in the Mongol struggle for independence and unity, and asked him to send an envoy to Urga for further arrangements.[3] But Japan, appreciative of the importance of Russian cooperation,

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[1] Krasny Arkhiv, vol. 37, pp. 37, 39-40.
[2] Die Grosse Politik, vol. 32, No. 12,007, p. 443
[3] Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol. XVII, No. 1, April 1933, pp. 192-194.

returned the letter unopened through Russian Minister at Tokyo. Later when Dai Lama, the Mongol Minister of Interior, attempted to go to Japan in person, the Japanese consul in Harbin refused him the right of way at the instance of the Russians. Even the pro-Russian Sayen Noyan Khan was angered and accused the Russians of conspiring to insulate the Mongols under exclusive Russian domination.[1]

In May 1914, the Mongol Government again took up the issue of foreign recognition. Notes were again addressed to the French, British, German and American Ministers in Peking. In the note to the French Minister, the wishes were broached that direct negotiations be opened, a French consul be sent to Urga, and a treaty of commerce be concluded. But, advised by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, the French Minister simply pigeonholed the letter without even bothering to write an answer.[2] When World War I broke out in Europe in June 1914, the contending Powers naturally became too occupied in their own life-and-death struggle to give thought to such a picayune matter as the recognition of the independence of a far-off nomadic people.

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1. Korostovets, ~~"~~Von Cinggis Khan bis Zur Sowjitrepublik~~"~~, pp. 213-214, 255, 257.
2. Internationale Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, vol. 1, 3, No. 147, p. 137.

VI. The Russo-Sino-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement of 1915

"To subdue the gansters, first capture the ringleader," as a Chinese saying has it. Russia having nodded assent, it was indeed but a matter of procedure to induce Mongolia to come into line. Thus, in conformance with the stipulation of the Russo-Chinese exchange of notes, the three parties, Russia, China and Mongolia, opened parley at Kiakhta on September 8, 1914, for a final settlement of their relations with one another. The Mongols were in an intransigent mood, feeling themselves slighted in the Russo-Chinese negotiations of the previous year. The confabulations dragged on until the latter part of May 1915, with some 48 formal and 40 informal meetings held. Fortune again seemed to turn her back to China, for just at the time China was also fighting the notorious Twenty-One Demands submitted by Japan. When Russia and Japan played the ball in such an excellent teamwork vis-à-vis China, the latter could not but find herself between the devil and the deep sea. The upshot was that China got practically nothing further than the empty word "suzerainty". The treaty finally signed on June 7, 1915, known as the Tripartite Agreement in regard to Outer Mongolia, provided, *inter alia*, for the following:[1]

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[1] For text of the Agreement, see MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 1239.

1. Outer Mongolia recognized the Russo-Chinese Declaration and exchange of notes of November 5, 1913, and hence the suzerainty of China.

2. China and Russia recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of China, and agreed not to interfere with its internal administration.

3. Autonomous Mongolia should have no right to conclude international treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions, but might conclude treaties and agreements of commercial and industrial nature. As regards questions of a political or territorial nature the Chinese Government was obligated to come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiation in which Outer Mongolia should participate.

4. The ruler of Outer Mongolia should be invested by the President of the Chinese Republic.

5. No Russian or Chinese troops were to be stationed in Outer Mongolia except a limited number of consular or military guards.

6. The Chinese Commissioner at Urga and his Assistants in various localities of Outer Mongolia were to exercise general control of Autonomous Mongolia "lest the suzerain rights and interests of China be impaired by the acts of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities."

7. The Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 1912 relative to Russian commercial rights in Outer Mongolia should remain in force; that is, the Russians were assured of all commercial prerogatives she had obtained from the erstwhile Independent Mongolian Government.

Other articles on boundaries, customs, administration of justice, telegraphs, and posts, honor, etc., are too detailed to be recited here.

In a word, this Agreement, which formed the basis of the Russo-Sino-Mongolian relations until the Russian Revolution, is humiliating enough for China. Russia retained all her vested rights -- among them the right of free trade in Outer Mongolia -- and was assured of an autonomous Outer Mongolian buffer which she desired. China secured nothing substantial except the right of representation in political and territorial matters of Mongolia; but even this had to be shared with the Russians. It is most humiliating for China to manage her own things in conjunction with a foreign country and not to be allowed to do many things without that country having a hand in. Some writers have said that by this Agreement China and Russia were legally required to exercise a joint protection over Outer Mongolia; but we would come nearer the truth to say that by this Agreement China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, under her

suzerainty, but as Russia's protectorate, as an American writer aptly put it.[1]

VII. Survey of Czarist Russia's Policy in Outer Mongolia

It will be pertinent here to make a coup d'oeuil of Russia's policy toward Outer Mongolia prior to the Russian Revolution. Firstly, from whatever accessible evidences we now have, it may be assumed that the Russian Government -- or, to be more precise, the segment of Russian authorities charged with her foreign policy -- did not contemplate the outright annexation of Outer Mongolia, although the creation of a Russian sphere of influence was ranked high on the governmental slate. In 1912, Sazonov, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation with State Councillor Korostovets, opined that "Russia must be a European and not an Asiatic Power".[2] In his talk with the German Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, he again confided that Russia should not "increase its burdens along its long southern frontier."[3] He even decried the idea of annexing Outer Mongolia as "positively insane."[4] This Russian policy may also be evinced

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1. Leonard Ludwin, "Mongolia Against Japan", The New Republic, vol. 94, March 23, 1938, p. 188.
2. Korostovets, op. cit., p. 128
3. Die Grosse Politik, vol. 32, No. 11, 996, p. 432
4. British Parliamentary Command Papers, 6,447, China, No. 3, 1912, p. 414.

from the following passage from the protocol of an extraordinary meeting of the Russian Ministerial Council,

> "The violation or separation of a province from China cannot be justified by legal considerations. We know how expensive such annexations prove to be in the long run, and to what international complications they lead. The purpose of such annexations would not be understood in Russia."[1]

Such self-restraint on the part of Russia is not hard to explain. If she acted too rapidly or in a too naked manner, her actions might be dreaded by the other contending powers as a danger to the Far Eastern balance of power. In this event, these powers, ever so jealous in guarding their respective influence and so sensitive to the shift in equilibrium, would coalesce and force a showdown, as she herself, banded with France and Germany, did to Japan in 1895. The result would be either a restoration to the status quo ante, or enmity of the other powers. Both were at that time not to the interest of Russia.

Secondly, Sazonov was also opposed to an immediate recognition of Mongolia's independence. In a speech to the ~~Russian~~ Duma in April 1912, he explained his stand by the reason that the Mongols were not prepared by history for independence, nor provided with competent leadership in the

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[1] B. de Siebert, op. cit., p. 26.

movement, and that peace could be preserved only if Russia and China -- the Russo-Japanese secret agreement certainly kept him from mentioning Japan -- were agreed about the future of Mongolia.[1] As a matter of fact, the Outer Mongolian declaration of independence in 1911 had caught the Russian Government unprepared and caused it "some perplexity",[2] although it pleased the more militant coterie in the Government. In the Russo-Mongolian Agreements of 1912 the Russians were also careful enough to use the term "autonomous government" instead of "independence".

And even though Russia had, by her actual deeds, acknowledged the sovereign status of Outer Mongolia, she still exerted all influence at her command to prevent its being similarly honored by other powers, who had imperialistic stakes in the Far Eastern colonial contest. We have noted that when the Sayen Noyan Khan tried to approach the several countries in his bid for recognition, Russia was found standing in his way. Sazonov personally pointed out to the Sayen Noyan Khan that the majority of powers did not like to see China in a disintegrated condition, and the creation of an Independent Mongolia was already grudgingly considered as a Russian product. The Mongols were practically "free and

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[1] G. Grumm-Grzhimailo, "Western Mongolia and the Urianghai Country", pp. 748-769.

[2] Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 3^e Sec., Tom. 1, No. 321, p. 311.

independent in all respects," he said, "except in political and territorial matters; and that even in these they might have a voice under the Sino-Russian agreement of 1913.[1] The reason accounting for the Russian attitude is this: While loath to annex Outer Mongolia at the moment, Russia was most eager to keep the land as an *exclusive* Russian sphere of influence; the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and other countries would mean, at least to the Russians, the penetration of the latter's influence into Outer Mongolia, which would not only do harm to Russia's economic interests, but also endanger her security from a strategical point of view. Thus, the Russo-Mongolian agreements on mining, and railroad and telegraph construction, signed 1912-1914, while in a positive sense granting Russia special commercial privileges, were also designed to exclude other possible contenders from entering the Mongolian arena. The same view may be taken as regard the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 1912, by which Russia was accorded extensive commercial privileges, whereas the same was required to be denied other powers.

Thirdly, the Russian Government seemed also to discountenance the union of Outer and Inner Mongolias for a realistic reason. During the negotiations of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 the Mongols wanted the Agreements to apply

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[1] *Krasny Arkhiv*, vol. 37, pp. 63-64.

to Inner Mongolia as well as to Outer Mongolia in the hope that an All-Mongolian unification, buttressed by Russian aid, might ultimately be achieved.[1] They also asked for a substitution of "Mongolia" for "Outer Mongolia" in the text of the Agreements, with which substitution Russia finally chimed in. But the Russian Government disapproved the proposed union on the ground that the two parts of Mongolia were geographically distinct and had been differently administered for a long time.[2] When the Sayen Noyan Khan went to St. Petersburg in 1914, the Russian officials explained that any further territorial claim might alarm Japan and England, to the disadvantage of both Mongolia and Russia.[3] Perhaps this lack of positive assistance from Russia was accountable for the failure of the Outer Mongols' efforts to bring Inner Mongolia into their fold. Yet, for Russia, this is really an appropriate stand, since not only the Gobi Desert appeared to be too redoubtable a barrier even for the Russian giant, but a trespass into Inner Mongolia would inevitably strike at the vital spot of the Japanese imperialists.[4]

Fourthly and lastly, Russia, having learnt an expensive lesson from the Russo-Japanese War, adopted a policy of cooperation with other powers, especially Japan, in regard to

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[1] Gerard M. Friters, "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence", *Pacific Affairs*. vol. 10, p. 171.
[2] G. Grumm-Grzhimailo, *op. cit.*, pp. 748-749.
[3] *Krasny Arkhiv*, vol. 37, p. 64.
[4] Gerard M. Friters, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

their Mongolian adventures. The Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty of July 1912, as we have noted in a previous chapter, testifies to this policy. Also when the negotiations of this Treaty were in progress, and as it was concluded, the French and the British Governments were from time to time contacted, informed and consulted.[1] The undertakers of an empire building career have most often followed a way which tends to offer least resistance. The Russian leaders certainly made no exception to the time-honored tradition in picking their itinerary.

Thus, in the last analysis, Russia's policy in Outer Mongolia may be boiled down to this: She wanted to create an Outer Mongolian buffer state, which would be free from influence of China and other powers, without, however, having to bear the blame of overt aggression. Presented in positive terms, the policy would logically be one of recognising China's nominal suzerainty in Outer Mongolia, but in actuality precluding China, and other countries, from holding any determinative sway in its internal and external affairs. Thus, speaking in the Duma on April 19, 1912, Sazonov well sketched this policy:

> "Independent Mongolia as it is at present lacks political ability to run her own government, money to finance her administration and an army to protect herself from

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[1] Siebert, op. cit., p. 39.

invasion. Should we let her alone she will sooner or later come again under Chinese domination. Therefore, for the sake of our national interests we cannot be indifferent to the present situation. For if we abandon our forward policy in Mongolia we abandon at the same time our whole policy in the Far East which will spell the doom of our Empire. On the other hand, if we take Mongolia into our protection we cannot but incur the suspicion of other powers as bent on the ambition of swallowing up all Asia. This is not a sound policy for us to pursue either. Therefore, according to my opinion we should steer a middle course between these two extremes in order to protect our interests in the Far East. We should demand three conditions from China as a basis for negotiations. First, China should promise not to colonize Mongolia; second, not to send troops to Mongolia; and third, not to interfere with the internal politics of Mongolia. These three conditions are of the utmost advantage to us. Meanwhile, owing to a misunderstanding of our real intentions, feelings are running high in China against us and a settlement by a recourse to arms seems probable, but we are not to give way at this moment. We should persist in the acquiescence to our demands until full satisfaction of the

same is obtained."[1]

Later on he again summed up more laconically,

> "Russian recognition of China's suzerainty would be merely juridical, and the reestablishment of Chinese power in its original form would be out of the question."[2]

Bearing this policy of Russia in mind, we shall not fail to see what a diplomatic victory the Russians scored in writing the Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty of 1912 and the three principal agreements with Mongolia and China during 1912-1915. The former barred Japan from Outer Mongolia, while the latter shut the Mongolian door upon China. As a result, a vacuum of power was left in the great expanse of the Mongol territory wherein the Russians might do anything untrammelled.

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1. C. L. Chu, op. cit., p. 145.
2. Orange Book, 1914, published by The Russian Ministry of of Foreign Affairs, No. 55, pp. 54-55, Sazonov to Korostovets, January 22, 1913.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND OUTER MONGOLIA

I. Situation in Outer Mongolia before the Russian Revolution

With the conclusion of the Russo-Sino-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement of 1915 Outer Mongolia entered upon a short-lived autonomy. The Chinese Government, in keeping with the provisions of the Agreement, appointed in the same year a High Commissioner resident at Urga, and three Assistant Commissioners stationed respectively at Uliassautai, Kobdo and Kiakhta.[1] The solemnity of investiture was held on July 8, 1916 at Urga, conferring upon the Hutukhtu the title of "Bogdo Cheptsum Damba Hutukhtu Khan of Outer Mongolia," which means the "Great Venerable Sacred Reincarnated Ruler of Outer Mongolia." In January 1917 Mongolian delegates were sent to Peking to express the grateful feelings of the Mongol people and to present a large variety of tributes to the Chinese Government. Generally speaking, the Sino-Mongolian relations during this transient period were very amicable, although minor frictions occurred from time to time. It goes without saying that the Russians continued to have, or try to have, a finger in every important question that might happen to arise.

The most conspicuous and significant feature in the

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[1] Cheng Chung-tsu, op. cit., pp. 64-67, The Organization Law of the Office of the High Commissioner at Urga.

post-Autonomy situation of Outer Mongolia was the centrifugal shift of the Mongols from Russia. The secession movement before 1915 was, as noted previously, not entirely free from extraneous pressure. It is undeniable that the Mongols, especially the Khalkas, desired freedom from the Manchu overlordship; it is equally true that the Mongols, in desperation, had asked for Russia's assistance: yet, the fact remains that the manner in which such assistance was being rendered struck great awe into the naive Mongol mind. Before 1913 some of the chieftains of Kobdo had deserted the so-called "Independent Mongolia," and came, of their own accord, back under Chinese control. In 1915 the Urianghais also solicited China's help to free themselves from the Russians whose occupation of this region ever since the Chinese Revolution had proven too much for their endurance. And even on the part of the Khalkas, a change of mind was discernible everywhere. Both the lamas and the princes awoke to the dangers implied in the Russian shadow ever hanging on.[1] The princes also regretted the loss of large pensions which used to come from China before the

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[1] Reports had it that the Hutukhtu, when seriously sick in 1914, warned his Ministers and chief priests in his sickbed, "Beware of Europeans, and particularly Russians. If at any time you appeal for Russia's aid, our country will be plunged into misery and bloodshed."

Autonomy. Besides, according to a rule set by the Manchu Dynasty, and long observed by the Mongols themselves, the State and the Church in Mongolia had been distinctly and strictly separated, with the princes having charge of politics, and the lamas, religion. But, since the inauguration of Mongol Autonomy the Hutukhtu was invested as the Great Khan, the ruler. Since he became thus supreme in both heavenly and worldly affairs, it was but a natural concomitant that the lamas found easy access to political power. This encroachment of the lamas, coupled with a threatening invasion from Semenov's gang in Siberia, further strengthened the determination of the princes to come back to the Chinese fold.[1]

In 1916 secret negotiations were already initiated between some princes and the Chinese High Commissioner, looking to the abrogation of the Autonomy and the resumption of pension payments by the Chinese Government. But the overtures were turned down by the Chinese Government for fear of international complications as well as for financial considerations. Thereupon they turned to the diplomatic representatives of France, Great Britain and the United States at Peking, offering them favorable trade agreements in return for their intervention to weaken the Russian preponderancy. But nothing came

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 348-349.

of the offer either.[1] The Mongols apparently repented their impulsiveness in the past; but when they found the fruit was hard to eat, it became clear to them that to redress the faux pas was even harder.

II. The Cancellation of Outer Mongolian Autonomy

As soon as the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, the Czarist Government's hold on Outer Mongolia was naturally weakened. During the Kerensky régime, Russia was powerless to direct her attention to things in Mongolia. But two new factors loomed large in the Outer Mongolian picture. They are the White Russians and Japan.

A White Russian, by the name of Semenov, who owed his allegiance to the Czar and also claimed Mongolian blood in his veins, conspired to take up the unfinished business upon his own responsibility. He planned to establish a Pan-Mongolian state, consisting of Inner and Outer Mongolias, Hulun Buir, Tibet and other districts where the Mongol dialects were spoken, with Hailar slated as the seat of the projected government. Accordingly two conferences were called by him in 1919, at which some self-appointed representatives of the above-mentioned districts were present.

On the other hand, Japan was not slow to see her

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[1] L. Forbath and J. Geleta, "The New Mongolia," pp. 210-211.

opportunity now. Since 1918 Japan had been invading Siberia in contributing her share to the Allied Intervention against the Bolsheviks. Her covetous eye was naturally cast upon Outer Mongolia. So, Japanese agents, all of a sudden, were seen at Urga bent upon cajoling the Hutukhtu to join Semenov's party.[1] But their persuasion bore no fruit.

These surrounding dangers were already enough to make the Mongols afraid. Yet, simultaneously internal unrest was also steadily rising among themselves. Prior to the Autonomy, the Mongols had to contribute only a limited amount of money to the revenue of the Hutukhtu. But under the Autonomous Government, levies became unbearably heavy. The Russian Revolution made it necessary for the Government to prepare for any possible exigencies, which again meant further burden on the poor Mongol subjects. Furthermore, now that the Russian Bear was no longer dependable, the Mongols deeply felt their being isolated and being dangerously exposed to foreign aggression -- from Japan on the east, the Red Russians on the north and the Chinese irredentists on the south. The state of insecurity has always been a cause for anxiety; and it made no exception to the Mongols. Again, for many years Russian currency had been widely used as the medium of exchange and store of value. Now

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[1] Cf. "Conference on the Limitation of Armaments," official bulletins published in the Washington Conference, 24th meeting, p. 1394, and especially p. 1398, a "concise statement" read by Baron Shidehara, the Japanese delegate.

they found the old Russian money was practically "not worth a Continental." This hit the Mongols greatly. Such being the conditions in Outer Mongolia, the one-time Sinophobes now came to recall their good old days under the Chinese aegis.

Given this situation, the Chinese, always on the alert, swung into action. According to the Tripartite Agreement of 1915, Chinese troops, as well as Russian troops, were required not to be stationed in Outer Mongolia. But now the precarious position of Outer Mongolia compelled it to seek Chinese aid. Therefore, arrangement was made in June 1918 that China was to send a battalion of troops, or more, if necessary, into Outer Mongolia to strengthen its defense, but as soon as the situation was stabilized, these troops should be withdrawn. By March 1919, a battalion (actually comprising two battalions) of Chinese cavalry already drilled at Urga. The Russian Minister at Peking then lodged a protest on April 3, to which the Chinese Government merely replied:

> "The internal chaos of Russia has not yet been wiped out. Troops of many countries are still in Russian territory. Why did the Russian Government not lodge protests to all those countries? Moreover, inasmuch as Outer Mongolia is an integral part of Chinese territory, China cannot remain indifferent to the maintenance of order in that region. The Chinese Government, when required by the conditions in Outer

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"The internal chaos of Russia has not yet been wiped out. Troops of many countries are still in Russian territory. Why did the Russian Government not lodge protests to all those countries? Moreover, inasmuch as Outer Mongolia is an integral part of Chinese territory, China cannot regard interference by the administration of China in that region. The Chinese Government, even weighed by the conditions in other

Mongolia to send troops there for the purpose of maintaining order, is taking a justifiable measure.... Therefore, the Russian protest sounds only too extraordinary."[1]

When such military arrangement was being carried out, some other political maneuverings were under way. Early in February 1919 the Chinese Government had instructed the High Commissioner at Urga to initiate negotiations on propitious occasion with the Outer Mongolian Government with a view to concluding a new treaty in place of the Tripartite Agreement. The intention of the Chinese Government was that if such a new treaty as proposed could be signed, it might be advantageously used in time as a legal excuse to keep the Russians out and as a bargaining tool in the later negotiations for the recognition of a new Russian government. The gist of the instruction was as follows:

> "The new treaty should be negotiated on the basis of a transference to us (China) of all the rights and interests which Russia has acquired under the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 1912. Besides.....there should be no restriction to the stationing of Chinese troops in Outer Mongolia....In a word, the purpose is to extirpate Russian influence on the one hand, and to

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 360, note 48.

> strengthen the solidarity between us and the Mongols on the other."[1]

The efforts of the Chinese High Commissioner met with favorable response from the Mongols, as might be expected. In a conference of the princes and the lamas, it was decided that Semenov's suggestion of resuming independence should be rejected and that China's aid should be solicited. On one score the princes and the lamas did dissent with each other; the former were in favor of outright cancellation of autonomy, while the latter hoped for preservation of it. In August 1919 the princes expressed _sub rosa_ their desire to cancel autonomy outright to the High Commissioner and asked for substantial aid from the Chinese Government to ward off Russian intervention which was anticipated, and to iron out the internal differences among the Mongols themselves. Up to this point the Russians were still kept uninformed of the game being played in confidence.

The Peking Government naturally would see no anathema in such proffer, and official endorsement was accordingly granted. At the same time the Hutukhtu, convinced by his princes, willingly okayed the proposed cancellation. Thus, a protocol consisting of sixty-three articles was initialed and sent to Peking for sanction.[2] In this agreement considerable

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, _op. cit._, vol. I, p. 349.
[2] Chang Chung-fu, _op. cit._, vol. I, p. 352; C. L. Chu, _op. cit._, p. 162.

latitude in the management of their own affairs and fair treatment by the Chinese Government were promised the Mongols by the High Commissioner.

So far, so good. But unpleasant things were also happening. Early in June 1919, in order to strengthen China's defense on her northern frontier, the Peking Government appointed a certain General Hsu Shu-cheng, nephew of President Hsu Shih-chang, then heading the Peking Government, as Commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Frontier Defense Force.[1] Few good soldiers have made good diplomats; this is especially true with General Hsu, unscrupulous by nature, and domineering by his profession. Upon his arrival at Urga on an alleged mission of military inspection, he began to take matters into his own hands. He opposed to a conditional surrender of autonomy, as promised by the draft agreement, and insisted upon a Mongol abnegation of the autonomous régime before further agreement could be thrashed out. This the Hutukhtu and the princes vehemently opposed. Infuriated by the determined objection General Hsu, on November 16, 1919, peremptorily compelled the Outer Mongolian Ministers and Vice Ministers to sign a petition for the cancellation of autonomy under the

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[1] It was reported that Japan played a part in the dispatch of the Northwestern Frontier Defense Force and the appointment of General Hsu as its Commander-in-Chief. For a more detailed account of the story, see A. E. Khodorov, "Mongolia and its Claimants," The Living Age, vol. 314, August 5, 1922, p. 336.

points of his bayonets. With this command the Mongols officials could not but comply, though grudgingly. Yet, the Hutukhtu still could not be persuaded to attach his name to the document. The petition, as it appeared in the Peking press, is translated as follows:

> "We, the Ministers and Vice Ministers.....of all the departments of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, and all the princes, dukes, hutukhtus and lamas and others resident at Urga, hereby jointly and severally submit the following petition for the esteemed perusal of His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:
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> "Outer Mongolia has been a dependency of China since the reign of the Emperor Kangsi, remaining loyal for over two hundred years, the entire population, from princes and dukes down to the common people having enjoyed the blessings of peace. During the reign of the Emperor Taokwang changes in the established institutions, which were opposed to Mongolian sentiment, caused dissatisfaction which was aggravated by the corruption of the administration during the last days of the Manchu Dynasty. Taking advantage of this Mongolian dissatisfaction, foreigners instigated and assisted the independence movement. After the Kiakhta Convention was signed, Outer Mongolia lost many of its

old rights and privileges. Since the establishment of this autonomous government no progress whatsoever has been chronicled, the affairs of government being indeed plunged in a state of chaos, causing deep pessimism.

"Lately, chaotic conditions have also resigned supreme in Russia, reports of revolutionary elements threatening our frontiers having been frequently received. Moreover, since the Russians have no united government it is only natural that they are powerless to carry out the provisions of the treaties, and now that they have no control over their subjects the Buriat tribes have constantly conspired and cooperated with bandits, and repeatedly sent delegates to Urga urging our Government to join with them and form a Pan-Mongolian nation. That this propaganda work, so varied and so persistent, which aims at usurping Chinese suzerainty and undermining the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, does more harm than good to Outer Mongolia, our Government is fully aware....

"Now that both our internal and external affairs have reached such a climax, we, the members of the Government, in view of the present situation, have assembled all the princes, dukes, lamas and others and have held frequent meetings to discuss the question of our

> future welfare. Those present have been unanimously of the opinion that the old bond of friendship having been restored, our autonomy should be cancelled since Chinese and Mongolians are filled with a common purpose and ideal.
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> "The result of our decision has been duly reported to His Holiness the Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu Khan and has received his approval and support. Such being the position we now unanimously petition His Excellency The President of China that the old order of affairs be restored."[1]

At the same time, the Mongol leaders also made the following declaration:

> "It is our hope that the Central Government will fix the system of Government of Outer Mongolia in accordance with the circumstances of various banners and leagues....It is our only desire that the Republic of five races should thrive and its people enjoy peace and prosperity. In connection with our foreign intercourse, we beg further to state that it was on account of the declaration of autonomy that in former days the Sino-Russo-Mongolian Agreement and the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol were concluded and notes between

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[1] Roy Chapman Andrews, "Across Mongolian Plains," xxi-xxiii.

China and Russia were exchanged. Since we are willing to renounce autonomy, all these instruments are null and void automatically. As to the commercial enterprises started by Russians in Outer Mongolia, the Central Government must undertake the responsibility of making arrangements with the Russians when their new government is established, so as to promote the friendship between China and Russia, and to protect our interests....."[1]

Accordingly, the President of China proclaimed the cancellation of Outer Mongolian Autonomy on November 22, 1919. The proclamation said, in part:

"Their petition is hereby granted, and the desires of the people of Outer Mongolia are hereby complied with. The dignity of the Hutukhtu shall, hereafter, be preserved and the rights and privileges of the Chiefs of the Four Leagues respected. The old system obtaining under the late Manchu Dynasty is hereby restored, and specially favorable treatment shall be given to Outer Mongolia. I, the President, hope that peace and good relations will forever be maintained between the Central Government and Outer Mongolia."[2]

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1. Millard's Review, vol. II, p. 12; Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
2. Ibid, vol. II, pp. 12-13; Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 353-354.

In this manner, the autonomous régime of Outer Mongolia was cancelled "voluntarily." This tremendous part of extramural China henceforward would be at the disposal of the Peking Government. All the international agreements entered into during the last decade between China, Russia and Mongolia were also declared null and void. Apparently, judging from the immediate gain, it was a most successful piece of China's opportunism. But so far as the effect of this compulsory cancellation is concerned, it is, indeed, a most regrettable faux pas on the part of China. First of all, the cancellation of autonomy had already been desired and proposed by the Mongols and a settlement by means of diplomacy, with satisfaction to both parties, was already on the point of accomplishment. If the Chinese authorities had properly exploited the Mongol psychology, as the Russians had done before, the result would indeed have been a masterly stroke. To substitute diplomacy with force at this time not only made bitter foes of potential friends, but also was suggestive of the imperialistic ways of the Western Powers, to which the Chinese people were, by their long tradition, most averse. Secondly, as a consequence of this unwise measure, the Mongols, changed their mind almost in a flash. Such a strong distrust in, and disgust for, China was again struck into their minds that China has never been able to win back the Mongol good will up to this very day. And lastly, this change

of mind on the part of the Mongols led them to look to Semenov for help, from whom they had been so anxious to keep away. If the Chinese Government had had more respect for the Mongol dignity, and thus secured whole-hearted cooperation of the Mongols, it would have been well-nigh impossible for Semenov to succeed in his invasion of Outer Mongolia. In sum, to judge the act of General Hsu, if judge we can, we cannot but indict it as a big crime.

On the day when the Presidential Proclamation was issued, another order was given conferring upon the Hutukhtu the title of "Lishan Fuhus Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu Khan." In December 1919 General Hsu, instead of being censured, was commissioned as High Commissioner for Northwestern Frontier Defense with charge of rehabilitation and pacification affairs of Outer Mongolia.[1] Offices of the former Autonomous Government were incorporated into the Office of the High Commissioner. The Mongol troops were disarmed.[2] A Mongolian Bank was established with a capital of $10,000,000, and having its head office at Peking. Use of Russian currency was outlawed. Three battalions of troops were sent to garrison the border posts from which invasion by White Russians was expected to

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1. In addition, there were also appointed two Vice Commissioners at Uliassutai and Kobdo, and a Civil Administrator at Kiakhta.
2. China Year Book, 1923, p. 674.

come. As regards civil administration, General Hsu pushed through many drastic measures in reversal of the traditional policy of lenient treatment.[1] Everything looked well, but augured ill. In the following pages, we shall see how after a brief respite a violent storm came eventually.

Russian protests were naturally lodged with the Chinese Government. However, the Czarist régime was then already overthrown, the whole of Russia was still caught in internal chaos. Her protests, however strongly worded, were paid but little heed by China.[2]

III. The White Russians and the Independent Government of Outer Mongolia

As Czarist Russia had taken advantage of the Chinese Revolution to engineer the independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911, so China retaliated by cancelling the Mongol autonomy in 1919 in the course of the Russian Revolution. But there was a difference between the two cases: in the former case Russia was a unified country, backed by her superior force, and therefore had the upper hand in driving a bargain after

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 355-356; Far Eastern Review, February 1920, pp. 106-107.

[2] Cheng Chung-tsu, op. cit., pp. 7-8; China Year Book, 1921-1922, p. 579. It should be noted that although the Czarist Government had been overthrown, the Chinese Government continued to recognize the old Russian diplomatic and consular officers as Russia's official representatives in China.

some _fait accompli_ had been created; while in the latter, China, although as opportunistic and audacious as Russia had been, did not, however, have her own house in order, and was ever handicapped by her lamentable weakness. Little wonder that China's post-Cancellation honeymoon in Outer Mongolia was even more shortlived than the Autonomy itself. The year of 1920 had hardly run its course when adversity again overtook China.

As we have seen above, General Hsu, during his reign over Outer Mongolia as High Commissioner, carried out a sort of paternalistic rule in Outer Mongolia.[1] It was only his superior force that made things go on. But in July 1920, with the fall of the An-fu clique in China, General Hsu was ousted and deprived of all his public offices. His forces were also ordered to dissolve. The Mongols quickly sensed what these events might mean to them. The same princes and lamas, who had petitioned for the cancellation of autonomy, now stood out for its resumption. Both the White Russians and the Red Russians, whom they had so dreaded, were now approached by Mongol emissaries for armed assistance.[2] To choose between two evils, the Hutukhtu could not but turn his back to his

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[1] For instance, he compelled the Mongols to pay taxes for the full period since the autonomy was established. His troops also engaged in a crude and cruel purging campaign throughout the country. Ferdinand Ossendowski, "Black Magic of Mongolia," _Asia_, vol. 22, 1922, p. 586.

[2] F. A. Larson, "The Lamas of Mongolia," _Atlantic Monthly_, vol. 145, March 1930, p. 378.

own warning against Russia when he was gravely sick in 1914. Furthermore, a loan of $6,000,000 was secured from the Japanese agent at Harbin on the good security of Mongol forests and mineral resources.[1] During the interregnum when General Hsu was gone, and the new High Commissioner not yet sworn in, things developed rapidly in Outer Mongolia.

Then, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, a White Russian and a lieutenant of Semenov, became the central figure on the Mongolian scene for about a year. This man, half Magyar, half Russian, was married to a Manchurian princess, and deeply versed in Buddhistic mysticism. He sought to establish a Buddhist empire embracing Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet, with the Hutukhtu as the titular ruler and himself the actual head of the State. He and his band, being hard pressed by the Reds, filtered into Outer Mongolia in August 1920, and launched an attack on Urga in October.[2] The vigilant Chinese garrisons succeeded in repulsing the invaders; and the Hutukhtu and several princes were put under custody on charge of disloyalty towards the Republic. The confinement of the Hutukhtu was regarded as an unprecedented sacrilege in the eyes of the Mongols. Hostile sentiments ran high and a revolt seemed imminent. This Mongol discontent was accentuated to a higher pitch when the Chinese troops availed themselves of this occasion to

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[1] Chang Chung-fu, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 357.
[2] A. E. Khodorov, "Mongolia and its Claimants," The Living Age, vol. 314, August 5, 1922, p. 337.

plunder the foreign population of Urga, including about 2,000 Russians, many of whom were imprisoned, ill-treated and even shot. In spite of such internal unstability, the Chinese grip on the Mongol situation would not have slipped off so easily, as it turned out to do later, if the Peking Government had applied itself to the task of strengthening the frontier defense. But, unfortunately, things did not come out this way. After the Peking Government, anticipating further incursions from Siberia and possibly a revolt of the Mongols, appropriated a sum of $500,000 to Chang Tso-lin, war-lord of Manchuria, to lead his army to Outer Mongolia, he only took the order, pocketed the money, and then never sent a man to Urga. As anticipated, the mad Baron came back in February, 1921, with 5,000 Russian, Mongolian, Buriat, and Japanese soldiers, and routed the handful Chinese army; before Chinese reinforcements could arrive, Urga had fallen into Ungern's hands.

Immediately after Urga fell, an "Independent Government of Outer Mongolia" was set up on March 21, with the Hutukhtu as the puppet ruler, and Ungern, who had declared himself a Mongolian subject, as his supreme military adviser. It need not be said that Ungern was the real dictator. His authority was shortly extended to other parts of Outer Mongolia, when the towns of Kobdo, Uliassutai, and Wang-Kuren were captured

by local Russian White Guards.[1] With himself thus established, he proceeded to carry out a reign of the blackest terror. A cruel purge was conducted among the Mongols, the Chinese, the Jews, and even his own followers.[2] Then, in May 1921, on the occasion of the triumphal coronation of the Hutukhtu, he launched a fantastic appeal, full of quotations from the Apocalypse and the Lamaist scriptures, for a punitive expedition against the Red Russians.[3] Soon afterwards, he was found marching northward toward Kiakhta at the head of his band, only to court disaster.

IV. The Red Russians and the Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia

Meanwhile, under the auspices of the Red Russians, a People's Revolutionary Party of Mongolia was organised in 1918 at Trans-Baikalia, Siberia, [4] and on March 13, 1921 a Provisional People's Revolutionary Government was proclaimed by the Party at Kiakhta. This Provisional Government immediately

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1. *China Year Book, 1923*, p. 675.
2. For accounts of Ungern's diabolic cruelty, see L. Forbath and J. Geleta, *op. cit.*, chapters 26 & 28; F. Ossendowski, "With Baron Ungern at Urga," *Asia*, vol. 22, August 1922, pp. 614-618.
3. China Year Book, 1923, p. 676.
4. Alfred L. P. Dennis, *"The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia,"* p. 322; Tennyson Tan, *"The Political Status of Mongolia,"* p. 66. This group of Mongols consisted of a few semi-educated Mongols mostly Russian subjects, such as Bodo, formerly a typist of the Russian Consulate-General at Urga. *China Year Book, 1923*, p. 675.

solicited the intervention of the Russian Communists. The request was readily honored. A joint military expedition organized by Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic then swept into Mongolia and in May defeated Ungern's men in an encounter in the vicinity of Kiakhta. Ungern was captured alive and later executed. The Reds marched into Urga in July 1921. On July 12, the Independent Government of Mongolia, was officially dissolved, and its function taken over by the Provisional People's Revolutionary Government. The following edict was issued by the outgoing Government upon its abdication:

> "To the Provisional People's Revolutionary Government from the Ministry of Interior of the old Government:
> We Mongolians, under the pressure of the circumstances of the times, have lost our rights of autonomous government to the benefit of the Chinese, the autocratic reactionaries. Last year an officer of the Russian White Party, Baron Ungern, with his forces, invaded Mongolian territory, mobilized Mongolian soldiers, and thus reinforcing himself, gave battle and drove out from Urga the Chinese officers and soldiers. In accordance with the declaration of Baron Ungern of the need of establishing the autonomous government by all princes and influential people, the latter, after a discussion of this question, put the Bozhdikhan (the Hutukhtu) on the

precious throne and created the *yamen* of Internal Affairs and all the other five *yamens*.

"In view of the fact that Baron Ungern with his forces left for the north, and in view of the weakness of our forces and the lack of armament, and also in view of the possibility of an assault by the Chinese reactionaries, as early as last year, an appeal for the assistance was made to foreign powers by the Bozhdilkhan and many princes, who, obtaining such assistance, established at Kiakhta a people's government, which mobilized model forces, and having driven out the 'ghamens' laid the foundation of the State of Mongolia, fortifying the nation and improving the conditions of the masses as Urga, the capital, was occupied on the first of the second moon.

"After the occupation of Urga the People's Government together with the officials of our five old ministries opened free discussions, which resulted in resolving to establish immediately a new People's Government in accord with the requirements of the times and the progress of the people, leaving the Bogda Khan on the throne and handing all seals and documents of all ministries to the new People's Government. This resolution was reported to the Bogda Khan, who sanctioned it, and on fifth day of the sixth moon at

> a joint conference the handing over of the said seals and documents of the Ministry of Interior and the rest of the ministries to the chairman of the People's Government was held. The Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia is hereby informed of the aforesaid for its consideration in accepting the power, and at the same time the public in all localities is being informed to this effect.
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> "By many established on the 5th day of the 6th moon, 11th year."[1]

Thereupon, Bodo, the new Mongolian Prime Minister, holding concurrently the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a declaration which runs, in part,

> "...Having no desire to bear the yoke of usurpers and bandits the Mongolian people from all ends of the Mongolian earth arose in arms against the oppressor, and joined in the ranks of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, which had been organised by the best representatives of the nation and which had received the assistance of the Government of Soviet Russia in this cause. In cooperation with the latter we have succeeded in liberating almost all of our territory from the hands of Ungern....The country is ruled by

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[1] Leo Pasvolsky, "Present Status of Mongolia," _The Baltimore Sun_, November 28, 1921; _The Nation_, vol. 113, October 26, 1921, p. 486.

> the People's Government....The Government has made it its aim to free the people from foreign oppression and from those hardships which we had to bear before. The People's Government, resting upon the broad basis of the national movement for the liberation of Mongolia, granted the people their civil rights and secured for them the full opportunity to enjoy these liberties...."[1]

In August, the new Government sent a request to Russia that the Red Army remain in Mongolia, so as to preserve the "security of the territory of Mongolia and of the frontiers of the R.S.F.S.R.", until "the complete removal of the menace from the common enemy." Such a request naturally was acceded to.[2] So, during the short period of one year and a half, the Chinese came in and went out; the White Russians came in and went out; while the Japanese were sticking to her hands-off policy, it was now the turn of Soviet Russia to stay in Outer Mongolia.

As regards the initial steps undertaken by the new Government, a passage from the Irkutsk magazine Peoples of the Far East, (No. 3, 1921) may be quoted, although the

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[1] The Nation, vol. 113, November 23, 1921, p. 605.

[2] Leo Pasvolsky, "Russia in the Far East," p. 176. However, the troops sent by the Far Eastern Republic at Chita were withdrawn soon after the campaigns were over. Paul S. Reinsch, "Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia," The Nation, vol. 114, May 3, 1922, p. 525.

authenticity of it is still uncertain:

> "The new Government immediately set out to organize the financial and economic apparatus of the cooperative groups are being organized all over the country. In Urga a number of Chinese, America and Russo-Tartar commercial enterprises have been established, besides a military leather factory, a laboratory for anti-djuma serum, several workshops for military necessities, and a printing shop. Little by little the Government machinery is establishing contacts with the outlying districts."[1]

V. The Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of 1921

In order to legalize her hold on Outer Mongolia, Soviet Russia signed a secret treaty, on November 5, 1921, with the People's Revolutionary Government to the following effect,

1. The Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary Mongol Governments recognize each other as the only governments in the territory of Russia and Mongolia.

2. They agree mutually to respect each other, and not allow on their territory the formation of groups, or the recruiting of troops hostile to one of the Contracting Parties, as also not to allow the transportation of arms and the transit of troops hostile to one of the Contracting Parties

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[1] The Nation, vol. 113, November 23, 1921, p. 605.

through their territory.

3. Both Governments will establish, at their discretion, consulates in necessary places.

4. The question of frontier delimitation must be decided immediately by a mixed Russo-Mongol commission.

5. Citizens of either of the parties, residing on the territory of the other, shall enjoy the same rights and perform the same duties as citizens of the most favored nations. Both parties agree that in case one of the Contracting Parties should grant to citizens of some third countries special privileges in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, court procedure, or execution of sentences, these privileges shall automatically be extended also to the citizens of the other Party.

6. Taxes on imports and exports will also be fixed by a mixed commission.

7. The Soviet Russian Government undertakes to establish in Mongolia, free of charge, postal and telegraphic communications and will supply the necessary materials for this purpose, whereupon a special postal and telegraphic convention will be signed.

8. The Mongolian Government recognizes the right of land property of Russian nationals within the territory of Mongolia, and agrees to give the ground space necessary for buildings of diverse kinds and for railways, built with

Russian capital.

9. The present Treaty comes into force from the day of the signature by the representatives of the Contracting Parties.[1]

This Treaty was not made public until November 11, when the Moscow _Izvsstya_ of that day printed a statement of the Foreign Office of the Russian Government giving the news of the Treaty.[2]

A glance at the provisions of the Treaty will reveal that it is not only an unequal treaty between Russia and Mongolia, but also constitutes an infringement upon the sovereignty of China. If the Soviet Government of Russia had intended to respect China's sovereignty in Mongolia, it should have known that Mongolia, as a part of China, was without any right to negotiate a treaty of a political character with a foreign country. The very fact that Russia did sign such a treaty is sufficient evidence of her desire to detach that region from the Chinese Republic. And this was done by a revolutionary government that professed to preach the gospel of anti-imperialism to the oppressed world. Indeed, this Soviet policy is only too reminiscent of the old Czarist credo to make itself differentiated from imperialism. To comment upon the ways of the Soviet diplomacy, a sentence from Mr.

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[1] _China Year Book, 1924_, pp. 578 ff.
[2] _The Nation_, vol. 114, Jan. 4, 1922, p. 28.

Leo Pasvolsky may fittingly be quoted here:

> "Though the details differ, the basic lines of the Imperial and the Soviet diplomacy in this (Mongolian) particular instance coincide most remarkably."[1]

VI. The Soviet-Mongolian Secret Treaty of 1923

In February 1923 a secret Soviet-Mongolian Agreement was again concluded to the effect that,

1. The Government of Outer Mongolia should nationalise all forests, mineral resources and land in Outer Mongolia, and prohibit private ownership thereof. Such nationalized resources would be alloted to the Mongol proletariat and farmers of Soviet Russia for development or cultivation;

2. The management of all mines in Outer Mongolia should be entrusted to Soviet workmen's organizations;

3. Outer Mongolia should employ Soviet engineers and technicians for the purpose of exploiting its natural resources as well as of developing its industry and trade;

4. A Revolutionary Committee and a Military Committee should be organised in Outer Mongolia to carry on domestic administration for the time being, and afterwards a People's Assembly should be convoked with a view to drafting a constitution.

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[1] Leo Pasvolsky, "The Ways of Soviet Diplomacy," The Independent, vol. 108, March 4, 1922, p. 213.

6. Soviet troops might station in Outer Mongolia in order to help the Mongolian people resist the Chinese encroachments.[1]

This secret Treaty is significant in that it set the pattern after which the Mongol Constitution of the next year was to be molded. It also serves as a conclusive testimony to the statement that the People's Republic of Mongolia, established in 1924, is primarily a Russian product.

VII. The Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924

In spite of the determination of the People's Revolutionary Government to sever all administrative connections with China, it was, nevertheless, eager to enter into normal diplomatic relations with the latter, for while Outer Mongolia was still recognized by the whole world as part of Chinese territory, the legal status of the Revolutionary Government had to be established through dealings with its former suzerain. Furthermore, a conservative yet powerful faction in the Revolutionary Party was also vociferously clamoring for adjusting Sino-Mongolian relations to a normal track. Therefore, the Mongolian Foreign Minister, Bodo, declared on October 6, 1921 that

> "The People's Government of Mongolia cherishes no unfriendly feelings to the Middle State (China) and

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[1] Mo Ko Tai Kang, Appendix II, pp. 550-551.

> contemplates no hostile acts whatever against the latter on condition of complete non-intervention on the part of China in the internal affairs of Mongolia in general and non-intervention with the exercise of the principles of national independence and the democratic system of government proclaimed by the People's Government in particular. Firmly convinced that it is an urgent necessity for China and Mongolia to take steps towards the speediest restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations, the People's Government is certain that this question will be solved in a manner favorable to Mongolia and for the welfare and peace of both nations."[1]

The intention of the declaration was presumably to sound out the attitude of the Chinese Government with respect to the question of recognizing the fait accompli of Mongolian independence. This appeal China naturally put aside. But, at the same time, the People's Government had requested the Soviet Government to offer her good offices, and on September 14, 1921 the Moscow Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin gave the following telegraphic answer to the Mongolian Foreign Minister:

> "More than once has the Russian Government approached the Government of China, both directly and through the

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1. Izvestya, October 6, 1921.

> representatives of the Far Eastern Republic who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin negotiations on this (Mongolian) question. In the near future the Russian Government expects to enter into permanent relationships with the Government of China by means of a trade delegation which is being sent to Peking. The Russian Government notes with joy the readiness of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government to enter into negotiations with China on this question, as expressed in Citizen Bodo's note of September 10th. It hopes that the Chinese Government will receive favorably this offer, in order to remove the possibility of a conflict between the peoples and the governments of Mongolia and China."[1]

The Soviet Government being ready to take a part in the Mongolian efforts to reconcile with China, things naturally became much easier.

On the part of China, the previous Soviet offer of armed assistance to restore order in Outer Mongolia had been persistently yet politely refused. On November 10, 1920, when Ungern was embarking upon his first assault on Urga, Moscow wired the Peking Government to the effect that "at the instance of the Chinese authorities at Urga," Soviet Russia

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[1] China Year Book, 1923, pp. 679-680.

had decided to order the Red forces to help repress the White bandits. Peking, fearing the undesirable consequence of such a move, immediately set out to disavow the truth of this statement.[1] The collapse of Ungern's forces, however, forestalled the contemplated intervention of the Soviets. Subsequently, on November 27, Moscow again volunteered by notifying that

> "Should the followers of Semenov be found again within the boundaries of Mongolia and should the Chinese authorities apply to Russia for assistance, such assistance will be given."[2]

Peking again disclaimed any intention to request Soviet assistance. When eventually Soviet troops, without bothering to consult Peking, marched into Urga, and set up the People's Revolutionary Government, the Chinese Republic again remonstrated, but in vain. A wave of indignation swept over China; the cry for a chastising expedition was resounding throughout the country. But the internal situation, as it stood then, made any such undertaking impossible.

Such uncompromising attitude of China was vividly reflected in the early negotiations between China and Russia for China's recognition of the Soviet Government. Towards the end of 1920, the first Soviet mission, headed by the Soviet

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[1] Tennyson Tan, op. cit., p. 65.
[2] Leo Pasvolsky, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

delegate, M. Yourin, came to Peking with the avowed purpose of negotiating a trade agreement. But the negotiation foundered when the news of the Soviet occupation of Urga came as a shock to the Chinese Government. In the fall of 1921 another negotiation for the settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway problem was again put aside because of the refusal of the Soviet mission to discuss the Mongolian question. In February 1922 the situation looked a little brighter when on February 14 the *Shanghaiskaya Zhisn* published an amicable correspondence between General Li Yuan, representing China, and Mr. A. Paykes, representing the Soviet Government. The note sent by General Li to Mr. Paykes, dated February 2, 1922, reads, in part,

> "Having had the honor of carrying on negotiations with you on the question of the evacuation of Urga and Kiakhta, I am quite convinced by your assurances that the Soviet Government had no aggressive intentions in regard to Mongolia and that you are authorized by the Soviet Government to declare that the Soviet Government is willing to remove its troops from the territory of China. As a representative of the Central Government of the Republic of China, I have the honor to inform you that your declaration not only bears witness to your sincerity and the friendly intentions of your Government, but that it has

> been received with a feeling of joy by our people which sees in Russia a sincere friend...."[1]

To this note, Mr. Paykes made a reply on February 7, 1922,

> "....Replying to your letter of February 2, I inform you again that the Soviet Government has no aggressive intentions as regards Mongolia and that it looks forward impatiently to the moment when the Peking Government will reach an agreement with the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia at the request of which the Soviet troops temporarily remain in Mongolia to help in the dissolution of the White bands and in maintaining order."[2]

But this correspondence, though amicable, cannot be taken as too heartening. It is welcomed in China only because the Soviet Government disclaimed by its official words any aggressive intentions towards Mongolia and promised to evacuate "ultimately." However, from between the lines of the Russian note, the implication still cannot be mistaken that Russia has ever recognized Mongolia as a separate entity, and an agreement between it and China was deemed by the Soviets as a condition precedent to their withdrawal.

Soon the situation took a turn for worse. News of the secret Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of 1921 leaked out just at this

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1. The Nation, vol. 114, May 3, 1922, P. 546.
2. ~~The Nation, vol. 114, May 3, 1922, p. 546.~~

Ibid,

crucial moment. Chinese indignation ran higher and higher. As if this were not enough to enrage the emberrassed Chinese, the Mongolian representatives at Moscow later declared that "no treaties, neither political nor economic nor of any other kind, exist between China and Mongolia." This statement served only to fling fat in the fire. Therefore, on May 1, 1922, an abrupt note was forwarded to Mr. Paykes of the Soviet delegation, who was still lingering at Peking:

> "According to the recent report of General Li Yuan on the subject of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, we asked you about this matter when you first arrived in Peking and you replied that it was entirely untrue. However, during a recent conversation with you I again put the question to you, owing to the recent publication by the papers of the text of the treaty, and you admitted the truth of this report.
>
> "The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared to the Chinese Government 'that all previous treaties made between the Russian Government and China shall be null and void, that the Soviet Government renounces all encroachments on Chinese territory and all concessions within China, and that the Soviet Government will unconditionally and forever return what has been forcibly seized from China by the former Imperial Russian Government and the Bourgeoisie.'

> "Now the Soviet Government has suddenly gone back on its own words and secretly and without any right concluded a treaty with Mongolia. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government is similar to the policy of the former Imperial Russian Government toward China.
>
> "It must be observed that Mongolia is a part of Chinese territory and as such has long been recognized by all countries. In secretly concluding a treaty with Mongolia, the Soviet Government has not only broken faith with its previous declarations, but also violates all principles of justice.
>
> "The Chinese Government finds it difficult to tolerate such action, and therefore we solemnly lodge a protest with you to the effect that any treaty secretly concluded between the Soviet Government and Mongolia will not be recognized by the Chinese Government.
>
> "You are respectfully requested to transmit this note to the Soviet Government at Moscow."[1]

Such being the situation, the immediate reestablishment of Sino-Soviet relations seemed beyond hope.

Under these circumstances Moscow did not lose its heart. In August 1922 another mission, headed by the renowned M. Joffe, was sent to Peking with the aim of settling all

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[1] Peking Daily News, May 6, 1922.

outstanding issues, including the Mongolian problem, between China and Russia. Upon his arrival at Harbin Joffe published a statement expressing the opinion of the Soviet Government that,

> "While the West is searching for outlets for economic and financial alliances, tossing about from international conference to another, from one witty combination to another, from Geneva to the Hague, the East is accumulating strength and becoming more a powerful factor in international politics."[1]

Continuing, he asserted,

> "The position which China is gaining every day in international politics indicates the necessity of establishing friendly relations between Russia and China on a basis of equality and strict observance of sovereignty between both parties. Soviet Russia is watching with great attentiveness the national struggle in China, since the Soviet Russia is the only country which rejects all imperialistic policies. With hope we watch the growing national consciousness of the many millions of Chinese people, because, in line with the Russian Revolution, the awakening of the Chinese people is a factor of immense historical significance."[2]

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1. Tennyson Tan, op. cit., p. 72.
2. Ibid.

China, never too intransigent, was thus cajoled to re-enter into negotiations with the new Soviet delegate.

At the very outset of the pourparlers China raised the question of the presence of Red troops in Outer Mongolia and demanded their immediate evacuation as a sine qua non to further settlements. This demand Joffe rebutted on the ground that "the stationing of Russian troops in Mongolia concerns Chinese interests no less than the Russian interests."[1] Meanwhile, Chinese merchants were vehemently protesting against the exorbitant taxation under the new régime in Outer Mongolia, accusing the Russians of often making their own valuation of Chinese goods freely and levying duty thereupon equal to the actual value of the merchandise. Among other complaints were the imposition of trade licensing taxes, a poll tax, special assessments for administrative purposes and numerous other taxes; the establishment of customs stations in the trading centers in Mongolia where a 20% ad valorem tax was imposed on Mongolian exports; detention of outgoing horses on the pretext that exportation had been prohibited, and the deportation of some 2,000 Chinese farmers, artisans, merchants and miners from Urga.[2] Such pressure being brought to bear upon the governmental authorities by the Chinese people, the conversation was again

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[1] K. S. Weigh, op. cit., p. 284.
[2] Tennyson Tan, op. cit., p. 73.

forced into a deadlock.[1]

In September Karakhan came to Peking to resume the negotiations. He was the author of the famous Karakhan Declarations toward China issued in 1919 and 1920, which pledged to seek the friendship of China and to relinquish all such special rights as the Czarist Russia had secured from China. He arrived in Peking on September 2, 1923, accompanied by a large retinue of experts and attaches, and declaring that while the foreign Powers wanted to see China remain "a sick man" without a strong army, divided, weak, entangled in internal difficulties, and thus incapable of resisting external aggression, only the Soviet Republics desired to see China strong, powerful, possessing a strong army, and capable of defending the interests and the sovereignty of her people, and so "the Great

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[1] After M. Joffe had failed his mission, he suddenly left Peking for Japan by way of Shanghai, where he held daily conferences with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was then in control of Canton and many parts in southern China as against the northern war-lords. On January 26, 1923, Dr. Sun and M. Joffe authorized the publication of a statement, of which the following passage concerns Mongolia:
"(4) M. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and has never been the intention, or purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, therefore, does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China, the more so on account of the inability of the present Government at Peking to prevent such an evacuation being followed by a recrudescence of intrigues and hostile activities by White Guardists against Russia and the creation of a graver situation than that which now exists."

Chinese people, with its culture, peacefulness, and exceptional diligence, is the best ally of the Russian people in Asia."[1]

However, the new Soviet delegate insisted upon securing *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government by China before discussion of the other impending questions could be started, while China stood for the reverse order. The negotiations were, indeed, protracted and painful; numerous impasses having to be tied over.[2] Finally both sides consented to compromise, and on May 31, 1924 an "Agreement on General Principles for the Outstanding Questions between The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was signed.[3] By this Agreement China formally recognized the Soviet Government of Russia. Most of the questions between the two countries were settled on terms of equality and reciprocity.[4] The articles

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[1] Tennyson Tan, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[2] *China Year Book, 1924*, pp. 1192 ff.
[3] The negotiations were too complicated to be treated at a length in this study. For details, cf. K. S. Weigh, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-302.
[4] Among other questions than the Mongolian problem, settled definitely or preliminarily, may be enumerated the following: the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations; the problem of Communist propaganda in China; the boundary questions; the problem of navigation on the frontier rivers; the Chinese Eastern Railway question; the abrogation of Russian extra-territorial and other related rights in China; the abrogation of the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity; the tariff problem; the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the two countries; and the claims for compensations against each other. Besides, there were also a Provisional Agreement for the Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway (6 articles), six Joint Declarations, and an exchange of notes.

~~The articles~~ relating to Mongolia are the following:

Article II. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold, within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, a Conference which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided in the following Articles.

Such detailed arrangements shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Article III. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annual at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contrasts, et cetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Czarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, et cetera, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of 1919 and 1920.

Article IV. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, et cetera, concluded between the former Czarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

Article V. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia -- namely, as to the time limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers -- are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

Also on the same day a Joint Declaration was issued with reference to Outer Mongolia,

> "The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China

> and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, et cetera, concluded between Russia since the Czarist régime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles."

The Sino-Soviet Agreement, on the whole, was satisfying to China, and up to now it still serves as the basis of Sino-Soviet relations. It was the first time in modern Chinese history that a treaty was concluded with a foreign power on such equal and reciprocal terms. In regard to Outer Mongolia, the Soviet recognition of China's sovereignty and the promise to withdraw her troops from that region also gladdened the Chinese people. A comparison of this Agreement with the former Russo-Sino-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement of 1915 will show the following improvements in favor of China. First, in the latter case, China was compelled to accept, explicitly or tacitly, the arrangements under the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of 1912; while in the former China was not required to recognize the validity of the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of 1921. Secondly, in the two previous documents,

China and Russia recognized co-jointly the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and pledged themselves to consultation, in all matters of a political nature, thus making Outer Mongolia practically under a Russo-Chinese condominium; while the new Agreement made no such impositions upon China. Thirdly, the Czarist Russia only recognized the "suzerainty" of China over Mongolia; while in the present Agreement, the Soviet Russia recognized the "sovereignty" of China.—Theoretically, there is a difference between these two terms: by the former the relationship between China and Mongolia was fixed as that between a suzerain and a vassal; whereas by the latter, China was still free to define the scope of her authority in Outer Mongolia. And lastly, in the Tripartite Agreement of 1915 Outer Mongolia was admitted as a member of the trio, standing on an equal footing in the negotiations with China and Russia; while no such status was accorded Outer Mongolia in the course of negotiating this Agreement.

This Agreement appears all the more satisfactory when compared with China's dealings with other countries at that time, that Dr. Dennis even dubbed it as China's Magna Carta. The injustice done to China by the Great Powers in the Paris Peace Conference with regard to the Shantung question, was still fresh in the memory of the Chinese people. The dismaying answers to the Chinese claims in the Washington Conference in no way diluted their suspicion and bitterness toward the outside world. The conclusion of this Agreement, by which

Soviet Russia voluntarily and so generously relinquished her extra-territorial rights in China naturally tended to create a contrast in the Chinese mind, and impressed the Chinese that Russia was a "genuine friend" of China. At the same time the Soviet agents spared no efforts to foment a second revolution against the war-lords' Peking Government, which the Chinese people hated most. Thus was laid the foundation for the Sino-Soviet rapprochement during the first years of the Punitive Campaigns of the Nationalists against the northern war-lords. It was not until 1927, when the National Government was founded at Nanking, that China went anti-Soviet as a result of her refusal to be Bolshevized by the latter, and with the result that Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, and were afterwards severed.

The Conference as provided for in Article II of the Agreement was not convened until August 26, 1925, 14 months overdue. The Conference did not sit long. In the spring of 1926, the Conference was indefinitely adjourned, for political reasons, and since then no effort has been made to resume negotiations. However, on March 6, 1925, prior to the abortive Conference, Russia had notified China that the Russian troops had been withdrawn with the consent of the Mongolian authorities.[1]

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[1] G. E. Sokolsky, "The Tinder Box of Asia," p. 183; Far Eastern Review, vol. 21, October 1925, pp. 631-632.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF OUTER MONGOLIA

1. The Constitution of the People's Republic

After the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, the Mongolian situation looked outwardly better, but the underlying forces remained unchanged. On the Soviet side, Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared soon after the Agreement was signed,

> "The Soviet Government recognizes Mongolia as a part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its internal affairs and to establish independent relations of Mongolia. It ought to be noted that after several crises the internal situation in Mongolia has settled down and been consolidated on a basis somewhat similar to the Soviet system."[1]

It is apparent from what Chicherin declared that despite her treaty commitments toward China, Soviet Russia had no intention to quit Mongolia. And on the Mongol side, the radical segment of the revolutionaries had in their grip control of the Government, and they believed that to counteract the undesirable effect the Sino-Soviet Agreement might have on the Mongolian situation some positive measures should be

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[1] *China Year Book, 1925*, p. 428.

taken by the Mongols themselves. Thus, an Assembly was convoked on November 8, 1924, just six months after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement. Soviet Russia connived. Present at the Assembly were 77 deputies, elected by the Mongols. Of these 77, 6 belonged to the old nobility, 46 came from among the leaders of the national revolution, 13 were Independents, 6 lamas represented religious interests, and the remaining 6 belonged to various minor interest groups.[1] The Assembly proclaimed the Mongol land an independent "People's Republic of Mongolia", and formally adopted a Constitution, drafted closely on Soviet lines.[2]

The general principles laid down in the Constitution are the following:

1. Mongolia is proclaimed an independent People's Republic in which all powers belong to the labouring people. The feudal-theocratic régime should be abolished. The titles and class distinctions of the former ruling princes, etc., are abrogated, as well as the sovereign rights of the Hutukhtu, etc.[3]

2. All the lands, and mineral wealth, forests and waters and their resources, are the property of all the people. Private property is not allowed.

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[1] L. Forbath and J. Geleta, op. cit., p. 196.
[2] For text of the Constitution, see ~~Appendix II~~ China Year Book 1926, pp. 795-800.
[3] The last Hutukhtu had died on May 20, 1924, prior to the Assembly. The succession has since been ended.

3. The unified economic policy of the country is to be concentrated in the hands of the Government and a state monopoly of foreign trade is to be gradually introduced.

4. The Church shall be separated from the State, religion being a private concern of every citizen.

5. The people's freedom of opinion, of assembly, of unions, the right to free education, and the equality of rights, shall be guaranteed by the State, subject to deprivation or limitation of such should they use these rights to the detriment of the interests of the Republic.

6. In view of the fact that the labouring masses of the whole world are striving to uproot capitalism and to attain socialism, this Republic must coordinate its foreign policy with the interests and fundamental aims of small oppressed nations and the revolutionary workers of the whole world.

As for the organisation and functions of the government, the following may be noted:

1. The supreme power is vested in the Great Huruldan (People's Assembly) during its sessions; between such sessions, in the Small Huruldan (Standing Assembly); and during the period between the sessions of the latter, in the Presidium and the Government. No president shall be installed.

2. The Great Huruldan is composed of the representatives of the people, elected by the latter according to the proportion of the population of the electoral districts, and

for one year's term. The fundamental laws of the Republic can be approved and amended only by the Great Huruldan.

3. The Small Huruldan, composed of 30 members, is elected by, and responsible to, the Great Huruldan. It promulgates laws, decrees, etc., unifies the control over the higher organs of the Government, determines the sphere of competence of the Presidium and of the Government, and controls the execution of the fundamental laws of the Republic and of the decisions of the Great Huruldan.

4. The Presidium, consisting of 5 members, is elected by the Small Huruldan, and also responsible thereto. It controls the execution of the decisions of the Small Huruldan, directs the Government, and between the sessions of the Small Huruldan approves laws, etc., appoints and dismisses Ministers.

5. The Presidium calls the ordinary sessions of the Small Huruldan twice a year. The Small Huruldan calls the ordinary sessions of the Great Huruldan once a year.

6. The Government, or the Council of Ministers, is appointed by the Presidium. It attends to the general administration of the Republic. It consists of: the President (or the Prime Minister), the Vice President (or the Vice Prime Minister), the President of the Military and Economic Council, the Commander-in-Chief, the State Comptroller, and the Ministers -- of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, of

of War, of Finance, of Economics, of Justice, of Public Education, etc.

7. All citizens who have attained the age of 18 and earn their means of livelihood by their own labour or are busy with their own establishments based on their own labour, have the right to elect, and be elected to, the Khuruldans. All exploiters, usurers and traders who live on other people's work, former princes, hutukhtus, persons permanently residing in monasteries, insane persons, etc., may not elect and be elected.

The following chart shows the organizational outline of the People's Republic's national and local governments:


Great Huruldan
Small Huruldan
Presidium
Council of Ministers
President & Vice President
Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of the Interior
Minister of Animal Husbandry & Agriculture
Minister of Commerce & Industry
Minister of Communications
Minister of Post Service
Minister of Justice
Minister of Education
Minister of War
Minister of Public Health
Bureau of Legal Affairs
Bureau of Press & Publicity
Supreme Court
Attorney General
Dep't of Political Training
Hdqt of the Army
Aimak Council
Aimak Government
Somon Council
Somon Government
Bak Council
Bak Administrator

II. Political Parties

The People's Revolutionary Party, first organised with Soviet aid in 1918 and now the only legitimate political party in the People's Republic, is built on the model of the Communist Party of Russia, and was controlled by the Comintern. In 1939 the Party's membership roster had 12,000 entries.[1] The Party members are subject to the same rigid discipline as the Bolsheviks of Russia. All the members are required by the Party rules to abide by the orders of the highly centralized Party authorities, which exercise a sort of absolute control over the Party affairs. New members must pass through a probationary period -- for the common people, four months are required; but in the case of lamas, the period may extend over eight months.[2]

Beside the People's Revolutionary Party, there was once also a Mongol Revolutionary Youth Corps, composed mainly of the younger Mongols of the lower social strata,[3] with more

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1. The New International Year Book, 1944, p. 396. Its membership was only 23 at the beginning of its organization; by the close of 1921, rose to 150; in 1922, to 1,500; in 1923, to 2,500; in 1924, to 4,000; in 1925, to 6,200. As a result of the Party purge some 3,200 were expelled at the end of 1925. Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., p. 70.
2. Ibid, p. 71.
3. Its members numbered only 30 in August 1921; in January 1922, 300; in July 1923, 2,500; in 1924, over 4,000; in 1925 6,000; in 1931, 22,000. As a result of the purge up to 1934, 8,000 were dropped from its membership roster. According to a 1924 figure, 90% of its members came from the common family; while only 8.5% had been lamas, and 1.5%, nobles. Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., pp. 72-74.

radical leftist leanings. The Corps was originally independent of the Party, and kept direct connection with Moscow. Its rôle was to mobilize the young Mongols to the cause of Bolshevism, and to scan the activities of the Party (which was considered more susceptible of the conservative influence), in its capacity as a "non-political organization". But gradually the Youth Corps loomed larger and larger in Mongol politics, owing, partly, to the higher level of knowledge of its components, and, partly, to the positive support of the Soviets.[1] Therefore, during the first ten years of its existence the Corps rose to exert even a greater influence than the People's Revolutionary Party, and most of the radical changes introduced into the Mongol life were sponsored and pushed forth by these young men. Since 1932, however, the Youth Corps has given up its independent status, and joined the Party as an adjunct, undertaking the task of preparing young Mongols for future Party membership and Party services.[2]

III. Political Developments

From 1921 to 1924 the Party, controlled by its radical elements, launched a vigorous attack, in conjunction with the People's Revoluntionary Youth Corps, on the feudal-theocratic

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1. Ho Chien-Min, "Mon Ku Kai Kwan" (An Outline of Mongolia), pp. 317-318; Ma Ho-tien, Nai Wai Mon Ku Kou Cha Chi" (Journeys in Inner and Outer Mongolia), pp. 145-148.
2. Mo Ko Tai Kang, p. 386.

faction of the old régime, particularly the lamas. Not only the prerogatives of the Living Buddha in temporal affairs were eliminated, but the ruling rights of the feudal princes in their kingdoms or principalities were also abrogated. But opposition to these drastic innovations, led by the major victims, the aristocrats and the clergymen, mounted so high that an open clash occurred not only among the Mongols generally, but also within the ranks of the Party in power. These clashes led to a series of crises in the Mongol political picture. Thus, in April 1922, only about one year after the new Government was inaugurated, the Mongol Prime Minister, Bodo, together with fifteen other ranking officials, were executed on anti-revolutionary charges.[1] Toward the close of 1924 the feudal-theocratic bloc, allied with "new capitalist forces", led by Danzan, Commander of the Mongol Army, put up desperate efforts to reestablish political control. The movement was crushed in the Third Congress of the Party in August 1924, when Danzan was shot before a firing squad.[2] Thus, the radical leftists were able to keep themselves in power.

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1. Gerard M. Friters, "The Development of Outer Mongolian Independence," *Pacific Affairs,* vol. 10, p. 318.
2. Maslennikov, "The Mongolian Problem", *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika* (World Politics and Economics), May 5, 1936, p. 81; N. Khalkhin, "The Stages of Development of the Mongol People's Republic", *Pravda*, Moscow, July-September, 1936, pp. 68-94, esp., p. 86.

After the establishment of the People's Republic the opponent clique revived in 1924-1928, succeeded in manipulating Party leadership, and pushed forth policies which were stigmatized as "reactionary" and "capitalistic" by the leftists. A left-wing opposition was formed in 1927 seeking to mobilize mass support against the right wing. The climax was reached at the end of 1928 in the Seventh Congress of the Party, when the right wing was again routed. And the leftist elements, having strengthened their hands, continued pushing forward their extreme sovietizing measures unrelentingly. The following are the more notable items of their radical programme:[1]

1. Confiscation of the properties of the princes, lamas, wealthy landlords, and former government officials;

2. Compulsory collectivization of stock-farming;

3. Anti-religious movement and compulsory secularization of the lowly lamas;

4. Nationalization of foreign trade and restriction of domestic private commerce.

With inadequate technique and transport the difficulties of managing the collectives soon became insuperable. The too rapid introduction of government-controlled trading led to a similar impasse. The suppression of Lamaism only yielded the fruit of Mongol demoralization. By the end of

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[1] Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 384-385.

1931, the Mongol populace began to experience a "commodity hunger", which finally led to the abortive rebellion of 1932, and the repudiation of the 1929-1931 policy. So in July 1932 the Party instituted a series of measures roughly analogous to the New Economic Policy of the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1928, with the avowed purpose of creating a "national-revolutionary, anti-imperialistic, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic republic of a new type".[1] Many of the collectives were voluntarily dissolved. Private enterpring was partially reestablished in the spheres of distribution, mining and transportation, and was accommodated, under certain conditions, with bank credits. To counteract the effect of these concessions, annual contracts stipulating wages and hours of hired labor were enforced. This policy has worked fairly smoothly and advantageously up to this time.[2]

From the above brief survey we may note three main stages through which the infant Republic has gone: (1) From 1921 to 1928 the revolutionaries and the conservatives grappled with each other for political ascendancy. It was a struggle between theocratic-feudalism and soviet-equalitarianism. But it was also a struggle between the old ruling class and the new ruling class, and little trace can be found to indicate that the Mongol common people played a

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1. Report to the Great Huruldan by the Mongolian Prime Minister, Tikhii Okean, Jan.-Mar. 1935, pp. 250-267.
2. T.A. Bisson, "Conflict in Outer Mongolia", The Nation, April 22, 1936, pp. 307-308.

noticeable part in the political war. (2) From 1928 to 1932, with the conservative force utterly shattered,[1] a hasty, reckless socialization of the Mongol economy by the leftist revolutionaries, on a too grandiose scale, was seen progressing in Mongolia. This unscrupulous programme made a mess of the Mongol economy, with the old system partly broken down, but the new one not yet fully erected. The upshot was that the new ruling class came direct into conflict with the Mongol people, and a series of popular uprisings ensued.[2] But the government was successful in stamping out or forestalling these outbursts by means of force. (3) From 1932 up to now, the government, aware that its efforts at swift collectivization failed, has reorientated its policy on the basis of gradualism, and the effect of this new experiment has proved fairly satisfactory.

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[1] However, adherents of the old clique still plotted against the government sometimes. For example, in the summer of 1930, there was the movement known as "The Feudal Confederacy of the Thirty Eight", which was, nevertheless, quickly suppressed. Gerard M. Friters, "The Development of Outer Mongolian Independence", *op. cit.*, pp. 318-319.

[2] During the uprisings of the western Mongols against the eastern radicals of June 1932, the former demanded, (1) re-opening of trade relations with China to meet the needs of the Mongol people; (2) admitting Chinese merchants to trade in Mongol territory on the basis of equal treatment; and (3) abolishing bolshevization of Outer Mongolia. The Government at last yielded to the first two demands. Fang Fan-chiu, "*Mon Ku Hsien Chwang Chi Nai Mon Tze Chih Yuen Tung*", (Present Situation in Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement), p. 47.

IV. Administrative Divisions

The capital, Urga, has been renamed in 1924 Ulan Bator Khoto, that means the City of Red Hero. The Mongolian national flag, according to the Constitution, is red, with a coat of arms in the middle, which coat of arms consists of the symbol *soyunba* (representing independence), with, below it, the figure of the flower *badmalinhova* (a kind of lotus, the sacred flower of Buddhism). The solar calendar was adopted. And 1911 was officially proclaimed the first year of Mongolian independence; so 1921, when the new Revolutionary Government was established, became the 11th year, although the Republic was non-existent before then.

The political divisions of the country have been twice adjusted by resolutions of the Mongolian Great Huruldan. On January 6, 1931, Outer Mongolia, formerly divided into five *aimaks*, or provinces, made up of 72 *hoshuns* divided in turn into *somons*, was redivided into 13 administrative-economic units, or *aimaks*, comprising 324 *somons*. The *somons* were subdivided into *horins*, which constituted the basic structural units. These 13 new *aimaks* also replaced the six trading and 8 veterinary districts, into which the country had been divided.[1] But in 1934, upon the recommendation of the Soviet geographers and political economists, the new

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[1] *The Geographical Review*, vol 24, January 1934, pp. 145-146.

administrative divisions were revised. The two aimaks of Dzapkhan and Altai were amalgamated into one Dzapkhan aimak, and the numbers of somons in each aimak were also readjusted. The area, populations and number of somons of the 12 aimaks in 1934 are shown in the following table:[1]

Aimaks	Area (sq. km.)	Population	No. of Somons
Eastern	179,000	59,600	27
Kentei	114,000	54,000	28
Central	115,000	96,800	35
Selenga	67,000	36,500	19
Kosogol	124,000	67,100	24
Ara-Khangai	85,000	116,300	35
Ubur-Khangai	115,000	64,700	30
Dzapkhan	190,000	88,000	30
Durbet	70,000	45,800	16
Kobdo	111,000	51,100	28
South Gobi	205,000	33,700	23
East Gobi	128,000	26,100	23
Total	1,503,000	739,700	319

Likewise changes were also made in the subdivisions of the aimaks. The horins were reorganized into baks, which became the basic unit of local self-government.[2]

V. Military Strength

There are three important military organs in Outer Mongolia. First, the People's Red Army, as it is called

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[1] Far East Year Book, 1941, pp. 1080-1081
[2] Mo Ko Tai Kang, p. 388.

since 1928, is the standing army (exact strength unknown)[1] which is recruited by selective conscription with a 2-3 year term of service. Well armed, and trained by Soviet instructors along modern lines, this force constitutes the main bulwark of the Republic, although its effectiveness as an independent fighting force has not yet been fully tested.[2] In addition to military training, political reorientation and indoctrination are equally emphasized, with the result that this force becomes the centre of the Mongol revolutionary movement, and forms a privileged class. The second organ is the officers' training corps at Urga. It numbers over a thousand, and provides a reserve of officers for the standing army. The third is the local army, or militia, which is organized in local units corresponding to the old banner territories. All males between 18 and 45 are eligible for draft to military training. Women can join the training on a voluntary basis, and many of them occupy high positions. It was estimated that under normal conditions approximately

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1. A report in 1936 said that the Mongol Army (presumably all the armed forces in Outer Mongolia, including militiamen) numbered between 60,000 and 100,000, and the Mongol air force was rumored to comprise more than 300 planes. Margaret Wettlin, "Celebrating a National Holiday in Outer Mongolia", *Travel*, July 1936, p. 32. Another report estimated the Mongol Army at more than 200,000 men and women with the most modern means of warfare, tanks, flame-throwers, artillery, etc. Leonard Ludwin, "Mongolia Against Japan", *The New Republic*, vol. 94, March 23, 1938, p. 187. A third report set the strength at three armies, comprising 150,000 to 200,000 men. *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, p. 421.
2. It was reported that the Muter Mongolian troops had been sent to German fron t during World War II in order to get some real fighting experience. Owen Lattimore, China's Future Relations with Asiatic Peoples, *The Chinese Christian Student*, vol. XXXVI, No. 1, November 1945, p. 37.

15 per cent of the male population receives military training, and through rotation the size of the citizen army is being steadily enlarged.[1]

The main task of the Mongol army is, in addition to keeping internal order and tranquility at various localities, to guard the frontier between the Chinese Inner Mongolia,[2] and Sinkiang Province,[3] on the one side, and Outer Mongolia, on the other, and to guard the frontier between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo to prepare for the exigency of a Japanese-Manchukuoan attack from the east. But it is doubtful whether this defense would be as effective as propagated if the Mongols are left alone to carry out their task. It was also reliably reported that a number of conscript recruits frequently deserted with their weapons in order to escape from the soviet rule, although the Mongol authorities used to boast that those who went through the full two years of service were "so filled with the revolutionary spirit that only

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[1] Leonard Ludwin, "Mongolia Against Japan", *The New Republic*, vol. 94, March 23, 1938, p. 187; *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, pp. 417-425.

[2] The Outer Mongolian Army on the Inner Mongolian frontier intervened as a *deus ex machina* during the Chinese civil war of 1927 in favor of the northern army under the command of General Yen Hsi-shan. Wilmot P. N. Russell, "From Peking to Mongolia", *The National Review*, vol. 90, 1927-1928, pp. 766-769.

[3] Many incidents have occurred along the Outer Mongolian-Chinese border in Sinkiang. Cf. Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, No. 1, October 1945, p. 143.

a general collapse of the Government would be likely to affect the rigid discipline and high morale of the national army."[1]

VI. Lamaism

When the Republic was first founded, all the religious establishments which owned territory and had administrative powers were ordered to be liquidated.[2] Formerly about one half to one third of the Mongol males were in the orders of the church, and were, then, celibate, according to conservative computation.[3] But from 1924 to 1928, anti-religious measures were taken one after another, and alone in 1938 some 12,000 lower lamas were compulsorily secularized, and 2,000,000 head of church-owned livestock confiscated by the

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[1] *China Year Book, 1936*, p. 20

[2] The progressive Mongols attributed the degeneracy of their people to the success of the Manchu policy to encourage Lamaism and, therefore, they deemed the attack on the established religion a pre-requisite to the effective fruitim of Mongol rejuvenation. Owen Lattimore, "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 11, January 1933, pp. 323-324. This statement leads us to the question: Whether Lamaism is the main cause of the Mongol degeneracy? Most writers on Mongolia agree that it is. But, Mr. Lattimore hold the opinion that "the decay of the Mongols was *largely* due to other causes." *Ibid.* Yet, it seems undeniable that Lamaism, to a great extent, accounts for the change of the Mongols from their militant spirit to the present state of effete docility. Douglas Carruther wrote that side by side with the Mongols and living under the same environment was the Turkish tribe of Kirei-Kirghiz, a nomad Mohammedan people whose mode of life exactly resembled that of the Mongols, but whose state of well-being and continued progress stood in direct contrast to that of the Mongols. D. Carruthers, "*Unknown Mongolia*", vol. 1, pp. 307-314.

[3] F.A. Larson, "The Lamas of Mongolia", *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 145, March 1930, pp. 368-369; Serge M. Wolff, "The People's Republic of Mongolia", *Contemporary Review*, vol. 135, March 1929, p. 363.

state.[1] It was reported that only the third son of a family could be sent to the lamasery, while formerly, as a rule, the eldest had always been.[2] Another requirement was that all lama candidates must be graduates of elementary schools, and because the education in schools was tinged with a strong anti-religious character, this requirement actually barred new recruits from lama churches.[3] Furthermore, all the lamas, by a decree of the Government, were made ineligible for public offices in the Government,[4] and they were not even allowed to travel without government-issued passes.[5] The following table shows the general decreasing trend of the percentage of lamas in the Mongol population as a result of such restrictive measures:[6]

Year	No. of Lamas	Per Cent in Total Mongol Population	Per Cent in Male Population
1917	116,577	21.48%	41.95%
1924	112,672	20.63%	40.55%
1925	86,671	13.39%	23.29%
1926	91,269	13.34%	26.45%
1927[7]	92,310	13.21%	26.15%
1928	94,857	13.35%	26.30%
1930	110,000	15.09%	-
1931	93,800	-	-
1932	82,000	-	-

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[1] *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, p. 110

[2] *Literary Digest*, vol. 124, September 18, 1937, p. 28.

[3] Ma Ho-tien, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[4] *China Weekly Review*, vol. 66, November 25, 1933, p. 520

[5] Ma Ho-tien, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 60.

[6] *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, pp. 109-110.

[7] The Mongols' reaction to the oppressive measures of the Government may be seen from the increase, rather than decrease, in the number of lamas between 1927 and 1930.

But we must not be misled into thinking that Lamaism has ceased to be a religion of the Mongol people. The new Government, after its failure to suppress the religion as a national incorporate system, has taken measures rather restrictive than prohibitive.[1] As a matter of fact, in spite of all the red tapes imposed by the Government, the common people are still devout believers in Lamaism. The bulk of such people accept the spiritual legacy left by their ancestry without questioning its value, simply because they find it incomprehensible, difficult, and even sinful to deviate from the ways which their elders have trodden. Others, more thoughtful and conscientious ones, hold to their conception that all progress is vain, that comforts and inventions and economic advance are but illusory things, binding man to the "wheel of change", itself forever evil, and that only in communion with the Holiness can real and lasting peace of mind and greatness of soul be sought. And even many members of the Party and officials in the Government are still paying allegiance to both the Party and the Lamasery. When some Buddhist festivals were being celebrated at the "City of Honoring Holiness" on the Bogdo-Ola mountain, such dualists could often be seen heading uphill from the sophisticated Urga, amidst the stream of reverent pilgrims who trekked from

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1. Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., p. 97; William C. White, "Headline for 1943", North American Review, vol. 236, 1933, p. 431; Mo Ko Tai Kang, p. 110.

far and near to spend some days there in devotions.[1] These facts show convincingly that whatever may be the merits of anti-religious movement, the mind of human beings really cannot be controlled by outside force.

VII. Finance

According to statistics published by the South Manchurian Railway Company in 1927, the national wealth of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was roughly as follows:[2]

Items	Quantity	Value	
Camels	300,000	23,000,000	roubles
Horses	1,500,000	38,000,000	"
Cattle	1,400,000	42,000,000	"
Sheep and Goats	9,500,000	29,000,000	"
Clothings	-	36,000,000	"
Premises (including municipal establishments, home furniture, and other domestic wealth)	-	20,000,000	"
Working tools	-	8,000,000	"
Articles for Religious Rituals	-	6,000,000	"
Lamaseries (buildings, statues, etc.)	-	35,000,000	"
Coal Products	-	3,000,000	"
Miscellaneous (silver money, precious articles, etc.)	-	10,000,000	"
Total		250,000,000	roubles

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1. Anna Louise Strong, "Old and New Gods in Mongolia", Asia, vol. 28. 1928, pp. 564-569.
2. "The People's Republic of Mongolia", published by South Manchurian Ry Co., vol. II, p. 94.

The annual income of the Mongol people was roughly as follows:[1]

Items	Quantity	Value
Livestock (including cattle, horses, camels, etc.)	1,919,000	14,000,000 roubles
Pastoral Products (including meat, milk, cream, skings and hair)	-	42,500,000 "
Salt, other minerals, & Hunting Games.	-	18,000,000 "
Total		74,000,000 "

From the above we can see that the aggregate value of livestock amounts to 52.8% of the total national wealth, and that the proceeds derived from pastoral occupations amounts to 76.3% of the total people's income per annum. The predominant part of stock-raising in the Mongol economy thus appears very clear.

There is also a Mongol state banking system under the name of the Bank of Trade and Industry of Mongolia. The Bank performs the function of a state bank, possessing issuing right. It was established in 1924 conjointly with Soviet Russia, with its capital first set at 500,000 gold roubles, shared equally between the governments.[2] The currency, formerly silver, in coin and ingots, as well as Chinese Mexican dollars, now has its Mongolian character. The unit of money is the tukrik, a silver money valued at its begin-

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[1] Ibid, p. 96.
[2] I.I. Serebrennikov, "A Soviet Satellite: Outer Mongolia Today", Foreign Affairs, vol. 9, 1930-1931, p. 515.

ning at the ratio of 90 *tukriks* to 100 Mexican dollars. Later parity between the two was proclaimed, but it could not be justified, since the *tukrik* contained only about 20 grams of pure silver as against 36 grams in the Mexican dollar. The *tukrik* is covered by silver deposits with the Minister of Finance and is minted as a silver coin in Moscow, against which paper notes are issued as full legal tender.[1]

The *tukrik* is divided into 100 parts called *mungos*, which are minted by the State.[2] With the introduction and enforcement of the national currency, the time-honored method of barter is no more prevalent in domestic trade. Moreover, the banknotes contributed amply to the increase of the volume of trade in Outer Mongolia, as, up till then, loads of silver had to be transported for thousands of miles by camel or bullock caravan, through a lapse of many weeks, in order to make the business transaction complete. Public finance also benefited because the use of banknotes has greatly removed the obstacle to tax collection.[3]

VIII. Economic and Social Developments

A. Foreign Trade -- According to the Constitution, foreign trade is a state monopoly. For this purpose, and

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[1] "Monetary Reform and the National Economy of Mongolia", (The New East), No. 25, 1929, p. 175. *Novyi Vostok* .

[2] L. Forbath and J. Geleta, *Op. cit.*, pp. 217-219.

[3] *Ibid.*

also for the purpose of promoting and controlling domestic commerce, a Mongolian Central Cooperative (also called Moncencop by Westerners) was set up. In 1929 this Moncencop had about 100 branches spread over the country, and also branches in China and Russia, and its membership reached the figure of 10,000, as compared with about 70 in 1921, and 3,000 in 1924.[1] The following tables show the amount of principal exports and imports of Outer Mongolia, as estimated in 1927:[2]

Principal Exports of Outer Mongolia in 1926-1927

Items	Value
Livestock	9,650,000 roubles
Wool	1,800,000 "
Furs	2,500,000 "
Horse Hair and Tails	500,000 "
Camel Hair	350,000 "
Sheep Skins	370,000 "
Other leathers	400,000 "
Hunting Games	500,000 "
Total	16,070,000 roubles

Principal Imports of Outer Mongolia in 1926-1927

Items	Value
Tea	4,500,000 roubles
Flour	3,200,000 "
Textiles	300,000 "
Cereals	2,200,000 "
Tobacco	900,000 "
Alcohol	550,000 "
Sugar	150,000 "
Articles for Religious Rituals	450,000 "

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1. Serge M. Wolff, "The People's Republic of Mongolia", Contemporary Review, vol. 135, March 1929, pp. 367-368.
2. Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

Total 12,250,000 roubles

From the above tables we can see that the bulk of the Mongolian exports is composed of livestock and pastoral products, while the bulk of the Mongolian imports, of agricultural produce. The extent to which the Mongols depend upon foreign trade for their daily-life necessaries is really very great.

Since China refused to recognize the new Republic, no official intercourse, political and economic, was possible. Not only the Sino-Mongolian relations failed to be readjusted, but the Mongols carried out a systematic anti-Chinese campaign in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese merchants either were forcibly expelled from Outer Mongolia since 1922,[1] or were subjected to discriminatory treatment, notably exorbitant taxation. Failure to pay the taxes would incur imprisonment until payment was made in full. The business tax was the highest, being 30 per cent of the total capital of the firm. As a result almost all the Chinese shops, including many stores engaged in Chinese-Mongolian trade, closed down, most of their property being confiscated by the Mongol authorities under various pretences.[2] And, besides, all Mongol debts owed to the Chinese before 1924 were arbitrarily cancelled.[3]

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[1] Survey of International Affairs, 1921-23, p. 431
[2] China Weekly Review, vol. 63, January 14, 1933, p. 317; Ma Ho-tien, op. cit., pp. 49-51
[3] The Americana, 1944, p. 482.

This situation led to a complete stoppage of trade with China. Consequently almost the whole of the Outer Mongolian foreign trade has been thrown toward Russia in recent years, through the Soviet organization called Stormong and the Mongolian Moncencop. To Russia Outer Mongolia is an inexhausitible source to supply raw products, such as wool, hides, livestock and furs, and also a profitable market for her manufactured goods which can not complete with those of other countries in other parts of the world. To Outer Mongolia Russia is also both its best customer and source of supply. This Soviet-Mongolian trade has increased to such a proportion that it holds the fourth place in Soviet foreign trade.[1] The following statistics, covering practically the entire foreign trade of Outer Mongolia except a small portion handled by the Wostwag through Kalgan,[2] are published by the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade:[3]

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1. The Americana, 1944, p. 482.
2. The Wostwag was registered as a German firm, and originally carried on trade between Tientsin and Kalgan. In 1932 the firm opened communication between Kalgan and Urga, and carried on this Chinese-Outer Mongolian trade on a two-section basis, with exchange of freights at Ude, on the frontier between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. Tea was the most considerable import from China, together with boots and cloth, in exchange for wool, hide, etc. But the volume of transactions thus handled was quite negligible. China Year Book, 1936, p. 19.
3. Vneshniaia Torgovlia (Foreign Trade Statistics of the U.S.S.R.), for the years referred to; Mo Ko Tai Kang, p. 412.

Year	Imports from U.S.S.R. (in roubles)	Exports to U.S.S.R. (in roubles)	Balance on part of Outer Mongolia (in roubles)
1930	17,819,000	19,745,000	+ 1,926,000
1931	37,343,000	28,833,000	− 8,510,000
1932	41,395,000	19,298,000	−22,117,000
1933	28,562,000	17,269,000	−11,293,000
1934	44,810,000	20,561,000	−24,249,000
1935	11,633,000	7,911,000	− 3,722,000
1936	50,433,000	32,120,000	−18,312,000

In 1936 Outer Mongolia's trade with the U.S.S.R. alone, both in imports and exports, far exceeded its total trade figures of 1927, as may be seen from below:[1]

Principal Imports from U.S.S.R. in 1936

Items	Volume (in tons)	Volume (in roubles)
Bone grinders	7,895	1,247,000
Flour	49,545	8,038,000
Sugar	6,065	1,594,000
Tea	4,283	3,196,000
Confectionary	1,588	2,445,000
Tobacco	974	2,336,000
Cotton Cloth	2,306	5,782,000
Clothings	158	2,161,000
Silk Textiles	60	394,000
Woolen textiles	60	1,486,000
Dressed hides & skins	188	1,050,000
Hemp goods	613	904,000
Petroleum	14,379	2,383,000
Chinaware	99	124,000
Rubber goods	54	211,000
Boots and shoes	149	994,000
Iron and copper plate	1,440	1,328,000
Metal goods	1,228	1,898,000
Metal machinery	190	296,000
Articles needed in motor transport	418	814,000
Total	91,692	37,645,000

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[1] *Far East Year Book, 1941*, p. 1089.

Principal Exports to U.S.S.R. in 1936

Items	Volume (in tons)	Value (in roubles)
Livestock	30,262	12,640,000
Meat, prepared & unprepared	1,278	1,282,000
Intestines	41	106,000
Furs	91	866,000
Hides	4,474	4,778,000
Wool	3,130	7,036,000
Animal hair	1,945	4,666,000
Total	41,221	18,434,000

B. Communications -- The first railways in Outer Mongolia, connecting Ulan Bator Khoto (Urga) with the Nalaicha coal mine 22 miles distant, and linking Kiakhta with the Trans-Siberian Railway at Ulan Ude, were completed in 1939. An air service has also been opened betwen Verkhneudinsk and Ulan Bator Khoto. Several truck roads have been constructed, and over a large part of the country, motor cars can run freely even without roads, the great tableland being itself nearly as good as a constructed highway. But the high cost and meagre supply of gasoline limit the use of cars. Postal routes for mounted men radiate from Urga. At every station there is a herd of ponies from which travelers provided with passes may draw remounts. Steamers ply the Selenga and Orkhon Rivers. A powerful wireless station is at Urga, originally established by a British company under contract with the Chinese Government. However, generally speaking, the communications in Outer Mongolia are still

very poor, considering the tremendous expanse of the territory. Camel caravans and bullock carts still provide the chief transport for goods. Even the Russians, who have secured such easy and liberal concessions for railway construction from the Mongols, wax reluctant to make use of their privileges for considerations of the scanty profit and maybe even business loss, which may result from such undertakings.[1]

C. Industry -- As to industrial development, the Mongols have achieved very little, if we measure by the standard of Western industrialization. But it is true that a start has been made, and the process of industrialization is being pushed on steadily by the Mongol soviets. There is a Combinat at Urga, built under the curses of the lamas who thought it a sacrilege and a sin to mutilate the face of God, the earth.[2] The Combinat establishes and manages and State-owned industrial installations which comprise textile mills, carpet factories, tanneries, steam wool-cleaning plants, flour mills, brick works, power works, alcohol distilleries, etc.[3] Except the coal mine at Nalaicha, gold mines, of which Outer

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[1] *The New International Year Book, 1944*, p. 396; *China Year Book, 1936*, p. 20.

[2] Since the days of Kublai Khan in the 13th century, it was laid down as a divine law that no man, under pain of death, should dig in the earth and extract treasure. Only the Government and the hutukhtus had the right to deal with precious metals. For generations this monopoly was meekly accepted by the Mongol people. Douglas Carruthers, *"Unknown Mongolia"*, vol. I, p. 316.

[3] *Far East Year Book, 1941*, pp. 1085-1086.

Mongolia has a large reserve, are also exploited by the Mongolor Company. The domestic light industries, such as boot-making, etc., are free from State interference, and are given to private enterprises. Almost all of these rudimentary industries are based upon pastoral products, and the output shows but a negligible number.[1]

However enthusiastic the industrial-minded Mongols may be about the development of their industries, they are always labouring under many handicaps. First of all comes the uncertainties of the amount of natural resources. In the aerid desert areas there can be raised no industry unless the immense sea of sands is moved, and that seems a task beyond the strength of Hercules. As for the prairies to the north, their geological resources are enshrouded in mystery. No reports on Mongolia's reserves in iron ores, copper, oil, sulphur, etc. could pretend to claim exactitude. Nor there have been any nearly exact estimates of its coal and gold deposits. There are, indeed, valuable virgin forests in the region between the Selenga and the Orkhon Rivers, capable of supplying great amount of lumber, pulp and cellulose; but the infestations of the wild beasts and the lack of technique present almost insuperable obstacles to the Mongol nomads.

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[1] Violet Conolly, "The Soviet Union and the Industrialization of Asia", Foreign Affairs, vol. 15, 1936-1937, pp. 196-198.

Secondly, the Mongols have no access abroad to raising a big capital which they cannot afford to raise for themselves. Attempts have been made to absorb foreign investments for the purpose of exploiting the mineral wealth. But practically no favorable answer came except from Russia, because the uncertain political situation debarred foreign capitalists from entering the trouble spot. Indeed, from time to time, Soviet Russia has supplied Outer Mongolia with loans, and in some instances, even gifts; but it is doubtful whether such Russian investments will be enough to serve that purpose.

Thirdly, Outer Mongolia is in dire need of trained technicians, which can be obtained almost only from Russia now. A typical instance is found in the Mongolian Central Cooperative. During the first two years of its existence its accounts were kept in Mongolian by Mongolian bookkeepers. After it was found that this work was beyond the ability of these native bookkeepers, the accounting department was then put in charge of Russian experts, using Russian in the books. In 1926 the 786 persons on the staff of the Cooperative consisted of 361 Russians, 257 Mongols, 95 Buriats, and 73 of other nationalities. Its field agencies looked even more like Russian than Mongolian ones, because of the complete absence of Mongolian employees.[1] The shortage in

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[1] I.I. Serebrennikov, op. cit., p. 512.

skilled workers and specialists is still more acute, as may be imagined.

And lastly, there is the psychological wall of aversion for industrial work on the part of the Mongol people. As mentioned above, the lama priests cursed industrial enterprises on theological grounds. The views of these priests unquestionably exert no little amount of influence upon the mind of the public. Besides, the Mongols, traditionally free, self-sufficient and complacent hunters and herdsmen in a communal society, do not take kindly to industrial work, which they think enslaving and unworthy the dignity of a self-respecting Mongol free man.

All in all, it can be concluded that the prospect of Mongolian industrialization is not a bright one, at least for years, or decades, to come, if not for ever.

D. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry -- The Mongolian agriculture is progressing as a result of the efforts at mechanization, but rather slowly. Cultivated regions lie mostly in the basins of the Selenga and Orkhon Rivers, with Russians and Chinese, and occasionally a few Mongols, doing the tillage. In 1928 farm lands under cultivation totalled about 105,000 acres, or less than 1/5,000 of the total area of Outer Mongolia. The total agricultural production was estimated at about 22,950 tons, valued at 4,800,000 *tukriks.* New scientific methods have been gradually introduced into

Mongol farms, but in general cultivation is still being done in the old primitive way. The Mongolian state bank also opened special credits for the financing of agricultural activities of the Mongols; but the nomadic Mongols simply did not find the rural homesteads any more comfortable than the horsebacks and their favorite yurts. It seems impossible, indeed, for Outer Mongolia to become an agricultural country. This reason accounts for the failure of the new Government to inaugurate collective farms in the rural areas.[1]

But in the field of stock-raising Outer Mongolia is advancing by strides. A veterinary department was organized under the Ministry of Interior, contributing enormously to the decrease of animal mortality. The following table shows the progress made in Mongol stock-raising during the years 1924-1935:[2]

Year	Camels	Horses	Cattle	Sheep	Total
1924	275,000	1,340,000	1,512,000	10,649,000	13,776,000
1928	-	-	-	-	21,435,429
1930	-	-	-	-	24,552,750
1934	551,900	1,638,200	2,063,000	16,868,900	21,107,000
1935	557,320	1,770,290	2,351,220	17,693,650	22,372,480

The *per capita* share of animals in 1924 and 1930 may be seen from the following table:[3]

Year	Livestock	Population	Per Capita Share
1924	13,776,290	546,000	25.23
1930	24,552,750	733,000	33.40

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[1] I.I. Serebrennikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 511-513.
[2] *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, p. 391
[3] *Ibid*, p. 392.

However, the Government's attempt at inaugurating a communistic economy by the introduction of national ownership of cattle failed, because such new measure only caused a remarkable reduction in the number of animals.[1] According to Premier Gendun of the Mongolian Government, 7,000,000 head of livestock out of a total of some 21,000,000 were killed by the Mongols to avoid collectivization.[2]

E. Education -- Before 1924 Outer Mongolia was a land of illiteracy. School education was practically non-existent. If any, the type of education was in the lamaseries, where those children who were fortunate enough to be admitted were taught to read and write.[3] It naturally follows that about 95 per cent of its population were illiterate. A census of the People's Party, taken in 1926, reveals that in that admittedly advanced group only 1,894 out of 5,100 could really read; only 24 knew any language other than Mongolian.[4] Such being the situation, it is no wonder that in managing their state affairs, the Mongols cannot go on without the guiding hand of Soviet Russia. However, since the new

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[1] Franz Michael, op. cit., p. 319.
[2] Edgar Snow, "Japan at the Gates of Red Mongolia", Asia, vol. 36, January 1936, p. 12; Far East Year Book, 1941, pp. 1082-1083.
[3] There was a tendency to teach the young Mongols to read and write Tibetan, instead of Mongolian, because most of the Lamaistic literature was written in Tibetan language.
[4] Lewis S. Ganett, "Mongolia - A Nomad Republic," The Nation, vol. 123, December 1, 1926, p. 557.

Government came into power, public education has received the most serious attention. The past two decades have seen numerous schools springing up, like mushrooms, throughout the country. Its school system is based on the Western model, with elementary and secondary schools, and a University of Urga. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, free education was also experimented with a number of boarding schools where the students received not only a free education, but also free maintenance, and even pocket money. High posts in the Civil Service were also given to those people who had a secular education. Therefore, public education quickly passed from the hands of the lamas into those of the State; myths and theology were replaced by courses in modern knowledge.[1] No statistics showing the present proportion of literacy and illiteracy among the Mongols are available; but presumably the percentage of illiteracy must have much abated.

Besides, young Mongols are also sent abroad by the Mongol Government for higher learning, at State expenses. Some went to Germany to learn some technical knowledge, and an Administration of Mongol Students in Germany and France was established in Berlin for the supervision and control of these youngsters.[2] A representative of the Mongol Ministry

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1. L. Forbath and J. Geleta, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217.
2. Serge M. Wolff, "The People's Republic of Mongolia", *Contemporary Review,* vol. 135, March 1929, p. 364.

of Education remained in Berlin from 1926 until 1930 when the office was closed and students were called back. In recent years most of such Mongol students went to Soviet Russia, and received free education in Russian colleges or universities. Through them the Russian Government spread the Communist ideology among the Mongol mass, as these highly educated Mongols were usually given influential positions in the government service upon their return. For example, in the parliamentary elections of 1929 the Moscow-indoctrinated Mongol young men, who were up till then opposed to the Government, were returned with an overwhelming majority.[1] This ideological control over Outer Mongolia is really a factor not to be ignored when we analyse the present Soviet-Mongolian relations.

F. Public Health -- The Mongols by their habits are a filthy people. Two expeditions sent out by the Soviet Government reported that among the Mongols venereal disease was wide-spread; birth rate low; and infant mortality high. Tuberculosis consumed many a talent. General ignorance of the most elementary rules of sanitation and hygiene was indeed deplorable. Many improvements along this line stand to the credit of the new Government. Under the Ministry of War has established a special health department with many Russian surgeons. The attack on syphilis, one of the evils

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[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941 pp. 1081-1082.

most responsible for the Mongol degeneracy, is remarkably successful. But generally speaking the people are still foreign to the ways of individual as well as public health. Occasionally the attempts of the Government to improve public sanitation were even thwarted by the people. Once when the Government began to build fourteen public conveniences in the streets of Urga, the inhabitants of Urga took exception to this idea, and sent a deputation to ask the Government to rescind these projects, on the ground that they considered it "far better to have human excreta consumed by dogs than to have it stored in the middle of the town." The Government, finding the popular opposition so poignant, could not but comply with their request.[1] Indeed, a decent life could hardly be expected of a semi-primitive people until the general level of their modern knowledge has been elevated.

IX. Foreign Relations

Outer Mongolia's foreign relations are very simple. The only country in the world with which it has established official relations is the U.S.S.R. Soviet loans to Mongolia are frequent. Frontiers have been demarcated. Navigation, telegraph, mines, aerial communication, etc. have been developed or constructed with Soviet capital and technique. Many agreements regarding the construction of Mongolian

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[1] L. Forbath and J. Oelsta, op. cit., pp. 222-223; Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 1082.

railways have been concluded.[1] Mongolian defensive alliance is in operation now, *vide infra.* As for its relation with China, little more need be said than that there could be no official intercourse between the two, unless Outer Mongolia forsook its claim for independence or China forwood its claim for sovereignty. In 1930 an appeal was tendered Outer Mongolia by the Chinese Government to attend a conference on Mongol affairs, to be held in Nanking, but the request was not honored with a response.[2] Even postal communication is not only carried on by the way of Siberia.[3] With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, in which China gave the promise to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, the relations between China and the People's Republic will certainly be readjusted in the near future. The relations between Outer Mongolia and other countries than Russia and China are still more out of the question, because Outer Mongolia is not yet recognized by the world

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1. *China Year Book, 1921-1922*, pp. 593-594; 1926, p. 800.
2. International Relations Committee, *Chinese Affairs*, No. 82-83, May 31, 1930, pp. 1-2.
3. *Ta Kung Pao*, Tientsin, February, 27, 1931

as a member of the family of nations.[1] In 1925 and 1926 a Mongolian Trade Delegation appeared in Berlin. Besides ordering machinery and engaging engineers, it tried to arrange for a kind of exchange-trade system between Mongolia and several European countries. A treaty was nearly signed by which a Mongol consulate would be opened in Berlin. But the Delegation was, for an unknown reason, recalled.[2] Of the attempts and failure of the People's Republic to secure international recognition we have noted previously, and no repetition need be made here.

XI. The True Nature of the People's Republic

Now, at last, we should make some observations on the true nature of the People's Republic. First, according to the Constitution, it is intended to be constituted as a republic on the basis of complete democratization of the administration of the State. The sovereignty belongs to

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[1] Although Tibet concluded a treaty with Outer Mongolia in 1912, in which the two signatories mutually recognized their sovereignty within their respective domains, yet Tibet itself was not admitted as a sovereign state by the nations of the world. Such mutual recognition is then invalid from the standpoint of international law. The same view may be taken of the Manchukuoan-Mongolian relations. Although Japan agreed to respect the inviolability of the People's Republic in the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 1941, yet she failed to establish diplomatic relations with it. For a study of the People's Republic's status in international law, see L. Nemzer, "The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law," American Journal of International Law, vol. 33, June 1939, pp. 452-464.

[2] Serge M. Wolff, op. cit., p. 364.

the people who exercises it through a constituent assembly (the Great Huruldan), elected by the former by means of universal suffrage. Therefore, so far as constitutional institutions are concerned, the new state is a democracy of a type similar to that of the U.S.S.R. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the Government of the People's Republic is up to the present still a minority government. Its access to power was buttressed by a foreign power through the application of force. Its continuance in power is possible only under the Soviet system of one-party rule, accompanied by terrorism which smacks of autocracy. To seek evidences in support of this statement we have only to turn to the many revolts and attempts at revolting, so far recorded. We have reason to conclue that if the people could be allowed to exercise their constitutional rights untrammelled, there would be a different government elected into office. In this sense, the Republic has actually a totalitarian government based on one-party dictatorship. If, according to the concept of the Western democracies, totalitarianism runs counter to democratic principles, then we can only consider the People's Republic as a non-democracy despite its constitutional professions.

Secondly, as regards the economic system of the Republic, it is intended by the Constitution to be a communistic state of the labouring people where private ownership is prohibited. But in view of the achievements of the system

in Outer Mongolia, we can believe that it adopts rather a sort of state socialism, than communism in the true sense of the term. Some writers have properly said that the Mongol system is not Communism, but pre-Communism, in the sense that "the political, social and economic questions are being handled in such a manner as to create a society which in the future can be adapted to some form of Communism".[1] It is true that modern Communism, as distinguished from the primitive communistic system, can not prosper on such a land as the Mongols', where people's thinking is still so conservative and almost the whole mass of the people are herdsmen with practically little agriculture and no manufacturing industry worth speaking of. Therefore, it seems more accurate to describe the Republic as a "socialistic institution", as the Mongolian Government has openly admitted.

Lastly, the Republic has been, from its very beginning created and maintained by the aid of Soviet Russia. Whether such support is mere "assistance" rendered by one country to another, or it borders on, or amounts to "aggression", is a question susceptible of heated debate. For the fact remains that nowadays the Mongolian Government invariably looks to Moscow for guidance, both in its internal and its external affairs, and without the green light given by the Soviets, the Mongols cannot afford to take their own course

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[1] Owen Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", p. 17.

of action. In this sense the People's Republic is really little more than a satellite of Soviet Russia, as so many writers have called it.

From the above observations we can arrive at the conclusion that the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia, as it now stands, is a socialistic-totalitarian satellite of Soviet Russia.

CHAPTER IX

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF TANNU TUVA

I. The Creation of the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva

Urianghai, the land of the forest-dwelling and reindeer-keeping nomads of mixed Mongol and Turkish origin in the basin of the Upper Yenisei,[1] had been divided into two parts by the Sayan Mountain, with the northern part owing its allegiance and paying tribute to Russia, and the southern part, to China. Notwithstanding this division, Russia was always casting a covetous eye on the Chinese portion. The Russian activities in the land were traced by many as far back as the beginning of the Ching Dynasty in the middle of the 17th century. In 1715 the Russian Government had asserted,

> "The Siberian rivers Ob, Yenisei and Lena have been Siberian since time immemorial, from their mouths, where they flow into the sea, to the mountains from which they come. Whatever rivers flow into them, and the surrounding lands from which these rivers derive,

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[1] A most detailed account on the natural, economic and social aspects of the land and people of Urianghai can be found in Douglas Carruthers' book, "Unknown Mongolia, a Record of Travel and Exploration in North-West Mongolia and Dsungaria," vol. I, chapter VIII, pp. 197-256. Also see Zen Uchi Togai, "Mo Ko Shi Ken Kiu," (A Study of Mongolian History), pp. 1-32, and Otto Manchen-Helfen, "Reise ins Asiatische Tuwa."

are lands of His Tsarist Majesty."[1]

The gigantic power of the Chinese Empire at that time, however, made the advancing Russians shy away from attempting any overt actions. In the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Kiakhta, 1727, the Sayan Mountain was agreed to be the dividing line of the respective domains of Russia and China. Each party was required to collect tributes and exercise control only within its own sphere. Thus, the part of Urianghai, lying to the south of the Mountain (called Tannu Urianghai in China), was legally established as Chinese territory.[2] Subsequently, the Treaty of Tarbahatai of 1864 and the Treaty of Uliassutai of 1870 further demarcated the boundaries along the Sayan Mountain, and erected many stone signs with inscriptions carved thereon to indicate the demarcation line.[3] Yet the Russians did not stop looking at Tannu Urianghai as a possible and desirable prey within their easy reach.

Throughout the Ching Dynasty Tannu Urianghai was under the jurisdiction of the Manchu General-Protector stationed at

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[1] Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 24, October 1945, p. 148.
[2] Yano Jen Echi, "Kendai Shina Kenkiu," (A Study of Modern China), pp. 258-260; Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., p. 111; Shih Shou-chang, "Chung Oh Yueh Chu" (Sino-Russian Treaties and Annotations), vol. I, Treaty of Kiakhta.
[3] Chow Yuan-fong, "Chung Oh Chieh Chi" (Sino-Russian Boundary Demarcations), vol. II, chapters 2-3.

MONGOLIA
Carruthers


Sketch Map
of the
SIBERIAN-MONGOL FRONTIER
Showing Racial Distribution
on the
RUSSO-CHINESE BORDERLANDS
by
DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS

Shaded lump shows the land of Urianghai, with the Sayan Mt. (black line) dividing the Russian & Chinese portions.

Uliassutai in west Outer Mongolia.[1] The commercial relations between Tannu Urianghai and Uliassutai were also very close. The Urianghai people paid to the Manchu Court, as a rule, a tribute of 574 sable skins each year through the General-Protector of Uliassutai. The General-Protector, in turn, made an inspection tour to the territory every three years.[2]

No sooner the Chinese Revolution broke out, than the Russian troops occupied the territory of Tannu Urianghai, synchronizing their maneuvers in east Outer Mongolia. At a time when China was thrown into internal chaos, she could do no more about the Urianghai incident than about the problem of Outer Mongolian independence. But some Urianghai tribes, resenting and apprehending the Russian invasion, did go eastward to take refuge in east Outer Mongolia where Russian troops were less.

During the negotiations of the Russo-Mongol Agreements of 1912, the delegates of Outer Mongolia suggested that the frontiers between Siberia and Mongolia should remain as before; that is to say, Tannu Urianghai should be conceded as a part

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1. Since 1715 the Oleots had frequently infested the territory. The Ching Dynasty, at the request of Popa, chief of the Urianghai tribe, began to apply force to stamp out the insurrection. By 1730 all the Urianghai territory between the Sayan Mountain and the Tannu Ola was once more brought under Chinese control. From 1755 to 1758 some tribes in Chinese Urianghai again showed signs of disloyalty, but were quickly disciplined. Pai Mei-chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-10.
2. Wang Chin-yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

of the New Independent Mongolian Empire.[1] The Mongols argued that without recognised frontiers their independence would be a mere fiction.[2] But the Russians, desiring to reserve the riches of this terra incognita for their own exploitation and to use it as a strategic outpost,[3] balked at the idea, and the Mongols were rebuffed. Therefore, in the notes exchanged between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Russian Minister at Peking on the same day when the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913 was signed, only the following was agreed upon,

> "4. Autonomous Outer Mongolia shall comprise the regions which have been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, of the Tartar-General of Uliassutai, and of the Chinese Amban of Kobdo. Inasmuch as there are no detailed maps of Mongolia and as the boundaries of the administrative divisions of this country are uncertain, it is agreed that the exact boundaries of Outer Mongolia, as well as the boundary between the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, shall be the subject

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[1] Orange Book, 1914, published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in "Collection of Diplomatic Documents concerning Mongolia," August 23, 1912 to November 2, 1913, No. 6, p. 5.

[2] Korostovets, op. cit., p. 173.

[3] Tannu Urianghai is surrounded by the mountains of Sayan and Tannu Ola which have almost no easy passes. Therefore, control of this territory by Russia makes the southern borders of Siberia practically impregnable to any attacks from the south, presumably from China. This strategic importance was recognized by the Government of Peter the Great. Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia," Foreign Affairs, vol. 24, October 1945, p. 148.

of the subsequent conferences provided for in Article V of the Declaration."[1]

As noted above, Tannu Urianghai had always been under the jurisdiction of the Tartar-General (General-Protector) of Uliassutai during the Ching Dynasty; therefore, according to the exchange of notes, the realm of the Autonomous Outer Mongolia may be interpreted as including Tannu Urianghai. But the proviso that "the exact boundaries of Outer Mongolia shall be the subject of subsequent conferences" in which not only China and Outer Mongolia but also Russia were to participate, made it possible for Russia to press her claims regarding Tannu Urianghai on a later occasion. As a matter of fact, Russia cherished no intention to loosen her hold on the seized territory, as the later events will show, and the provisions of the exchange of notes were designed to serve that purpose.

In 1914 Russia overtly made the territory a Russian possession by incorporating it into the Ussinsk district of the Altai province of Siberia.[2] Thereupon China lodged a protest to the Russian Government to the effect that the Russian action was prejudicial to the sovereignty of China.[3]

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[1] Carnegie Endowment, op. cit., p. 27, Note of the Russian Minister at Peking to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and reply of the Chinese Foreign Minister, *ipsissima verba.*

[2] E. M. Gull, "What of Mongolia," *National Review,* vol. 91, 1928, p. 600.

[3] *Mo Ko Tai Kang,* p. 469.

But no response was received. On the part of Outer Mongolia, the claim for the territory was again broached to the Russian Consul through the Kishantsun Hutukhtu of Urianghai, and again nothing came of it.[1]

In the course of the Kiakhta Conference between China, Russia and Outer Mongolia in 1914-1915, China proposed to incorporate a specific settlement of the problem in the Tripartite Agreement then under negotiations, but Russia refused to concur. Therefore, Article XI of the resultant Agreement merely mentioned the territory of the Autonomous Outer Mongolia as

> "...bound by the district of Houlounbouir (i.e., Hailar) on the East, by Inner Mongolia on the South, by the Province of Sinkiang on the South-West, and by the district of Altai on the West",[2]

but there was no mentioning as to where it was to be bound on the North. Even if it were taken for granted that the old Russo-Chinese northern boundaries, which had been fairly well defined, should be regarded, a priori, as the Russo-Mongolian frontiers, yet this very absence of any specific reiteration would most probably make room for subsequent controversies. Furthermore, the matter of Russian evacuation of Tannu Urianghai was still a subject untouched upon and unsettled,

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1. Ibid.
2. Carnegie Endowment, op. cit., p. 34.

because her promise to withdraw troops from Outer Mongolia, as provided by the Agreement, did not necessarily apply to Tannu Urianghai, in view of the fact that she had intended to consider this district as apart from the territory of Outer Mongolia. Such omissions and ambiguities are sufficient prima facie evidence of Russia's intention to detach Tannu Urianghai from the Chinese Republic and the Autonomous Outer Mongolia.

However, the Russian attitude drove Outer Mongolia and China to align themselves on the Urianghai problem. Thus, in keeping with Article VII of the Tripartite Agreement, which reads,

> "Article VII.....If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, Assistants of the Chinese Dignitary (High Commissioner) are appointed in other localities of Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each,"[1]

the Chinese Government soon proposed to Outer Mongolia to appoint an additional Assistant Commissioner to keep oversight of Tannu Urianghai affairs. The Mongol reply came in August 1916, concurring with the proposal and the dispatch of 50 bodyguards with the Assistant.[2] But, inasmuch as the Russian troops were still stationed in Tannu Urianghai, the arrival of the Assistant Commissioner, together with his military

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1. Carnegie Endowment, op. cit., p. 33.
2. Chen Chung-tsu, op. cit., p. 93.

guards, would inevitably lead to open clash with the Russians. So, instead of sending an official specifically in charge of Tannu Urianghai, the Peking Government appointed the Assistant Commissioner at Uliassutai to take care of this territory temporarily.[1] This appointment seemed to be unavailing for the moment, but it did help to prepare for the restoration of the lost territory in 1919.

After the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, Tannu Urianghai, like other parts of Outer Mongolia, became a battle ground of the White Russians and their opponents, the Reds. A series of see-saw fightings were seen waged amid the forests of the little known land. At last the White army carried the day, but its strength had been greatly extenuated by the bloodshed.

Taking advantage of the occasion, the Chinese High Commissioner at Urga and his Assistant at Uliassutai started in January 1919 campaigns against the White Russians in Tannu Urianghai. The residual White Russian Army was almost entirely wiped out in June 1919 without great difficulties, that early in February 1920 the Chinese High Commissioner was able to report to Peking that the whole of Tannu Urianghai was already cleared of all White invaders and was restored *in toto* to his control. Simultaneously, measures for reinforcement of defense along the frontiers between Siberia and Tannu

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1. *Ibid*, p. 94.

Urianghai were taken in order to prepare for the exigency of a Russian comeback.[1] And a special Assistant Commissioner was now appointed, who resided in Tannu Urianghai and undertook the task of recruiting and training new Urianghai troops and of rehabilitating the war-wrecked land.[2] Thus, in this manner, Tannu Urianghai had returned to China's embrace even before Outer Mongolia was forced to cancel its autonomy in November 1919.

But the story does not thus come to an end. More vicissitudes were to transpire. The White Russians, as anticipated, fought back later. The Chinese and Urianghai troops repulsed them easily. Again when Urga fell to Baron Ungern's White Army at the beginning of 1921, the White Russian residents at Uliassutai and Kobdo, taking advantage of their sudden ascendancy, rose against and drove away the Chinese authorities in those parts of west Outer Mongolia. Then, they, in combination with the Mongols of Outer Mongols, invaded Tannu Urianghai, but were once more defeated. Nevertheless, the bitterness against the White Russians and the insufficient Chinese garrisons in Tannu Urianghai led the Urianghai natives to solicit aid from the Reds as a temporary

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[1] For details of the Urianghai campaigns, see the Memorial presented by the High Commissioner at Urga, Chen Yi, to the Peking Government, February 1, 1920, Chen Chung-tsu, op. cit., pp. 152-158.

[2] See the Memorial presented by the Assistant Commissioner at Tannu Urianghai, Yen Shih-Chao, to the High Commissioner at Urga, Aug. 20, 1919, Chen Chung-tsu, op. cit., pp. 159-164.

protection.[1] Once having secured the pretense the Red Russian troops immediately poured into Tannu Urianghai, and, like the White Russians, drove the Chinese officials and garrisons out of their way.

Under the sponsorship of the Russian Reds a People's Revolutionary Party of Tannu Urianghai had been organised early in 1921; and now after the occupation of Tannu Urianghai by the Red troops an Assembly was called by the Party on August 13, 1912. Present were the self-appointed People's Representatives picked by the Party, and also delegates from the Soviet Government and the People's Revolutionary Party of Outer Mongolia. Independence was declared by the Assembly; the new State was named People's Republic of Tannu Tuva. Soviet Russia speedily recognized the independence of the new Republic on September 9, 1921.[2] Ever since the People's Republic has been in existence.

It was reported that the new Republic signed a Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Russia in 1925, the main points of which are as follows:[3]

1. Soviet Russia might station troops in the territory of the several banners in Tannu Tuva, subject, however, to the condition that the number of such troops should not exceed the

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[1] Wang Chan-yu, op. cit., p. 117.
[2] Adolf Grahowsky, "The Struggle for Mongolia," The Living Age, vol. 349, 1935-1936, p. 406.
[3] "Shina Nin Kan," (China Year Book), 1927, published by Toa Do Ben Kai, (The Far Eastern Cultural Association), p. 318. Also in November 1926 Tannu Tuva signed a Treaty with the People's Republic of Mongolia. "Mo Ko Tai Kang, P.471.

number of the troops of the Republic.

2. The titles of the princes were to be preserved, and inherited as before.

3. Russian political advisers should be employed by the new Government of Tannu Tuva.

4. The Russians should be entrusted with all matters in regard to the foreign relations of Tannu Tuva. No treaty or agreement should be concluded by the Republic without consulting Soviet Russia beforehand.

On the part of China, her reticence upon the problem of Tannu Urianghai, as contrasted with her frequent and vociferous protestations in regard to Outer Mongolia, is due to the assumption that Tannu Urianghai forms only a district of Outer Mongolia, and Outer Mongolia forms an integral part of China, so there is no need to deal with the Tannu Urianghai problem separately. Whether this assumption may be wise or unwise, proper or improper, the fact remains that while China was unable to settle the Outer Mongolian problem with Russia, she was equally unable to settle the Tannu Urianghai problem, and whether a solution of the Outer Mongolian problem will bring about, *ipso facto*, a solution of the Tannu Urianghai problem, is really problematical.

II. Present Conditions of the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva

A. Political Situation -- The present Constitution of Tannu Tuva was adopted on November 24, 1926, in the Fourth Assembly of the Great Huruldan. The document is almost a counterpart of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mongolia, based upon the principles of dictatorship by the laboring mass, nationalization of land, state monopoly of foreign trade, separation of church and government, abrogation of titles of dignity, etc.[1]

B. Economic situation -- Tannu Tuva is an overwhelmingly pastoral land. In 1932 the total income of the people amounted to some 11,000,000 roubles, which may be broken down as follows:[2]

Items	Per Cent	Items	Per Cent
Mountain occupations	12.5%	Building	5.4%
		Commerce	4.5%
Handicraft products	2.7%	Hunting & Fishing	6.7%
Stock-farming	45.5%	Transportation	7.3%
Agriculture	14.5%	Others	0.9%

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[1] For text of the Constitution, see "Mo Ko Tai Kang," Appendix V, pp. 580-584. For more information on Tannu Tuva's political developments, see ibid, pp. 471-472.

[2] Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 472-473.

The total number of livestock in 1931 was 1,103,625, which may be broken down as follows:[1]

Items	Quantity	Per Cent
Reindeer	168,205	15.2
Horses	105,205	9.5
Sheep	529,780	47.7
Goats	291,848	26.4
Sables	10,415	0.93
Camels	952	0.08
Pigs	1,343	0.12
Others	817	0.07

The average share of animals among the Urianghai population (which totalled 82,183 in 1931[2]), is thus about 13, 49 head per capita, as against 33.40 per capita in Outer Mongolia in 1930.

The forests and mineral deposits are the two great valuable resources of Tannu Tuva. But they have been but slightly attacked as yet. Among its mineral wealth in the ground, are gold, iron, copper, coal, rock salt, granite, etc. Although one fourth of the country is woodland, yet the native people have not developed a sizable wood industry out of this natural wealth.[3]

III. Survey of Soviet Policy in Tannu Tuva

In summing up the Soviet policy in Tannu Tuva we need

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[1] Ibid, p. 473.
[2] Ibid, p. 471. The density of the Urianghai population is about 0.48 per square kilometers.
[3] "Mo Ko Tai Kang," p. 474.

only notice three points: First, her fundamental policy in Tannu Urianghai stems out from the same formulae as her policy in Outer Mongolia, that is, aggrandizement at the expense of China; secondly, Soviet Russia, copying the policy of the Czarist Government, have been in favor of separation of Tannu Urianghai from both China and Outer Mongolia, just as she wanted Outer Mongolia to be free from all kinds of connections with both Japan and China; and thirdly, the Soviet policy in Tannu Tuva has proved to be more positive and aggressive than that in Outer Mongolia. In Outer Mongolia she purposely avoids large immigration and colonization, which will offend the Mongols more than anything else. She also allows the Outer Mongols more freedom in managing their civil affairs. But in Tannu Tuva Russian immigration in recent years has increased by leaps and bounds. It is reported that the number of Russian emigres in Tannu Tuva has surpassed the native population.[1] With the influx of Russian nationals at such a speed, it is natural that the Republic's Government falls into the hands of these aliens, and orders from Moscow are constantly received for their guidance.

To conclude, we may properly say that if Outer Mongolia is considered as a Soviet satellite, Tannu Tuva may be counted as a the *de facto* Union-Republic of the U.S.S.R.

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[1] Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, October 1945, p. 152.

Indeed, its full-fledged status as such needs to be perfected only by a word from Moscow.

PART FOUR

INNER MONGOLIA BECKONED JAPAN

CHAPTER X

INNER MONGOLIA FROM THE CHINESE REVOLUTION TO THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

I. The Chinese Revolution and Inner Mongolia

In 1911, when the Chinese Revolution broke out, unrest and revolts actually began earlier in Inner Mongolia than in Outer Mongolia.[1] Attempts were made by some Inner Mongols to assert independence and to join force with their northern brethren. Later, after the Outer Mongols had succeeded in ousting the Chinese authorities at Urga, several detachments of their banner army were sent southward to come to the former's rescue. But eventually the Inner Mongolian Independence was never realized. It will be pertinent and important for us to resume the causes of the failure of the Inner Mongols here.

First of all, the Inner Mongolian prices and lamas constituted the most formidable obstacle in the way. Ofttimes they did resent the Chinese encroachments, and contemplated revolution; but always there were some considerations in their mind, which made them sooner or later veer round. These considerations may be summed up as follows:

1. They, as a privileged class, were most anxious to

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[1] For an analysis of the fundamental Mongol grievances against China, cf. O. Lattimore, "The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism," Pacific Affairs, vol. 9, September 1936, pp. 388-405.

keep their vested interests supreme. If the Inner-Outer-Mongolian union would be effected, they would certainly be overshadowed by their counterparts in Outer Mongolia which was much larger in size and had behind it the might of Russia.

2. Many Inner Mongolian princes were heavily interested in Chinese commercial firms which handled the lucrative Mongol-Chinese trade, and did not wish to risk the loss of the large revenues thus obtained. Furthermore, the Chinese Government used to pay, as a rule, large sums of subsidies and pensions to the Mongol princely dignitaries. Any imprudent action on their part would decidedly mean the loss of such means.

3. The princes deemed it safer to snug up under the roof of a weak China, with things much left to themselves, than to walk on the tight rope pulled by an ambitious Russia. The exodus of thousands of northern Mongols to Inner Mongolia to escape the Russian strangelehold naturally accentuated their determination to keep aloof from Russian influence.

Secondly, in spite of the turmoil in China Proper caused by the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese garrisons in Inner Mongolia were much stronger than those in Outer Mongolia. Also since the Manchu Court, during the last years of its existence, actively encouraged Chinese immigration to Mongolia, especially Inner Mongolia, and the reclamation of its arable lands, a great number of Chinese farmers, and following them,

Chinese merchants, went northward to seek their fortune. These industrious and robust Chinese also formed a force which was carefully reckoned with by the Mongol princes.

Thirdly, although in the Russo-Japanese treaties Western Inner Mongolia was laid out as a Russian sphere of interests and Eastern Inner Mongolia as a Japanese sphere, yet Russia was too busy elsewhere to penetrate deeply into her sphere, and Japan was not fully recovered from the Russo-Japanese War. Russia, on her part, was even opposed to the union of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, as we have noted above. Thus, the absence of either Russian or Japanese tampering was as much a decisive factor in letting down the Inner Mongolia revolutionary movement as was the presence of the Czarist aid in making good the Outer Mongolian independence.

Therefore, the schisms between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, the comparatively greater strength of the Chinese in Inner Mongolia, and the lack of foreign assistance combined to doom the cause of Inner Mongolian nationalism. However, this nationalism, once having been stirred up, did not die out, but remained as an undercurrent ever present in the Inner Mongolian situation. The fundamental reason is that the Mongol grievances were not remedied. In the following pages we shall have occasion to see that the center of Mongolian troubles shifted gradually to Inner Mongolia as the Outer Mongolian situation became more and more stabilised.

II. Political and Social Developments since the Chinese Revolution

As soon as the Chinese Republic was successfully established, the question of reorganizing Inner Mongolia began to receive serious attention. In fact, after the Russo-Japanese War the Manchu Court had planned to reorganize not only Manchuria but also the land of the Inner Mongols, especially three of the eastern Leagues which were vulnerably exposed to Japanese intrigues and were christened by them as Eastern Inner Mongolia. However, the Manchu Court did not last long enough to do more than the reorganization of Manchuria, and then left the rest of the work to be completed by the Republic. In 1915, after the Russo-Sino-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement had been concluded, the matter of Inner Mongolian reorganization was taken up anew, with a view to strenghtening China's control in that area. A part of the territory of the Jo-ude League was united with part of Outer Chihli that belonged originally to the Inner Mongols, to form a special district; the territory of the Silingol League was united with part of Outer Chihli and Outer Shansi that was originally the grazing ground of the Chahars, to form a second special district; the territory of the Ulan-Chap and Yegho Leagues was united with part of Outer Shansi that was originally the grazing ground of the Tumets, to form a third special district; and the three new districts were placed respectively

under the jurisdiction of the Garrison Commander of Jehol, the Military Governor of Chahar at Kalgan and the Garrison Commander of Suiyuan. As to the territory of the Alashan Mongols, no special district was created, but it was made a part of the province of Kansu and entrusted to the special care of the Garrison Commander of Ninghsia. Also, in the central government at Peking, a Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established as a supervisory and directing organ.[1]

After the establishment of the National Government at Nanking in 1927, further strengthening of central control over Inner Mongolia was considered. In 1928 the three special districts, as carved out in 1915, and a portion of Kansu were reorganized as the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia, with minor territorial adjustments.[2] Provincial Governors were appointed by the National Government to exercise control of all administrative affairs, while some Mongol leaders were also appointed to provincial posts as representatives of the Mongol natives. As regards the central administrative organ, the former Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs were replaced in 1927 by a Commission for Mongolia and Tibet, charged with the overall planning and administration of matters concerning "those areas of Mongolia and Tibet not yet reorganized into provinces or special districts."[3] As

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1. The Chinese Year Book, 1943, pp. 120-121.
2. Ibid, p. 121.
3. Shun Po, Shanghai, March 23, 1928. Article XIV of the Organic Law of the Commission.

regards the general policy in relation to Mongolia, the National Decree for the Period of Political Tutelage declared that "...irrespective of sex, race or religion, Chinese citizens are equal in the eyes of law."[1] Specifically speaking of Tibet and Mongolia, a resolution of the Third National Congress of Kuomintang again announced.

> "The aim of the principle of Nationalism is to promote the self-governing capacity of every people, in order that they may exercise their rights to take part in the political affairs of the nation."[2]

Subsequently, the Eighth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee passed a resolution to the effect that,

> "With the exception of the administration of national defense, foreign affairs and other nation-wide matters that must be centralized in control, the Central Government must assist the local governments of the frontier in the development of the cultural, economic, educational and communication conditions of the people according to the policy laid down by the Kuomintang."[3]

Based on the Party pronouncements, the new Commission for Mongolia and Tibet began to attack two major problems

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1. The Chinese Year Book, 1943, p. 224.
2. Ibid, pp. 225-226.
3. Ibid, p. 226.

concerning Inner Mongolia: (1) the readjustments of Inner Mongolian tribal organisations; (2) the settlement of Inner Mongolia by people from China proper.

As regards the problem of readjusting Mongol tribal organisations, the following plan was adopted in the Mongolian Affairs Conference convoked in Nanking in May 1930, and was quickly carried out:

(A) The League -- Each League should have a Chief and Vice-Chief (Meng Chang and Fu Meng Chang). The Chief should have control over all affairs and subordinate organs of the League, the functions of the Vice-Chief being to assist the Chief and to act for him during his absence.

The Chief should have an office, to be known as the Meng Chang Shu. Each League should also have an Assembly of Representatives, which should be composed of representatives elected by the various Banners under its jurisdiction. The Assembly should have the power of legislation relating to local affairs, and also exercise supervisory powers.

(B) The Banner -- The Chief (Jassak) of the Banner should have control over all affairs and exercise supervision over all subordinate organs in the Banner. He would be assisted by from two to six Banner officials, together with whom he would constitute a Banner Council, which should decide upon important matters affecting the entire Banner. Each Banner should have an Assembly of Representatives, to be elected by

the people belonging to the Banner. The Assembly should exercise the power of legislation and supervision.

(C) Except matters relating to foreign relations, national defense, and other administrative questions of a nation-wide character, which would remain under the direct control of the central and provincial governments, all the remaining matters would be regulated by the Leagues and Banners, under the supervision of the Provincial Governments.[1]

As regards the problem of settlement, the Chairman of the new Commission labored for a programme of immigration. It emphasized the encouragement of immigration into Mongolia, Tibet and Kokonor (Chinghai) -- the sparsely populated regions of China -- as an important solution for the rapid growth of population that had become a grave problem facing China in view of its limited arable lands. The failure of Chinese immigration to the northwest part of China in the past was attributed to four main factors, i.e., poor communications, lack of encouragement by the Government, banditry, and lastly, unsuitable choice of land for colonization. Therefore, the official plan urged that the National Government distribute free of charge agricultural implements and seeds for cultivation to all immigrants, and at the same time technical experts be employed to look after their interests, that proper protection be given them against raids by bandits, and that more roads be

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[1] Tennyson Tan, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-141.

constructed to improve communication. As a result of this governmental advocacy, coupled with poverty caused by war and fear of famine, a large number of the Chinese south of the Great Wall left their ancestral habitation and settled in Inner Mongolia. During the ensuing years the number of Chinese immigrants in those regions swelled so swiftly that, as we shall see, they became the predominant people in Inner Mongolia.

The Chinese colonization movement was extremely successful in wresting local ascendancy from the Mongol nomads to the hands of the Chinese settlers, so much so that the Mongols, in the face of the Chinese advance either withdrew northward to places where they might enjoy more freedom and security, or were assimilated by the Chinese culture at the expense of their nomadic identity. For a better understanding of the new situation in Inner Mongolia, an analysis may be made here on the factors conducive to this Chinese ascendancy:

A. The overwhelming majority of Chinese population -- As a result of the systematic colonization in Inner Mongolia under governmental sponsorship, a huge number of Chinese farmers flocked into this region to build their new life.[1] The Peiping-Suiyuan Railway (via Kalgan) was exceedingly instrumental in accelerating the northward movement, that in a few

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[1] For a study of the Chinese expansion in Inner Mongolia and the driving forces thereof, cf. Dudley Buxton "Present Conditions in Inner Mongolia," _The Geographical Journal_, vol. 61, June 1923, pp. 393-413.

years the Chinese immigrants greatly outnumbered the Mongols. This change may be clearly shown in the following Chinese official statistics:[1]

	Total Population	Non-Chinese Speaking Peoples			Per Cent of Mongol Population in Total Population
		Mongols	Unassimilated Manchus	Tungans (Turks)	
Jehol	2,184,723	458,757	131,835	——	21%
Chahar	2,035,957	71,295	——	——	3.5%
Suiyuan	2,083,693	170,959	——	——	8.2%
Ninghsia	719,676	17,450	——	137,000	2.5%
Grand Total or Average	7,024,049	718,461			8.8%

From the above table we can see that by the thirties of the current century, out of about seven million of the total population of Inner Mongolia, not even one million are Mongols. This mere weight of number is really enough to overpower the shrinking strength of the Mongols.

B. The Chinese economic primacy -- The industrious and thrifty Chinese émigrés easily wrested economic primacy from the Mongols, and made the latter almost entirely dependent

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[1] Statistics taken from *The Chinese Year Book*, 1943, pp. 42-45, and *The Year Book of the National Government of the Republic of China*, 1944, table 2.

upon the Chinese for the necessaries of their daily life. They occupied the districts offering the best prospects for tillage. These include: (a) the valley and terraces lying within the inner belt of scarps in Jehol and Chahar; (b) the intermediate belt between these and the other scarps which form the plateau edge; and (c) the alluvial lands round the northern bow of the Yellow River which embraces the most fertile land in Inner Mongolia. Thus, for agricultural products the Mongols must trade with the Chinese farmers and merchants. Furthermore, the Mongols, being inept in trading, could find no other business agents than the Chinese to dispose of their pastoral products. While the prohibitive distance across the Gobi Desert to Outer Mongolia defeated any hope of large-scale commercial transactions with Outer Mongolia and Russia, the Chinese railway, on the other hand, provided the only convenient outlet for the Mongol goods.

C. Superiority of the Chinese Political and Military Power -- The Chinese were superior also in political authority and military power in Inner Mongolia. All but few of the high offices in these provinces' governments were held by the Chinese, who only act upon orders emanating from Nanking. This relative position between the rulers and the ruled naturally worked to the advantage of the Chinese. Furthermore, the Chinese garrisons were also equipped with modern weapons which the Mongol horsemen could not resist. Under these circumstances, the Mongols were naturally kept down, while the

Chinese became the dominant race.

Although the Chinese policy served to benefit the frontier security and people's livelihood of the nation as a whole, yet, on the other hand, it produced destructive social and economic effects upon the Mongols. Socially, the tribal organizations of the Mongols faced the threat of a breakdown under the impact of the incoming force. Many more adventuresome Mongols quit their tribal chieftains, and threw themselves into the ranks of the desperadoes. The more passive ones could only stay to see their tribal organizations shrinking in both size and authority. Economically, the old tribal lands were nibbled away from the Mongols, and turned into the Chinese hands. This tendency was further precipitated by some Mongol princes who quite willingly sold or rented their lands to the new settlers in exchange for a price or rentals. Thus, as the Chinese advanced forward, the Mongols were pushed back, reportedly at an average rate of about 10 miles a year,[1] until the remnant of their tribal lands became too small for a sound pastoral economy. Tents were planted too close with one another; the country was over-grazed; there was not enough rayon d'action for seasonal movements; and the effects of drought and cattle plague were greatly enhanced.[2] Indeed, it is for this very reason that the Inner Mongolian

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1. O. Lattimore, "The Chinese as A Dominant Race," Asia, vol. 28, June 1928, p. 451.
2. O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria," p. 280.

situation remained as unstable as ever despite the many innovations vigorously pushed through by the Chinese Government. Little wonder that the Inner Mongols, indignant at the Chinese encroachment, and overawed by Soviet Russia's stranglehold on Outer Mongolia, tended to regard Japan as their possible saviour.

III. Japan and Eastern Inner Mongolia

During the negotiations of the Russo-Japanese Conventions of 1907, the first ones of a series, Japan had been most anxious to prevent Russia from swallowing the whole of Mongolia down her throat. She strove to make the separating line as much favorable to her as possible, and, indeed, a hard bargain was driven by either side. Thus, A. Gérard observed that,

> "As for Mongolia, it was recognised that the Russian sphere should not exceed the confines of the so-called Outer Mongolia, extending from the Siberian frontier to the Desert of Gobi. It was the determination of this zone which for several months retarded the agreement between the two countries."[1]

E. B. Price further supplemented the above statement:

> "Mongolia, as a whole, we may believe, was one of the points on which the parties disagreed during the negotiations; for, on May 9, 1907, Bahmeteff, Russian Minister

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[1] A. Gérard, "Ma Mission au Japon, 1907-1914," p. 32

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III. Japan and Eastern Inner Mongolia

During the negotiations of the Russo-Japanese Conventions of 1907, the first ones of a series, Japan had been much anxious to prevent Russia from swallowing the whole of Mongolia down her throat. She strove to make the separating line as much favorable to her as possible, and, indeed, a hair strain was drawn by either side. Thus, A. Popov observed that,

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[1] A. Popov, "Negotiation on Japan, 1907-1916," p. 28

to Japan, telegraphed from Tokyo to the Russian Foreign Office that Hayashi demurred at including in the treaty a provision touching upon Mongolia, 'as it might be interpreted in China in a sense unfavorable to Japan', and had instructed Motono to present a new draft. Possibly, Russia had wanted to include in her sphere all of Mongolia, and the eventual designation of Outer Mongolia, only, without any reference to Inner Mongolia, represented a compromise.[1]

The Chinese Republic having been successfully established in 1911, Japan could not be reticent any longer about Inner Mongolia. On March 8, 1912, before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty of the same year, Russia came out declaring that she "holds in northern Manchuria, Mongolia and Western China special interests and rights founded on her treaties and conventions with China." Then, on May 16 the Japanese Ambassador at Washington informed the American Department of State that in view of the Russian reservation Japan must also make one as to Eastern Inner Mongolia "in which quarter Japan is naturally interested," lest "silence might be misconstrued." To preclude any possible friction with Russia, Japan further signed the Secret Treaty of 1912, formally drawing a line between West and East Inner Mongolia with the latter branded as Japanese. We have reason to believe that

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1. E. B. Price, op. cit., p. 37.

this restraint on the part of Japan to claim only a part, instead of the whole, of Inner Mongolia represents another concession of Japan to Russia, so that an open conflict might be averted.

No sooner it was made clear to Japan that the Wilson Administration of the United States had struck a retreat from the Far Eastern scene by declining to support the American bankers in their proposed loans to China, than Japan swung into action. She pressed unceasingly upon China the question of Japanese loans for the construction of Chinese railways, and on October 5, 1913 succeeded in wresting from the Chinese Government the privilege to supply the capital for the construction of a railway from Taonan (in the Province of Heilungkiang) to Chengteh (in the Province of Jehol). This railway, running northeast-southwestward, was apparently designed to thrust Japanese influence into the heart of Eastern Inner Mongolia.

On January 18, 1915, taking advantage of the European War, Japan presented to China the well-known Twenty-One Demands, of which Group II were demands regarding Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia, vide supra. After 24 unpleasant meetings, she presented on April 26 a new set of twenty-four so-called Revised Demands, and on May 7 delivered an ultimatum calling for immediate acceptance. The Chinese underdog could not but sign a treaty on the 25th with many of the Japanese

terms embodied therein. The article related to Eastern Inner Mongolia reads:[1]

> "Article 6 - The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports."

And in one of the seven notes exchanged simultaneously, it was provided that, on the selection of places to be opened as provided in Article 6 and the drawing up of regulations therefor, decision would be made by the Chinese Government "after consulting the Minister of Japan."[2] In another note the following was provided,[3]

> "China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first; and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the security of the taxes in the above-mentioned places...may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists first."

But Japan was not to stop at these concessions. Soon after-

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[1] "Sino-Japanese Negotiations, Chinese Official Statement respecting the Twenty One Demands, 1915," p. 49.
[2] Ibid, p. 53.
[3] Ibid, p. 56.

wards another chance was offered to her. In the monarchical movement of 1915-1916, the movement which President Yuan Shih-kai engineered to make himself Emperor of China, Japan purposely lent assistance to Yuan's opponents in order to prolong disorders. She mustered 2,000 Manchurian bandits at Dairen, and 5,000 Mongolian bandits in the Desert, for a joint descent upon Fengtien, later Liaoling. After the sudden collapse of the monarchical movement, the Mongolian bandits were not dissolved, but kept marching on toward Taonan. The Chinese troops then came to station at Chengchiatun, a town in Fengtien near Taonan to stamp out the outlaws. Quite incidentally a fracas occurred between the Chinese soldiers and some Japanese soldiers who had long been in that inland town in the heart of northern Manchuria with a suspected objective.[1] As a result of the fracas twelve Japanese soldiers were killed. A little later, during the Chinese attack on the bandits, some of the Japanese troops "who were guarding the South Manchurian Railway zone" were alleged to be "fired at and injured, and a

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[1] According to a Sino-Japanese Agreement Japan might guard the South Manchurian Railway in the same manner as the Russians did the Chinese Eastern Railway. Chengchiatun was neither a city in South Manchuria nor was it adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway. Japan, therefore, had no right whatsoever to station troops there. However, without any reason, she dispatched a division of troops from South Manchuria to Chengchiatun and at the same time stationed police there. To the repeated protests of the Fengtien authorities the Japanese Commanders simply turned a deaf ear.

Japanese flag was shot through." Seizing this opportunity Japan again presented, on September 2, 1916, three demands and four desiderata to the Chinese Government.[1] One of the demands was for China

> "To agree that the Japanese Government may, with a view to the protection and government of the Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, send Japanese police officers to function at those places where considered to be necessary; also to let the Chinese officials in South Manchuria employ more Japanese to serve as police advisers."

In one of the desiderata she demanded,

> "Every Chinese army headquarters stationed in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to employ a certain number of Japanese military officers as advisers."

Finally, however, apprehensive of the unfavorable effects of such maneuverings, Japan consented to drop the phrase "Eastern Inner Mongolia" from these demands and desiderata.

Again when the new International Banking Consortium was being organized in 1919-1920, Japan insisted upon her reservation that South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia should be excluded from its scope. But this proposal was

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[1] M.T.Z. Tyau, "Treaty Obligations between China and other States," Appendix G, The Chengchiatun Affairs, p. 272; Tennyson Tan, op. cit., pp. 113-119.

categorically rejected by the other partners.[1]

From the above we can see that ever since the establishment of the Chinese Republic Japan never relaxed her efforts to thrust herself into Eastern Inner Mongolia, but she achieved very little. As a matter of fact, the Twenty-One Demands constituted the high-water mark of her achievements, after which there was a steady recession of tide. Not until the Mukden Incident of 1931 did the flood rise to a new height again.

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[1] M. J. Bau, op. cit., pp. 214, 398-399.

CHAPTER XI

HULUN BUIR FROM THE CHINESE REVOLUTION TO THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

1. The Chinese Revolution and Hulun Buir

Hulun Buir, the land of the Manchurian Mongols, had long been a trouble spot of China ever since the end of the 19th century. The centre of the Mongol unrest was the Barga district in North Heilungkiang. The cause was fundamentally the same as that in Inner Mongolia, i.e., the persistent, far-reaching and deep-going colonization by Chinese immigrants who could underlive and dispossess the native Mongols, and thus threatened to destroy the traditional economic, social and political structure of their care-free, primitive, pastoral life.[1] The Chinese policy of colonizing Hulun Buir received a fresh impetus as a result of the railroad construction in Manchuria -- the opening of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1903, the Japanese reorganization of the South Manchurian Railway (begun by the Russians in 1898) in 1907, and the completion of the Peking-Mukden Railway also in 1907. According as the Chinese colonization picked up tempo, the Mongol reaction to such paralyzing force rose to higher and

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[1] O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", pp. 89-90; Hsu Shih-chang, "Tung San Sheng Cheng Lueh", a collection of documents and maps relating to Manchuria under the administration of the editor, bk. 10.

higher pitch.[1] The result is perennial Mongol revolts. Already in 1891, still before the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty, a rebellion broke out in Barga, at the same time against the Mongol princes, who profited by exploiting their subjects, and against the Chinese agricultural settlers, whose expropriation of the Mongol lands had menaced the Mongol way of life. During the next two decades, two more rebellions were seen, both in Fengtien province -- one among the Suruk Mongols in the Changwu district, and the other near Taonan in north Fengtien.[2]

These Mongols were not only anti-Chinese, but also anti-Russian. They were greatly overawed by the destructive effect of the construction of Chinese Eastern Railway and the ominous presence of Russian troops along the projected line. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the Russian occupation of Manchuria and her belated evacuation further irritated the Mongols. Moreover, at this time Russia was backing up the Chinese policy in Manchuria against Japan, although aims of Russia and Japan were basically the same. Thus, so far as the Manchurian Mongols were concerned, Russia and China were eyed as allied aggressors, and, as a result, there was a tendency among them to look on the Japanese as their possible ally against both China and Russia. When the

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[1] For a detailed and authoritative study of the Mongol problem in Manchuria, see O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", chs. 3-4, pp. 63-108.

[2] Ibid, pp. 113-116.

Russo-Japanese War began, many Mongol malcontents and desperadoes overtly served as irregulars in the pay of the Japanese.[1]

After the Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911, the Barga Mongols, in imitation of their brothers in Outer Mongolia, declared their separation from China, and its union with Outer Mongolia.[2] In response to the call from the Barga Mongols, the Outer Mongolian secessionists sent immediately a contingent of troops, composed of Mongols and Russians,[3] and took Hailar on the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Heilungkiang province.[4] Things being as they were, Barga was thus thrown into a turmoil.

It appears that the Barga Mongols' separation movement was not enthusiastically supported by the Russians. This attitude on the part of Russia is understandable. The Chinese Eastern Railway, running through the Barha region, was owned and operated by both Russia and China. Should Barga, or Hulun Buir unite with Outer Mongolia, the Chinese influence would inexorably linger on in the new Russian satellite through the Railway, which was very contrary to

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[1] Ibid, p. 119. It should be noted that in the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1907, a great part of the Barga region was included in the Russian sphere of interests.
[2] F.A. Larson, "Duke of Mongolia", p. 223.
[3] Wang Chin-yu, op. cit., p. 119
[4] Shu Hsushi, op. cit., p. 353.

the Russian policy at that moment.[1] So in the Tripartite Agreement of 1915 between Russia, China and Outer Mongolia, Russia consented to specifically exclude from autonomous Mongolia the region lying east of the Great Hsingan Mountains. Article 11 of the Agreement reads:

> "....the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions which were under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban at Urga,........bounded by the district of Houlounbouir (i.e., Hailar) on the East, by Inner Mongolia on the South, by the Province of Sinkiang on the South-West, and by the district of Altai on the West."[2]

Having settled the Outer Mongolian problem, Russia came forward to bargain with China about this Barga problem. On November 6, 1915 she concluded another agreement with the Peking Government,[3] by which she obtained from China the creation of a "special district of Hulun Buir" to be ruled by the Russian policy of that moment.[1] So in the Tripartite Agreement of 1915 between Russia, China and Outer Mongolia, Russia consented to specifically exclude from autonomous Mongolia the region Barga, east of the Great Khingan Mountains. Article 11 of the Agreement stated:

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[1] O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", p. 119. But, although Russia refrained from extending to the Barga Mongols positive assistance, she, nevertheless, tried to thwart China's efforts to suppress the rebels. For instance, upon receiving the protest of the Chinese Government against her alleged assistance to the Outer Mongolian invaders in Barga, Russia declared categorically that her attitude was that of a neutral power; and at the same time she demanded that the Chinese Government send no troops to the Barga region by way of the Chinese Eastern Railway, that no fighting within the Railway zone was to be tolerated, and that all the Chinese officials leave the said zone. Wang Ching-yu, op. cit., p. 56.

[2] Carnegie Endowment, op. cit., p. 34

[3] For text of the Agreement, see MacMurray, op. cit., vol II, p. 1247. See also Hwa Chi-yuen, "Man Mon Wen Ti", (The Manchurian and Mongolian Problems), pp. 172-175.

"....the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the region which were under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban at Urga,.........bounded by the district of Hulunbuir (i.e., Hailar) on the east, by Inner Mongolia on the south, by the Province of Sinkiang on the Southwest, and by the district of Altai on the West."[2]

Having settled the Outer Mongolian problem, Russia came forward to bargain with China about this Barga problem. On November 6, 1915 she concluded another agreement with the Peking Government,[3] by which she obtained from China the creation of a "special district of Hulun Buir" to be ruled by

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1. O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", p. 116. [illegible] Although Russia refrained from extending to the Barga Mongols positive protection, she, nevertheless, tried to [illegible] their claims [illegible] the people. For instance, when [illegible] the request of the Chinese Government [illegible] to the Outer Mongolian invasion in Barga, Russia declared categorically that her attitude was that of a neutral party; and at the same time she suggested that the Chinese Government [illegible]
2. [illegible], p. 10
3. [illegible] pp. 173-175.

a governor appointed by the President of China from among the natives,[1] and the engagement to give Russia advance notice in case detachments of troops were to be sent there to suppress disorder, and to withdraw such troops as soon as order was reestablished;[2] to abstain from colonising the region;[3] to apply first to Russia in case foreign capital was needed for the construction of railways therein;[4] and to confirm contracts that had already been concluded between Russian investors and the authorities of Hailar before the Mongol occupation.[5] In this manner, Hulun Buir became formally an autonomous district since 1915.

II. Cancellation of Hulun Buir Autonomy

After Outer Mongolia cancelled its autonomy in November 1919, the authorities of the Mongol banners in Hulun Buir decided to follow suit and petitioned the Chinese Government in February 1920 to the effect that

> "The Hulun Buir region has always been an integral part of the Chinese territory, under the jurisdiction of Heilungkiang province. It was once compelled by the course of events in Urga to declare independence, and was later created as a special district. However, up to now the government of this district has failed to

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[1] Arts. 1-3
[2] Art. 4
[3] Art. 6
[4] Art. 7
[5] Art. 8

> attain its purpose...Therefore, we petition for your approval to cancel our status as a special district, and restore the government of this district to the discretion of the Central Government. The Russo-Chinese Agreement of November 6, 1915, signed for the purpose of instituting the special district, should also be declared null and void, we Mongols being willing of our own accord to waive our rights."[1]

The Chinese Government, as a matter of course, readily gave its approval, and put the region back under the oversight of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, while arrangements were also made to let the Mongols retain most of their autonomous rights which they had enjoyed before.

Notwithstanding all these international and internal arrangements, uprisings, on large and small scales, continued to occur recurrently in Hulun Buir, and served to keep alive the Mongol nationalism. Begun in 1916 and continued into the next year, another rebellion of the Barga Mongols, under the staunch leadership of Babojab, spread to almost the whole of the territory. The important town of Chengchiatun was occupied for a time by the rioting Mongols; Chinese officials were put under custody or were driven away; and the Chinese encroachment was staved off. But the attempt was at last crushed by the Chinese troops, with its leader, Babojab killed

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[1] Cheng Chung-tsu, op. cit., Part III, pp. 8-9

in action in Jehol province.[1]

In 1928 the Barga Mongols, under the threat of a sped-up Chinese colonization, rose once again, but again were unsuccessful.[2] In 1929 the Young Mongol Party of Barga again took charge of Hailar and the Barga region after the Chinese troops stampeded away during the Russo-Chinese clashes over the problem of Chinese Eastern Railway. But as soon as China and Russia again came to terms, the Mongols quietly submitted themselves to the return of the Chinese authority.[3] The last of such risings came in 1930 in Jerim League, Liaoling Province, as a result of the exploitation of the Chinese land-companies, and the official announcement of creating a new hsien, or county, out of the land thus expropriated. Needless to say, the rebellion lost ground in the face of Chinese superior arms.[4] Before long, as we shall see, the Japanese came to overlord Manchuria, and posed as the saviour of the Barga Mongols by the creation of a Hsingan Province of Manchukuo.

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1. O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", pp. 124-125.
2. Ibid, pp. 131-133.
3. O. Lattimore, "Political Conditions in Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 152, November 1930, p. 319.
4. O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", pp. 133-134.

PART FIVE

SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1931-1945) FORCED A SOLUTION ON CHINA, RUSSIA AND JAPAN

CHAPTER XXI

THE HSINGAN PROVINCE OF MANCHUKUO

In spite of their long-cherished dream of dominating Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese, up to the Sino-Japanese War had not been overly successful. However, when by a single stroke, they firmly established themselves in Manchuria in 1931, they were brought into territorial proximity with Mongolia. Aware of the fact that some Mongols in Inner Mongolia were agitating for a coup d'état against the Chinese authorities, they spared no pains to cultivate and engross such sentiment. So, after the province of Jehol was annexed to Manchukuo, Japan proceeded to set aside, in 1932, all of the supposedly Mongol territory as an autonomous Mongol province, under the name of Hsingan, after the Hsingan Mountains running through it. In all other lands where Chinese population was larger, local "Offices of Mongol Affairs" were set up to protect Mongol interests.

The Province was the largest one among the provinces carved out from Manchuria by the Japanese. It ran from the Amur basin southward all the way into the province of Jehol, covering an expanse of roughly 150,000 square milies -- about half the size of France, and one third of the whole of Manchuria. In this area were approximately 584,000 Mongols who originally resided there apart from the Mongols in Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. Externally, it bordered Siberia


SIBERIA
TANNU TUVA
BURIAT REPUBLIC
Chita
Kobdo
SAIN JAYAGATO KHAN
JASAKTO KHAN
Oliyasotai
SAIN NOYAN KHAN
Urga
TOSIYATO KHAN
SECHIN KHAN
OUTER MONGOLIA (KHALKHA)
BARGA
HEILUNGCHIANG
HSINGAN
MANCHUKUO
Harbin
KIRIN
Hsinching
Vladivostok
CHINESE TURKISTAN
ÖLÖT MONGOLS
SILINGOL
JERIM
JO-ODA
CHAHAR PROVINCE
SUIYUAN
OLANCHAB
INNER MONGOLIA
CHAHAR MONGOLS
TUMETS
JEHOL
JOSOTO
FENGTIEN
Mukden
KOREA
KANSU
EDSIN GOL
NINGHSIA PROVINCE
PROVINCE
Paot'ou
Kueihua
Kalgan
Peiping
Tientsin
Dairen
ALAKSHAN
ORDOS
Taiyuan
KOKONOR
TIBET
Lanchow
CHINA
Nanking
Shanghai
90
100
110
120
130
140
50
40
30
Scale of miles
0
100
200
300
400
500

MONGOLIA, MANCHUKUO AND CHINA

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
MANCHUKUO
showing
HSINGAN PROVINCE
and Mongol Territories colonized by Chinese
Scale of miles
0
50
100
150
200
"Lost" Territory of the Mongols
Nonni Valley tribes
Jerim League Mongols
Jehol Mongols
Railroads
In operation
Under construction
Projected
116
120
124
128
132
52
48
44
40
S I B E R I A
Amur River
Ch'ikang
Shihwei
Gan R.
Blagoveshchensk
Taheiho
Aigun
Manchuli
N O R T H
H S I N G A N
Hailar
EAST HSINGAN
Nonni R.
Mergen
H E I L U N G C H I A N G
Puhsi
Noho
Tetu
Khabarovsk
Chingghis Khan
Kannan
K'oshan
K'otung
Tsitsihar
Fuyu
Ian
Paich'uan
Hailun
OUTER MONGOLIA
Chinghsing
Lintien
Mingshui
Ch'ingkang
Anda
Peituanlintzu
Sungari R.
Ussuri R.
Solun
T'ailai
T'aik'ang
Chaotung
Hulan
Harbin
Chentung
T'aonan
Talai
Chaochou
T'uch'uan
T'aonan
Ankuang
Fuyu
Shuangch'eng
SOUTH HSINGAN
Ch'ienan
I N N E R
M O N G O L I A
Tanyu
K'ait'ung
Nungan
Tehui
K I R I N
Lupei
Ch'angling
WEST HSINGAN
Lintung
T'ienshan
Liaopei
Huaite
Shuangshan
Hsinching
Kirin
Chingp'eng
Linhsi
T'ungliao
Chengchiat'un
Lishu
Kungchuling
Vladivostok
K'ailu
Ch'uanning
Suitung
Ssup'ingkai
Suitungo
K'angp'ing
Ch'angt'u
Dolon-nor
Fak'umen
K'aiyuan
Ch'ihfeng
J E H O L
Changwu
F E N G T'I E N
Yuki
Rashin
Weich'ang
Chienp'ing
Fuhsin
Hsinmin
Peip'iao
Ch'aoyang
Tahushan
Liao R.
Mukden
Lingyuan
Yalu R.
Ch'engte
P'ingch'uan
Chinchou
K O R E A
SEA OF JAPAN
Kupeik'ou
Peiping
Shanhaikuan
Gulf of Pechihli
Tientsin
Taku
Dairen
Port Arthur
G Schweizer

© By Owen Lattimore, 1934.

on the north, the other provinces of Manchukuo on the east, a southern strip of the province of Jehol on the south and Outer Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian province of Chahar on the west. Internally, it was divided into four sub-provinces; the North Hsingan (Barga, the northern and western part of Helungkiang), the South Hsingan (Jerim League, covering practically the whole of Liaoling and part of Heilungkiang and Kirin), and the West Hsingan (Jo-ude League, the northern part of Jehol province.) The Josoto League in south Jehol is left out.[1] Each of the sub-provinces therefore coincided in part with the original Mongol boundaries.

According to Japanese sources, the population of the Hsingan Province, as of October 1, 1940, is as follows:[2]

Sub-Province	Estimated Area (in sq. km.)	Population	Density of Population per sq. km.
West Hsingan	73,934.1	763,804	10
South Hsingan	76,866.3	1,026,235	13
North Hsingan	156,230.3	132,477	1
East Hsingan	109,107.3	200,654	2
Total or average	416,138	2,123,170	6.5

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[1] About two thirds of the Jerim League, all of the Josoto League, and half of Jo-ude League have been thickly settled by the Chinese, and, therefore, were not included in the Hsingan Province.

[2] The Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 106

The population of Hsingan Province classified by races is as follows:[1]

Sub-Province	Manchus & Hans	Mongols	Mohammedans	Total
West Hsingan	518,930	134,422	3,601	656,953
South Hsingan	502,296	397,577	2,482	902,355
North Hsingan	38,681	31,420	893	70,994
East Hsingan	110,673	20,622	54	131,349
Grand Total	1,170,580	584,041	7,030	1,761,651

From the above table it is evident that although the Hsingan Province was _supposed_ to be a "Mongol territory", yet in none of the four sub-provinces the Mongol population exceeded the Manchus and Hans, which, by process of assimilation, have merged into a single race. The Mongol character of the Province, superimposed by the Japanese for political purposes, is, therefore, a stark concoction.

But on the other hand, the Mongols in the Hsingan Province did represent more than half of the entire Mongol population in Manchuria, as is shown in the following:[2]

Mongols in Manchukuo	986,480	100%
Mongols in Hsingan Province	584,041	59.2%

The Japanese granted the Mongols in the Province very liberal treatment to the point near autonomy. Theoretically, it was a kind of national reservation, within which the Mongols might govern themselves under the supervision of the

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[1] Ibid, p. 611. Other minor native or alien racial groups are not counted herein. Cf. _Mo Ko Tai Kang_, p. 281.

[2] _The Far East Year Book, 1941_, p. 612.

Department of Mongolian Administration in the Manchukuoan Cabinet, and later the Hsingan Office.[1] It had its allotment of Japanese advisors, as did the other provinces, but they exercised a less minute control. It had its own troops, and was free of garrisons of Manchukuo's army. The civil administration and military organization were either in the hands of Mongols, or promised to them for the future. The titles, honors and perrogatives of hereditary princes are recognised locally within the tribe,[2] but over and above the tribal organisations there was a provincial administration, the officials of which are in part elected by the tribal organisations and in part appointed by the Manchukuo Government.[3] The Organic Law of the Hsingan Provincial Governments was first promulgated in September 1935, and later revised in December 1937. In each of these Governments there were a Scretariat, a Civil Affairs Board, and a Police Department.[4]

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[1] The Geographical Journal, vol. 91, January 1938, p. 18. The Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 620. When Manchukuo was founded in 1932, a General Administrative Office of the Hsingan Provinces was created; in December 1934, the Department of Mongolian Administration was established simultaneously with the inauguration of the system of local autonomy; in July 1937, the Hsingan Office, attached to the State Council, was organised to substitute the Department of Mongolian Administration. The Far East Year Book, 1941, pp. 622-623.

[2] Minor changes were made in the traditional banner organization of the Mongol tribes in the Hsingan Provinces. In 1939 there were a total of 29 banners. The Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 623.

[3] O. Lattimore, "The Mongols of Manchuria", pp. 141-142.

[4] The Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 622; Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 246-247. But in East Hsingan Province, the Police Department was put under the Civil Affairs Bureau.

The following chart shows the organizational outline of the Provinces.[1]


Emperor of Manchukuo
Privy Council
Prime Minister
Legislative Council
State Council
Hsingan Office
Other Departments, Offices, Bureaus, etc.
Governors of the Hsingan Provinces
Counsellors
Civil Affairs Bureau
Police Depart-Ment
Secretariat
Police of the Banners and Counties
County Offices
Banner Offices
City Offices.

The motives underlying the establishment of a Mongol province by Japan is apparent. First, she hoped to win the Manchurian Mongols' allegiance by offering them "autonomy"; secondly, she wished to set an example in Manchukuo so as to induce the Inner Mongolian Princes and Bannermen to seek union with Manchukuo; and thirdly, she wished to use this setup as a vanguard for the purpose of an offensive, and also a

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[1] *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, p. 247.

buffer for the purpose of a defensive.[1] This last motive is especially true as towards Outer Mongolia. For offensive purpose, she could use the Manchurian Mongols against their brethren in Outer Mongolia, and thus sabotage the morale of the Outer Mongols. For defensive purpose, she could use them as a flank force which the Russians and the Outer Mongols would be reluctant to attack. Apart from this, this province offered one more strategical advantage. As we know, the Gobi Desert has contributed so much to holding the two Mongolias asunder. But along the flanks of the Southern Hsingan Mountains, there are good pasture and passage from north to south and therefore easy communication between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. Whoever controls the Mongols of the Hsingan Mountains can exercise an influence upon both Inner and Outer Mongolia that cannot be easily exercised from other regions.[2] So, if the Japanese could succeed in endearing themselves to the Manchurian Mongols, they could have a strategically superior position to both China and Russia. Indeed, we cannot deny the ingenuity of the empire-building craft of the Nipponese.[3]

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[1] O. Lattimore aptly said, "If Manchukuo be considered a buffer state, then Hsingan is the buffer province of the buffer state". "*The Mongols of Manchuria*", p. 137.

[2] O. Lattimore, "The Mongol Destiny of Manchukuo", *Asia,* vol. 34, April 1934, pp. 209, 213.

[3] K.K. Kawakami, "*Manchukuo, Child of Conflict*", p. 215.

We should also look into the possible effect of such a step taken by the Japanese. First, it tended to alienate still further the Mongols from the Chinese. Under the Chinese rule, the Mongols had not been in a position to govern themselves, and had always felt the destructive impact of the Chinese encroachments. Under the new regime, they might again, at least to some extent, become their own masters. Secondly, it tended to deepen the cleavage between the Mongols in Outer Mongolia and those outside Outer Mongolia, not only because Russia and Japan were sworn foes at the time, but also because feudalism and lamaism, which were vigorously repressed or oppressed in Outer Mongolia, were purposely and carefully fostered and

stressed by the Japanese.[1] And thirdly, it tended to alienate Outer Mongolia from Russia. As we have noted above, there was still a faction in Outer Mongolia opposing to Soviet influence there. Whether they were princes, lamas, or Mongol nationalists, they would feel themselves nearer

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[1] In this regard the following passages from "*The Survey of International Affairs*", 1936, p. 937, may be quoted textually:

"The instinctive conservatism of the Japanese, which showed itself in efforts to prop up the pre-revolutionary social and theocratic structure of the Mongolian peoples, clashed inevitably with the Socialist conception of society which caused Russian influence in Mongolia to be directed to the overthrow of the traditional social order. In the religious sphere, also, the two forces met in violent opposition. Japanese influence was exerted in support of the Lamaist Mahayanian Buddhist Church, while Russian influence was, of course, on the side of secularization.

"Careful attention was paid by the Japanese to the sustaining, and the reforming, of the Lamaist Mahayanian Buddhist Church among the Mongols. In the Hsingan province of Manchukuo, temples and monasteries were restored and asylum given to the large number of Lamas whom the anti-religious policy adopted in Outer Mongolia had forced to exile. At the same time a movement was on foot to bring Mongol Lamaism into closer alignment with the reformed type of the Mahayanian Buddhist faith as this was practised by the Zen and Nichiren sects, which in recent times had regained strength in Japan. The aisms of the Nichiren sect, which possessed in Japan between two and three million adherents, were understood to include, in regard to Mongolia, the establishment of a new and purified form of Lamaism, which was to be brought into existence through the efforts of Japanese religious reformers, and, in regard to China, the promotion of union between the Chinese and Japanese on the basis of the traditions and ethical conceptions which they shared as fellow Buddhists and fellow Orientals. This emphasis on a common spiritual heritage was shown again in the insistence laid upon the principles of 'Wangtao' (i.e., the Confucian concept of the 'Kingly Way') in the government of Manchukuo."

to the Japanese, who pretended to keep everything in its original Mongol identity, than to the Soviets, who strove to impose upon them all the things typically Russian. With the Japanese-made sample on exhibit, a counter-revolutionary movement might be again stirred up in Outer Mongolia; and in this event Japan would have a chance to fish in the troubled water, or even drive Soviet Russia out of her way.[1]

Thus, by one shrewd stroke, the Japanese finally altered almost the whole complexion of the Mongol situation. Before Japan showed her hand, the northern Mongols and the southern Mongols had always been finding their position under Russia and China intolerable, yet were both unable to change the situation for themselves; now with the creation of the Mongol buffer province in Manchukuo backed up by the prowess of Japan, not only a new balance of power between China, Russia and Japan was struck into shape, but, in a dynamic sense, Japan appeared, in the eyes of the discontented Mongols, as their saviour, and might eventually attract the malcontents of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia into the area of Manchukuo. By dexterously manipulating this nationalistic feeling of the Mongols, coupled with a little display of her military power, Japan indeed stood a chance to

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[1] O. Lattimore, "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria", Foreign Affairs, vol. 11, January 1933, pp. 324-330.

make good her dream of a Pan-Mongol state as a bleak shadow of the Rising Sun.[1]

However hopeful the Japanese might have been, it was not long before they were rewarded with disappointment. Contrary to Japanese expectations, a rising anti-Japanese sentiment among the Mongols, who had come to appreciate the danger implied in Japan's spiteful friendship and the intrinsic fallacy of the so-called Mongol "autonomy" was prevalent. Inspired by the desire to make their position more secure, the Japanese began a purging campaign by means of a clever frame-up in 1936. Charging that an espionage ring involving many ranking officials was being hired by the U.S.S.R., the Japanese military authorities summarily executed four Mongol leaders -- Lin Sheng (Governor of North Hsingan Province), Shung Teh (Chief Police Director of the Province), Fu Ling (Chief of Staff of the First Garrison District of the Province), and Hwa Lin-tai (Secretary to Lin Sheng).[2] Rumors about the story were so contradictory, that it is difficult to make out whether or not these four victims were really

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[1] For an acute analysis of the strategic position of the Hsingan Province, see O. Lattimore, "*The Mongols of Manchuria*", pp. 135-141. For a sketchy account of the Japanese economic policy in Hsingan Province, see *China Weekly Review*, vol. 87, December 3, 1938, p. 16.

[2] *China Weekly Review*, vol. 76, May 30, 1936, p. 460.

in the employ of the Soviets. But one thing seems certain, that is, in spite of the Japanese catering, coddling, and cajoling, discontent by no means entirely evaporated among the Manchurian Mongols.[1]

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[1] Cf. O. Lattimore, "The Phantom of Mangkukuo", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 10, December 1937, pp. 420-427.

CHAPTER XIII

INNER MONGOLIA AS JAPANESE PUPPET

I. The Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement

From the very outset of the Japanese scheme in the Hsingan Province, she had no intention to stop at the feet of the Hsingan Mountains; her aim was at Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, the Hsingan Province being designed merely as a convenient stepping-stone. Following the course of least resistance, the Japanese naturally turned to Inner Mongolia first. In the following pages we shall see how the Inner Mongolian problem came to the forefront as a result of the Japanese maneuverings.

The Japanese agents had long been active in Inner Mongolia, and many of them were disguised as businessmen, clergymen, or travellers. But their efforts did not bring about overly successful outcome, although much spadework for later penetration was done. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1931, an augmented number of such agents sneaked into this territory, especially Chahar and Suiyuan where the Mongols were more restive and which had long been the centre of Mongol unrest. These Japanese pioneers found an ideal personage for their use in Prince Teh, Jassak of the West Sunid Banner, in Silingol League. The Silingol League happened to be situated in that Northern part of the Province of Chahar where the

Chinese control was the weakest, and which was nearest Manchukuo. Prince Teh was a comparatively young Mongol, who, in spite of his princely standing and interests, had for many years espoused the cause of Mongol nationalism, and organized the so-called Young Mongols Movement.[1] Thus prepared by the joint efforts of the Japanese and some Mongols, the matter then came to a head in 1933-1934.

On July 26, 1933 many princes of the Inner Mongolian Leagues and Banners[2] assembled at Pailingmiao, and decided to send a message to the Nanking Government asking for Mongol autonomy.[3] In a conference held on October 9, the Mongol noblemen proceeded to outline the organizational scheme of an autonomous government[4], and on October 15, a draft Organic Law of the Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia was whipped

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1. Prince Teh (Demchukdongrob by his Mongol name) was also the Vice President (Fu Meng Chang) of the Silingol League. The President (Meng Chang) of the League, Prince Sonormurabdan was an old and feeble man, and consequently the virtual leadership of the League came into the hands of Prince Teh. Later his influence extended over the other Leagues in Chahar and Suiyuan, and thus made him the most important figure in Inner Mongolia. Cf. *China Year Book, 1936*, p. 16.
2. The Ordos Mongols, the Alashan Mongols, and the Etsingol Mongols in Suiyuan and Ninghsia were only remotely associated with the movement, but did not actively participate in it.
3. Shih Shik Shing Pao, December 29, 1933. For a historical analysis of the Inner Mongolian nationalism, cf. O. Lattimore, "Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 9, September 1936, pp.388-405.
4. *Chen Pao*, Nanking, December 11, 1933, Minutes of the Conference.

into shape.[1] In the conference convened October 20, important governmental offices were allotted among the many princes, preparatory to the formal inauguration of the self-made regime.

At first Nanking showed signs of vacillation and consternation as to the Mongol appeal, but later it became responsive and receptive. On October 17 a Reform of Inner Mongolian Administration Plan had been passed in a conference of the Executive Yuan, according to which an additional Ministry of Frontier Affairs was to be created, having charge of all administrative affairs relating to Tibet, Mongolia and other outlying territories, and several Mongolian Political Affairs Councils were to be established in Inner Mongolia, wherever there was a large Mongol population. These Councils would be vested with an increased measure of local autonomy, except in matters relating to national defense, foreign relations, and other nation-wide administrative measures which were to be retained to the Central Government or entrusted by it to the provincial governments.[2] On October 17 a deputation of the Central Government was sent to make on-the-spot investigations of the Mongol situation, and to negotiate a solution with the Mongol leaders. The delegates arrived at Pailingmiao on

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[1] For the text of the Draft, see Chen Chien-fu, "*Nei Mon Tze Chih Shih Tze Liao*,"(Collection of Documents concerning Inner Mongolian Autonomy), pp. 9-13.

[2] Chen Chien-fu, *pp. cit.*, 77-79.

November 10.

During the ensuing confabulations, the principal and hottest issue was whether there should be a centralized autonomous government for all Mongol territories in Inner Mongolia, as the Mongol leaders had planned, or there should be multiparous Mongol Political Affairs Councils in the several Inner Mongolian provinces, as the Central Government was ready to concede. At last, a compromise was worked out -- instead of a single centralized autonomous government or a multiplicity of separate district councils, an All-Inner Mongolia Autonomous Political Council, in the nature of a loose confederation of the Mongol Leagues and under direct supervision of the Central Government, was agreed upon. The Council officially came into existence on April 23, 1934 at Pailingmiao with Prince Yuen sworn in at the Chairman.

The Council was to represent all of the Mongol Leagues of Inner Mongolia, including those in the Tibetan-populated territory of Kokonor, but excluding Jehol, and was to be composed of 13 people's representatives and 15 tribal princes, with the addition of a Chinese supervising officer who had a veto power. The jurisdiction of the Council covered practically all Inner Mongolian affairs with the exception of military and diplomatic matters. It was specifically granted by Nanking that the ploughing up of grasslands and the settlement by Chinese agriculturists should cease, that the Mongolian

tribal organizations should be preserved unchanged, that no new counties should be carved out from the territories of the Mongol Leagues and Banners, that the Mongols should collect their own taxes and be free from contributions to the Chinese exchequer, and lastly -- an essential reform in view of past experience -- that Inner Mongolia should be completely exempt from the authority of the Chinese provincial officials and should deal directly with the National Government at Nanking.[1]

Thus, the Inner Mongols, by playing at China's fear of Japanese penetration, secured for themselves peacefully what their northern brethren had asserted in 1911-1915 *viet armis*. Furthermore, between these two cases there are other differences: (1) in the latter, the Outer Mongols were positively sponsored by the Russians; while in the former, the Inner Mongols came largely of their own will, steered their own course, and did not accept the Japanese hypocritical offer at its face value;[2] (2) in the latter, the Outer Mongols acted with the intention of entirely breaking away from China; while in the former, the Inner Mongols contented themselves with autonomy within the orbit of the Chinese Republic, at least for the time being.

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[1] *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 683-684; Chen Chien-fu, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122; Fang Fan-chiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

[2] Cf. O. Lattimore's views on this point, "*The Mongols of Manchuria*," p. 30.

This opportunistic but significant step pushed by the Inner Mongols was of course not satisfying to the Japanese, who, thereupon, fell back upon more positive methods for the attainment of their ambitions.[1] In January 1935, under the pretext of a frontier incident, Japan succeeded in bringing several districts in northern Chahar into the domain of Manchukuo. In June 1935 pressure was brought to bear upon Prince Teh and the Nanking Government for acceptance of a group of demands, reminiscent of the old Twenty One Demands, of which more notable were the following: the right to establish at Pailingmiao a branch of the Special Affairs Bureau of the Kwangtung Army and to set up an aerodrome and wireless station; the removal of the Autonomous Council from Pailingmiao to Paitze Miao near the Jehol border; the dismissal of the Chinese Governor of Chahar; the dissolution of all Kuomintang branches in Chahar; cessation of Chinese emigration to the eastern part of the province; withdrawal of Chinese troops from Changpei; and the establishment of a demilitarized zone in eastern Chahar. In July the Japanese even announced the appointment of military and civil advisers to the Chahar Government hoping to thus establish their political influence at Kalgan, the most strategically important position in the

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[1] Frank Oliver, "Mongolia Awakens," Current History, vol. 40, June 1934, p. 281.

whole of Inner Mongolia.[1] To these demands China shamefully acceded. As a result, Nanking actually gave up its control over Chahar, and the compromise worked out in 1934 between Nanking and the Inner Mongols was thus largely invalidated. Since then Inner Mongolia became, in fact, a no-man's-land, into which Japan was soon to march on to pick up the remaining pieces of territory with "the ease of turning a palm," to use a Chinese metaphor.

II. Mongokuo

We have noted above of the disillusionment of the Japanese for the Inner Mongols' failure to break snap away from China. To take matters into their own hands, several districts in north Chahar were occupied by the Japanese-Manchukuoan forces early in January 1936, thus leaving the Silingol League in an encircled position. Since the end of 1935 hostilities were carried on southward in Chahar by the invading forces, together with some Mongol irregulars. Prince Teh, who had previously resisted the idea of joining Japan, was hard pressed by the Japanese agents to collaborate; and seeing his territory bear the brunt of the Japanese invasion, he now felt the pressure irresistible and gradually gravitated toward the Japanese side. Changpei, a key point in Chahar, was thus

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[1] Survey of International Affairs, 1934, pp. 684-685; Harold M. Vinacke, "A History of the Far East in Modern Times", p. 513.

taken on December 24, 1935 with the aid of Prince Teh.[1] The year 1936 had hardly run its course when most part of Chahar fell to the hands of the Japanese-Manchukuoan-Mongol army and all Chinese troops were withdrawn within the Great Wall.[2]

At the beginning of 1936 some reports carried that a new Mongol Government was being planned by the Mongols at Changpei, under the sponsorship of the Japanese, and Prince Teh was expected to become the nominal head.[3] The Nanking Government, in an attempt to save the situation as much as possible, staged a countermove by establishing a Suiyuan Mongol Autonomous Council in February 1936, with General Yen Hsi-shan as its director, and by this means was able to forestall the Japanese design to bring the Suiyuan Mongols into union with the Chahar Mongols.

On March 18 an Associated Press dispatch from Kalgan stated that a new Mongol state, named Mongokuo (meaning the

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1. China Weekly Review, vol. 75, January 4, 1936, 152.
2. Ibid, p. 153.
3. China Weekly Review, vol. 80, April 24, 1937, p. 295; China Year Book, 1936, p. 16. According to a dispatch from Chinese source, Prince Teh had denied reports of his alleged declaration of independence. Peiping Chronicle, December 27, 1935. Gen. Doihara, nicknamed "the Lawrence of the Orient," also declared in an interview with the American newspaper correspondents that the Japanese army had no intention to create a further independent Mongol state out of the occupied districts in north Chahar. China Weekly Review, vol. 75, Jan. 4, 1936, p. 153. But it can be easily seen that such dementes were only used to camouflage the Japanese-Mongol preparations for further advance.

Mongol Nation) had been in existence for "some weeks", and the new regime was "laden with many Japanese advisers" and supported by the Manchukuoan troops under General Li Shou-hsin's command.[1] But no formal declaration was made.[2] In fact, this was only a transient setup in the nature of a military government. The territory of the new country would be confined to the six Mongol counties (hsieng) of northern Chahar, which had been occupied by the Japanese-Manchukuoan troops. The six counties were Kuyuan, Paochang, Kangpao, Huoteh, Shangtu, and Changpei, of which Changpei, owing to its location on the Kalgan-Urga road, was most important in that it dominated a broad district and was the center of large-scale trade in extramural China. Strategically speaking, the new Japanese conquest served the dual purpose of a corridor running into Inner Mongolia and a spearhead pointing at Outer Mongolia. It served as a wedge between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia, and between Manchukuo and the Suiyuan province of China. The pivotal position of this area indeed can not be overestimated. Thus, with the establishment of the Suiyuan Mongol Autonomous Council by China and the Mongokuo by Japan, the former Inner Mongolia Autonomous Political Council at Pailingmiao naturally came to be defunct.

As soon as the new Mongol régime was set up, the expected

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1. Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1937.
2. China Weekly Review, vol. 80, April 24, 1937, p. 296.

Suiyuan invasion was carried out by a conglomerate of Mongol, Manchukuoan, and Japanese troops, together with some local bandits.[1] Meanwhile, Prince Teh, the new head of the state, called a Conference of all Mongol Banner leaders under his jurisdiction on May 1, the anniversary of the birth of Gengis Khan, at Huoteh, to concoct further Suiyuan drive.[2] But owing to the staunch resistance put up by the Chinese garrisons in Suiyuan, they made very little headway, and even suffered many a setback.

While all these pantomimes were being staged in north China, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman declared in Tokyo:

> "The Mongols are striving to preserve themselves from Communists against whom they are preparing for a war of self-defense."[3]

III. The Federated Council of Meng Chiang

Having smelt blood, the Japanese military ran amok; and so came the all-out Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. In the appalling blood-shed which ensued, the bestial vandals took city after city and province after province. On November 22, 1937, a Federated Council of Meng Chiang,[4] under the

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[1] Shun Pao, Shanghai, April 16, 1937
[2] China Weekly Review, vol. 80, May 1, 1937, p. 30
[3] China Weekly Review, vol. 80, May 1, 1937, p. 320.
[4] "Meng Chiang" means "The Borderland of Mongolia".

Map Showing the Territories of the Three Autonomous States under the Federated Council of Meng Chiang


蒙古聯盟自治政府要圖
附 察南自治政府・晉北自治政府
Manchukuo
North China
Outer Mongolia
1
2
3
察南自治政府
晉北自治政府
錫林郭勒盟
察哈爾盟
巴彥塔拉盟
烏蘭察布盟
伊克昭盟
縮尺三百万分之一
0
50
100
150
200
250
300粁

On the map: 1.--territory under the jurisdiction of the United Leagues of Mongolia; 2.--territory under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Government of Chanan; 3.--territory under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Government of Chinpei.

leadership of Prince Teh, was formally established at Kalgan.[1] Four Committees -- General Affairs, Economics, Finance, and Communications,[2] -- were set up in the Council. The portfolios were divided between Chinese and Mongols. Under the Council were three autonomous states, namely, Chanan (comprising the 10 *hsieng* in south Chahar)[3] with Kalgan as its capital; Chinpei (comprising the 13 *hsieng* in north Shansi[4]) with Tatung as its capital; and the United Leagues of Mongolia (comprising all Chahar province except the 10 southern *hsiens* alloted to Chanan, and *supposedly* all Suiyuan province[5]) with its capital at Kweihwa (also termed by the Japanese as Hohohoto, and by the Mongols, Koko-hoto). The first two states were in regions inhabited predominately by the Chinese population; while the last one, the one established in lieu of the former military government of Mongokuo, was supposed to be, although in reality was not, a Mongol state. The following figures

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[1] *Mo Ko Tai Kang*, p. 290
[2] Later two more committees of Civil Affairs and Public Safety were added.
[3] The ten *hsieng* are: Yenching, Weihsien, Hweilai, Chihcheng, Hweian, Shuanhwa, Kalgan, Lungkwan, Yangyuan, and Cholu.
[4] The thirteen *hsiens* are: Tatung, Shuchow, Youyu, Lingchiu, Hwenyuan, Tiencheh, Tsoyuen, Kwanling, Yingchow, Pinglu, Hweijen, Yangkao, and Shanyen.
[5] The United Leagues consisted of the traditional 5 Mongol Leagues of Chahar, Payantala, Silingol, Ikhchao, and Ulanchap, in north Chahar and Suiyuan. It should be noted that a part of the Suiyuan province, mainly the part west of Wuyuan, was still in Chinese hands.

show roughly the area and population of the three states.[1]

Names	Total Area (in sq. km.)	Total Population	Density of Population (per sq. km)
Chanan	49,562	1,315,936	26.53
Chinpei	30,661	1,527,237	49.80
United Leagues	990,790	2,623,506	2.65
Total or Average	1,071,013	5,466,679	26.33

In Each of the two states of Chanan and Chinpei there was established an autonomous government, with a chairman and four Departments of General Affairs, Civil Affairs, Finance and Public Safety. The United Leagues of Mongolia had a somewhat larger and different organisation, with, characteristically, a Headquarters of the Mongol Army.[2] The following chart shows the organisation of the Federated Council of Meng Chiang:[3]

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1. Figures taken from Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 290-295.
2. It was reported that later a Ministry of Stock-Farming was added to the Government of the United Leagues. See John Ahlers, "A Made-in-Japan 'Jenghis Khan' ", China Weekly Review, vol. 87, February 4, 1939, pp. 302-303.
3. See the Organic Statutes of the Three Governments, Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 300-309. The Autonomous Government of Chanan was originally established on September 4, 1937; the Autonomous Government of Chinpei, on October 15, 1937; and the Autonomous Government of the United Leagues, on October 27, 1937.


Federated Council of Meng Chiang
Supreme Adviser & Advisers
Counsellors
Committee on General Affairs
Committee on Finance
Committee on Civil Affairs
Committee on Economics
Committee on Public Safety
Committee on Communications
Autonomous Government of Chanan
Autonomous Government of the United Leagues of Mongolia
Autonomous Government of Chinpei
Chairman
Chairman
Supreme Adviser
Political Council
Supreme Adviser
Counsellors
Dep't of General Affairs
Dep't of Finance
Dep't of General Affairs
Dep't of Civil Affairs
Dep't of Civil Affairs
Dep't of Public Safety
Dep't of Finance
Dep't of Public Safety
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Counsellors
Supreme Political & Military Advisers
Political Council
Headquarters of the Mongol Army
Ministry of Public Safety
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of General Affairs
Ministry of Stock-Farming

It goes without saying that all these establishments were but tools in the hands of the Japanese for the simple reason that they came into existence only by the magic hand of the Japanese military force. Their functions were to assist the Japanese in administering the occupied territories, to assist in the Japanese economic exploitation of Inner Mongolia,[1] and to help attain the purpose of Anti-Communism.[2] Under the Federated Council there was no federal police, nor federal army. Dr. S. Kanai, a well-known Japanese economist, served as the real ruler of Meng Chiang in his capacity as Supreme Adviser to the Council. And out of the total of 90 higher posts in civil affairs in the Council, 17 were filled by Japanese. Thus, the part played by the puppets was only to promulgate, as directed by their Japanese bosses, such laws, regulations and ordinances which would fit the Japanese.

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[1] The chief resources exploited by the Japanese were coal, iron and wool. The Tatung coal fields in north Shansi, estimated to hold about 12,000,000 tons of good coal in an area of 2,797 square miles, were the main object of the Japanese exploitation. Prior to 1937, only about 260,000 tons were put out annually. After the South Manchuria Railway took it over, the daily production had reached 2,000 tons at the end of 1938. The Lungyen iron mine, seated at South Chahar, with deposits estimated at 100,000,000 tons of iron ore, was given to the Fushun Collieries, a subsidiary of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and was reported to produce 600 tons of iron daily under Japanese administration. In addition, the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, which runs through Kalgan, was also put under the management of the S.M.R. Co. The Japanese shops, inns, hotels, opium dens, brothels, etc. were also numerous.

[2] Mo Ko Tai Kang, p. 300.

It goes without saying that all these establishments were mere tools in the hands of the Japanese for the simple reason that they came into existence only by the tacit consent of the Japanese military forces. Their functions were to assist the Japanese in administering the occupied territories, to assist in the Japanese economic exploitation of their [illegible] policy,[1] and to help attain the purpose of anti-Communism.[2] Under the Federated Council there was no federal police, nor federal army. Mr. [illegible], a well-known Japanese economist, served as the real ruler of Meng Chiang in his capacity as supreme adviser to the Council. And out of the total of 80 higher posts in civil affairs in the Council, 17 were filled by Japanese. Thus, the part played by the puppets was only to promulgate, as directed by their Japanese masters, such laws, regulations and ordinances which would aid the Japanese.

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[1] The mineral resources exploited by the Japanese were coal, [illegible]

[2] [illegible], p. 500.

As admitted by the Japanese military authorities themselves, the Federated Council was, for all practical purposes, but "an economic and financial superstructure."[1]

As for the several autonomous governments, the task alloted them was practically the same as that of the Federated Council. Although they had police forces to keep order, yet the command was entrusted to the Japanese officers. In the United Leagues of Mongolia a Mongol army, reputedly 10,000 men strong, was allowed, but the commander was General Li Shou-hsin, an out-and-out Japanese puppet. It is also provided in the Organic Laws of the several Governments that the Chairman must carry out his duties in consultation with the supreme advisers, that is, the Japanese superintendents.[2]

This Japanese move should be understood not only as a step in her search for territorial aggrandizement, but also as bearing paramount strategic significance for the fulfilment of her long-range politico-military plan against Soviet Russia. As Mr. M. Arens presaged in 1937, the Japanese policy was actually aimed at forming Inner Mongolia as

> "One of the territorial links in that broad buffer zone by means of which the Japanese General Staff intends to isolate the U.S.S.R. and the Mongol People's Republic

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[1] John Ahlers, "A Made-in-Japan 'Genghis Khan' ", China Weekly Review, vol. 87, February 4, 1939, p. 303.
[2] See the Organic Statutes of the three Governments, Mo Ko Tai Kang, pp. 300-306.

> from China, along the full extent of their borders. This zone stretches from Manchuria right away to Sinkiang and is intended to block all connection between the U.S.S.R. and China."[1]

And in the internal administration of Inner Mongolia, this Federated Council is also an extremely clever contrivance of the Japanese. They granted the Mongols the name, and some insignificant features, of autonomy. But at the same time they could make the Federated Council as strong as possible if they chose to stand behind it, thus overpowering the opposition of the Autonomous Governments; and could also make it just as weak, if they simply frowned at some measures contemplated by the Council members, and turned the constituent states against the central Council. It needs no telling that this scheme served Japanese purpose excellently. It also reminds us of the divide et impera principle which Japan had already applied with enthusiasm and some success to the Hsingan Province of Manchukuo.

lV. The Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia

On September 1, 1939, the Federated Council was reorganized as the "Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia," with

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[1] M. Arens, "Japanese Aggression in Inner Mongolia", Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean), Moscow, No. 4, October-December, 1936.

Prince Teh as its Chairman, and Kalgan as the capital.[1] By the original agreement reached on November 22, 1937, the Federated Council was entrusted with only some specified, and, consequently limited, powers; thus legally it was able to function only as a liaison organ among the three interested Autonomous Governments. Such structure did not work smoothly.[2] Therefore, the new Federal Autonomous Government was organized in its place on the basis of centralization of powers.

Concerning the developments in Inner Mongolia since 1939, very little is made known to the outside.[3] All we can collect is fragmentary pieces of information. Japanese were still serving in vital positions within the administrative machinery of the puppet government with full freedom to plan and command. There was an army of about 18,000 men,[4] two thirds Chinese and one third Mongols. The Inner Mongolian monetary and banking system was controlled by a Bank of Meng Chiang, supported by Japanese capital. Almost all the important enterprises were either government monopolies or government-controlled. Monopolistic "special companies" including the Bank of Meng Chiang, the Meng Chiang Electric Communications Company (telephone, telegraph, and wireless), the Meng Chiang Electric Co. (electric light and power and electrical equipments), the

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[1] Far East Year Book, 1941, p. 1089.

[2] Ibid.

[3] See Far East Year Book, 1941, pp. 1089-1091; David Weile, "How Japan Has Failed in Inner Mongolia", Asia, vol. 41, July 1941, pp. 371-374, Mr. Weile gave an analysis of the economic situation of Inner Mongolia up to 1941.

[4] Time, vol. 39-1, March 9, 1942, p. 21.

Lungyen Iron Mining Co., the Tatung Coal Mining Co., and so on. The "quasi-special companies", which were controlled by the government, included three regional banks, a Mongolian Petroleum Co. (for the purchase, import and sale of petroleum products), a Meng Chiang Transportation Co. (controlling transportation and warehousing of goods), a Meng Chiang Co. (controlling trade and the purchase, sale and exchange of major commodities), a Meng Chiang Cement Co., and a Meng Chiang Industrial Co. (controlling the sale and repair of machinery). Half or more than half of the total capital of the more important of the foregoing monopolies was Japanese. Exclusively Japanese companies included those dealing in medicines, furs, leather, matches, cigarettes, building materials and a large number of Inner Mongolian commodities.

Among the export goods of Meng Chiang opium was the one item most important. It was the Japanese policy to encourage the plantation of opium in her occupied area. In 1938 about 40% of the total export trade of the region was made up of opium; and substantial government revenues were derived by means of taxation on the growth, preparation, transport and export of this narcotic.

The Japanese South Manchuria Railway was also busied building railroads connecting Inner Mongolia with Manchukuo and other parts of north China. The Chengteh-Kupeikow line linked Chahar with Jehol, and, consequently, the whole of

Manchuria, and the Kupeikow-Tunghsien line linked Chahar with Peiping, and, consequently, the whole of north China. Furthermore, these two lines, considered together, provided an alternative line to the Peiping-Mukden Railway, which linked Manchuria and the Peiping-Tientsin area. These lines were not only important for the Japanese exploitation, but also essential to the Japanese strategic efforts to outflank and encircle Outer Mongolia.[1]

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[1] China Weekly Review, vol. 87, December 17, 1938, p. 78.

At last, we sould make a passing note of the Suiyuan Mongols during this period. As noted above, Suiyuan was partially kept in Chinese hands throughout the War, and the Suiyuan Mongols were also more inclined to China. Therefore, since the fall of Paotow in 1937 and the subsequent invasion of the Ulanchap League in western Suiyuan by the Chahar Mongols, the Suiyuan Mongol Political Council, which the Nanking Government ordered established in February 1936 to substitute the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Political Council, moved southward and was reinstated in the territory of the Ikhchao League. Prince Sha, Chairman of the Council, paying no heed to the intimidation of the Japanese, flatly rejected collaboration. The patriotic spirit of the Mongol amazons was demonstrated by Pa Yun-yen, wife of the Jassak of the Tung-kung banner of the Ulancha League and Chi Chun-feng of the Sikung banner, who led their Mongol troops to resist the enemy despite great odds in number. At the same time, Alin-shih, Jassak of East Suiyuan, also came to the Ikhchao League to help Prince Sha in his defense of the Mongol land. These gallant cavaliers contributed much to prevent the mighty Japanese forces from pushing across the bend of the Yellow River.[1]

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[1] The Chinese Year Book, 1943, p. 237; The Year Book of the National Government of China, 1944, chapter 17, pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER XIV.

SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHUKUO AND MONGOLIA

I. The Soviet-Japanese Tension on Manchurian-Mongolian Borders, 1931-1936.

The Japanese penetration into the whole of Manchuria and a part of Inner Mongolia from 1931-1935 naturally brought her into direct contact with Soviet Russia. The creation of Manchukuo had already established a long frontier between Manchukuo and Siberia to the north, along the Amur and its confluents, and between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia to the west. The seizure of northern Chahar again pushed the encirclement of Outer Mongolia further to the southeast. If Japan continued to advance westward, Outer Mongolia would be completely flanked by the Japanese on two sides. Such being the situation, it was natural that this Russo-Japanese contact came in the form of sharp conflicts.

By 1931, when Japan embarked upon her armed assault on Manchuria, Soviet Russia was still unprepared for a challenge against Japan's aggrandizement. The Soviet first five-year plan was still in the process of realization, and the critical era of agricultural collectivization was not yet over. But it was also clear to the Soviets that their special

interests in North Manchuria would certainly be jeopardized, if not eliminated, if the Japanese expansion went on unchecked. This situation gave rise to great anxiety on the part of the Soviet Government.

Two ways were now open to Russia: to enter into a rapprochement with Japan, with a view to re-sphering their respective zones, as she had done in 1907-1916; or to take up arms against Japan to safeguard her own security, as she resorted to in 1904-1905. At last, the Soviet Government chose the moderate stand of temporary withdrawal from North Manchuria, while preparations were also being made for a final showdown. However, as regards the boundary disputes, wherein the problems of sovereign rights and strategic security were directly involved, Russia decided to stand adamant, and, now and then made herself clear by a display of arms short of war.

Already in 1931 the U.S.S.R., fresh from the conclusion of a chain of non-aggression pacts with her western neighbors, had proposed a similar pact to Japan. The proposal was broached to Mr. Yoshizawa in Moscow as early as December 1931, who was en route from Geneva to Tokyo to assume his new portfolio as Foreign Minister. But the proposal met with unfavorable response when the matter was taken up for Japanese cabinet discussion in mid-January.[1] Subsequent overtures of like

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[1] Survey of International Affairs, 1931, p. 155; 1932, p. 535; 1934, p. 668. Also New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 1932.

tenor were repeated now and then by Russia, but, as usual, they came to nothing.[1] Official Japanese rejection came on January 21, 1933, when Foreign Minister Uchida declared to the Diet that, given the existence of the Pact of Paris and the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of 1925, there was no need for such a pact as overtured.[2] In December 1934, when Soviet Russia again took up the matter, Foreign Minister Hirota declared that any proposal for such a pact would be premature, if the frontier disputes between Manchukuo on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia on the other, which had been occurring recurrently ever since 1931, were not definitely settled. In addition to these disputes, he also mentioned the problems of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese leases of fisheries in Russian waters in Kamchtka, the Japanese oil and coal concessions in North Sakhalin, and the navigation on the boundary rivers of the Amur, Sungari, Ussuri, and Argun, which were also declared as primary to any guarantee of non-aggression on the part of Japan.[3] Finally Russia waxed receptive and agreed to begin such prior settlements as Japan demanded.

The ensuing negotiations were checkered, but several agreements were finally reached. The final agreement on the

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[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, October 19, 1932; Nov. 5, 1932.
[2] *New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1933.
[3] *Survey of International Affairs, 1934*, p. 668.

transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway was signed on March 23, 1935.[1] In January 1935, the agreement for regulation of navigations was approved by the Manchukuo and Soviet Governments. On October 10, 1936 an agreement was signed at Moscow by which the Soviet Union granted a 5-year extension of North Sakhalin oil concessions.[2] And in November 1936, a new convention on fisheries was concluded with favorable terms to Japan.[3] So far as these technical matters were concerned, both parties were inclined to reconciliation.

But the many border incidents, which had been clothed with a strategic or political character, proved less susceptible of easy compromise. Such border incidents had a history as long as Manchukuo itself, and happened mostly because of the largely undefined nature of the frontier between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. The first notable one of these conflicts came in January 1935. Reports from Moscow had it that Manchukuo troops, including infantry in trucks and fifty cavalrymen, said to be officered by the Japanese,

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[1] Manchukuo paid to the U.S.S.R. 140,000,000 yen for the railway, one third to be in cash and two thirds in kind, with another 3,000,000 yen to be paid in compensation to dismissed Russian officials. The sale agreement and two protocols were supplemented by an exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, by which the latter guaranteed fulfilment of the sale terms by Manchukuo. For texts of these documents, see Violet Conoll, "Soviet Trade from the Pacific to the Levant", Appendix VIII, pp. 200-220.

[2] New York Herald Tribune, October 11, 1936.

[3] Foreign Policy Report, vol. 14, February 1, 1939, p. 266.

pushed across the Manchukuoan border into Outer Mongolia near Bor Nor (Lake Buir), and occupied a small fortress.[1] Each side claimed that the troops of the other transgressed the defined frontier. On June 3, 1935, a conference was convoked at Manchuli whereat the Mongols and the Manchukuoans met face to face to negotiate a solution, with the Russians and the Japanese standing behind. But, the Japanese proposals to open comprehensive discussions on all the outstanding issues and the Mongol insistence on restricting the negotiations to settlement of the border incidents made the parley flounder. On July 4, following the arrest of a Japanese surveying party in the Bor Nor region by Mongolian guards, the Japanese Kwangtung Army handed a note to the Mongolian delegation, demanding the rights of residence for Japanese military observers in Outer Mongolia, freedom of travel for Japanese-Manchukuoan nationals, and permission to run telegraph lines into Outer Mongolia, and threatening to "demilitarize" eastern Outer Mongolia in case of failure to comply.[2] On July 13 the Mongolian delegation flatly rejected the demands, and suggested that a joint Mongolian-Manchukuoan frontier commission be established to probe and settle border incidents.[3]

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1. Literary Digest, vol. 119, February 16, 1935, p. 14.
2. New York Times, July 7, 1935.
3. The Trans-Pacific, Tokyo, July 25, 1935, p. 11.

On July 18 the Japanese-Manchukuoan delegates further requested an "exchange of resident representatives."[1] The Mongols countered on July 29 with the proposal that such representatives should be stationed at prescribed points near the boundary and should deal only with border disputes. Without arriving at an agreement on this issue, the conference adjourned in mid-August.

When the conference reconvened on October 2, a rift immediately developed when the Manchukuoan delegates insisted that three representatives from each side be posted in each other's principal cities. The Japanese spokesman further declared in Tokyo that "Manchukuo is now knocking at Outer Mongolia's door as Commodore Perry knocked at Japan's door in 1853."[2] Provocative and belligerent threats were simultaneously given by the Japanese army circles. Thus, the attempt at settling the border disputes again ended in a failure while incessant fightings were still going on along the shore of Lake Buir and the Khalka River.

Throughout the year of 1935 the focal point of the Soviet-Japanese tension was thus located in Outer Mongolia.[3] What began as a series of sniping skirmishes was engrossed into an open clash in February 8-10, 1936, when several

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[1] New York Times, July 19, 1935.
[2] New York Times, October 22, 1935; The Times, London, July 25, 1935.
[3] Survey of International Affairs, 1935, vol. 1, pp. 334-335.

hundreds of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops, armed to the teeth, penetrated six miles into Outer Mongolia, only to be smashed by the receiving Mongols. The Japanese, having tested the mettle of the Mongols, and having come into appreciation of the greater-than-expected might of the Russian Bear, then began to strike a strategic retreat.

Hirota, as Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1936, showed a disposition to do whatever was possible to improve diplomatic relations between the two countries. Under his instructions the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ota took up the question of a settlement of outstanding disputes with the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He proposed to appoint a joint boundary commission to end all excuses for perennial skirmishings on Siberian-Manchukuoan borders. On March 17 the U.S.S.R. agreed in principle, on condition that similar action be taken to clarify the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuoan border, further adding that the proposed commission might delimit the boundary only in the sense that the delimitation was to "verify the border as fixed by treaties" by setting up additional border posts, stretching barbed wire, and digging ditches between the posts.[1] When Mr. Arita succeeded Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs in April, he followed the same trend by referring publicly to the

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[1] T.A. Bisson, "Conflict in Outer Mongolia," *The Nation*, vol. 142, April 22, 1936, p. 509.

"Imperative necessity" of adjusting Russo-Japanese relations. To reemphasise his conciliatory position, Premier Hirota, who had succeeded Okado in March 1936 aftet the *coup d'état* of February 26, declared in propounding his "positive policy" toward Soviet Russia,

> "In 1935 I told Parliament that there would be no war while I was Foreign Minister. Let me tell you gentlemen that that still holds good while I am Premier."[1]

At the same time the more articulate of the Japanese people also discussed the advantages of a non-aggression pact such as for several years past the Soviet Government had repeatedly proposed and the Japanese Government as regularly rejected. But unfortunately the ensuing negotiations struck a snag when Tokyo again insisted that the proposed commission's competence be restricted to one section of the Manchurian-Siberian border only, while the Soviet authorities held that it should cover the whole of the Manchurian-Siberian, as well as the Manchurian-Outer Mongolian, frontiers.[2] Finally, the Soviet authorities agreed to a commission for dealing with disputes along the 200 mile border stretch running from Lake Khanka to the Korean border, as originally suggested by the Japanese.[3] Thereupon, Japan again demanded that the commission should

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[1] *Time*, vol. 27-2, April 13, 1936, p. 25; Joseph C. Grew, "*Ten Years in Japan*," pp. 179-180.

[2] T. A. Bisson, "Conflict in Outer Mongolia", *The Nation*, vol. 142, April 22, 1936, p. 509; *Christian Science Monitor*, March 17, 1936.

[3] *New York Times*, April 28, 1936.

contain equal representatives for Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union, that is, a two-to-one majority for Japan.[1] As a result, the conference ~~was~~ once more broke~~n~~ down up.

This thought of a re-orientation of Japanese policy towards Russia came too late indeed. The Soviet Government now had their forces strongly entrenched in the Trans-Baikal region; the construction of the new Baikal-Amur Railway, which was their essential line of communication, was already far advanced, and arrangements had been completed which would give the Union a free hand in Outer Mongolia in the event of a threat of war, vide infra. In these altered circumstances the Soviet Government was no longer tied to the "peace-at-any-price" policy which had largely governed their relations with Japan in the earlier period. Therefore, Soviet Russia became more adamant as Japan grew more compromising. On March 1st Stalin made a most important statement to the effect that

> "If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we shall have to help the Mongolian People's Republic...just as we helped it in 1921."[2]

Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniokov, also snapped at Japanese Ambassador Ota in Moscow on March 31.

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1. Foreign Policy Report, vol. 14, Feb. 1, 1939, p. 264, note 61.
2. Izvestya, March 6, 1936; "The Soviet Union and the Path to Peace," a collection of statements and documents, 1917-1936, p. 15.

"Energetic measures are necessary to put an immediate end to the attacks by Japanese troops against Mongolia. The situation does not permit pacifically waiting for developments of events.

"Serious responsibility will fall on the Japanese Government in case the actions of its dependent organisation (i.e., Manchukuo) lead to the extension of conflicts in Mongolian territory."[1]

Thus, when Russia wished to come into terms with Japan, the latter overbearingly spurned the offer, and conflicts occurred. Now Japan waxed communicable, but Russia turned intransigent. It is natural that the Russo-Japanese tension was still to be continued and engrossed.

II. Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance of 1936.

A secret gentlemen's agreement for mutual assistance between Russia and Outer Mongolia had been concluded as early

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1. *Time*, vol. 27-2, April 13, 1936, p. 24.

as November 27, 1934.[1] Again on March 12, 1936 a Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance was concluded at Ulan Bator,[2] but was not published until April 8, 1936.[3]

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[1] *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, p. 933. This is evidently stated in the preamble of the Protocol, which runs in part, "...and to promote further a consolidation of the friendly relations now existing between them, have decided *to formulate in the shape of the present Protocol a gentlemen's agreement which has existed between them since November 27, 1934*...." Whether this said agreement is a verbal understanding, or is couched in an official written form, is not clear. But it seems clear that this earlier agreement was originally kept secret by both parties. The Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Stomoniakov, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow on April 1 informed the latter that the obligation undertaken by the Soviet Union to render assistance to the Mongolian People's Republic had been actually in existence since 1921, but that was an "oral" obligation. *Izvestya*, April 1, 1936. It was reported that another Gentlemen's Agreement in the form of an oral understanding was reached in 1924, by which both parties pledged themselves to mutual, including military, assistance. Isvestya, April 8, 1936; *Pravda*, April 9, 1936. There is doubt as to whether this reported Gentlemen's Agreement is the same Soviet-Mongolian Secret Treaty of 1923, *vide supra*.

[2] *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, p. 934.

[3] The existence of the Protocol was indicated in a dispatch from Ulan Bator, dated March 27, which spoke of the full approval accorded by the 20th Session of the Small Huruldan of the Mongolian People's Republic to the foreign policy of the Government expressed in particular in the agreement between the Soviet Union and the Republic on mutual assistance. *Izvestya*, March 28, 1936.

The Protocol provided for the following:[1]

1. The signatories undertook, in the event of a threat of aggression by a third State, to consult each other and to "take all necessary measures to safeguard the security of their territories.

2. They agreed to provide each other with every assistance including military aid, in the event of an aggression.

3. Troops sent for this purpose were to be withdrawn when the emergency had passed.

The news of the Protocol was received in Japan with surprise and indignation. It was as clear as the day that the Protocol was primarily directed against Japan in view of the tense and delicate relations between Soviet Russia and Japan in Manchukuo and Mongolian during the previous years. In decrying the new Protocol the Japanese militarists and their mouthpieces, the Foreign Office at Tokyo, charged the U.S.S.R. with hostile intentions. They also cynically charged China with complicity in the scheme. It may be assumed that this Protocol was one of the contributing, though not decisive, factors, which led Japan to sign the Anti-Comintern Agreement with Germany at Berlin on November 25, 1936.

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[1] For text of the Protocol, see China Year Book, 1936, p. 21. It may be noted that according to the provision of the Protocol it shall remain in force for ten years as from the date of its signature, i.e., March 12, 1936. If not extended, the Protocol is due to expire on March 11, 1946. For an analysis of the provisions of the Protocol, confer Mr. T. "The Soviet-Mongolian Protocol," Contemporary Review, vol. 152, July 1936, pp. 67-75.

The Manchukuo Foreign Office charged that such alliance could be directed only against Manchukuo, since Mongolia was isolated from all other states. It was also averred that Manchukuo, having a common frontier with Outer Mongolia, could not remain indifferent, since its interest in Mongol affairs, being based on ties of blood, was as great as that of the U.S.S.R. if not greater.[1]

Nor was China pleased by the Protocol. The Nanking Government addressed a strong protest to Moscow on April 7, against her infringement of China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia and the violation of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, in which the U.S.S.R. had recognized explicitly Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China. The Chinese protest was couched in the following passages:[2]

> "It has been recalled that Article 5 of the Agreement on the general principles for the settlement of the question between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed on May 31, 1924, provides,
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> 'The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognises that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.'
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> "Outer Mongolia being an integral part of the Republic of

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[1] *Japan Chronicle*, Weekly Edition, Kobe, April 16, 1936.
[2] *China Year Book*, 1936, pp. 21-22.

> China, no foreign state has the right to conclude with it any treaty or agreement. The action on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union in concluding with Outer Mongolia the aforesaid Protocol, in breach of its pledge to the Chinese Government, constitutes, without doubt, an infringement of the sovereignty of China and a violation of the stipulations of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924....therefore,....the conclusion of the Protocol in question by the Government of the U.S.S.R. with Outer Mongolia is illegal and that the Chinese Government can under no circumstances recognise such a Protocol, and is in no wise bound by it."

The Soviet reply, dated April 8, declared that,[1]

> "The Soviet Government cannot agree with the interpretation of the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol as contained in the note and, therefore, cannot regard the protest lodged by the Chinese Government as being well founded.... The Protocol does not admit of, or contain, any territorial claim whatsoever by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to China or the Mongolian People's Republic.
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> "The signing of the Protocol does not introduce any changes in the relations, either juridical or factual, hitherto existing between the Union of Soviet Socialist

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[1] China Year Book, 1930, p. 22.

Republics and China and between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic. "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in signing the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, considered that the Sino-Soviet Agreement concluded in Peking in 1924 had in no way been prejudiced and still remained in force....On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, the Soviet Government considers itself compelled to reject the protest of the Chinese Government as being groundless...."

Meanwhile, the Soviet press was busied in rationalizing the irrationalizable. Some Moscow papers argued that the measures provided for in the Protocol were in the interest of the safety of the frontiers, for which the second paragraph of Article V of the Agreement of 1924 provided. Knowing the untenability of this argument from a legal point of view, the Moscow press went on to seek some political excuses. The *Izvestya* in a leading editorial remarked that the Nanking Government at the present time was in a less degree able to warrant the inviolability of the territory of Outer Mongolia and the safety of the frontiers than was the Peking Government when the 1924 Agreement was signed. Therefore, the editorial continued, the Chinese Government should regard it as a blessing that the Soviet Union was coming to the aid of the territories under China's sovereignty.[1] To this

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[1] *Izvestya*, April 8, 1936; *Pravda*, April 9, 1936; *Moscow Daily News*, April 10, 1936.

justification these papers added a bit of bluffing by charging that the Chinese protests were written under the Japanese pressure.[1] The inference was that if China wished to clear herself of the alleged complicity with Japan, she must shut up her mouth on the question and acquiesced in the police power which Soviet Russia had arrogated to herself.

The Chinese bitter feeling against Soviet Russia was by no means pacified by these assurances and assumptions. But, China was then absorbed in preparation for a life-and-death struggle with Japan. On her home-front she was not yet completely unified; under such circumstances she could do practically nothing more than lodging protests. This Soviet practice of robbing a sick man in the depth of his distress accounts for the far-from-cordial relations between China and Russia for the subsequent years.

III. The Soviet-Japanese Conflicts on Manchurian-Mongolian Borders, 1936-1941.

Although since 1936 Japan had been very meticulous in pacifying Russia, yet the irritating border incidents occurred as usual. In June 1937, the Kwangtung Army again became involved in a dispute over two islets in the Amur River on the Manchukuoan-Siberian border, 70 miles south of Blasovestchensk, with a Soviet gunboat sent to the bottom

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[1] Ibid.

by Japanese artillery fire. It is difficult to say how far the incident was provoked by Japan to sound out the degree of Russia's preparedness and belligerence. But at all events the Soviets were still trying to avert a final showdown; and Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, informed the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow that in his view the clash was amenable to peaceful settlement.[1] On June 29, while preliminary arrangements on mutual withdrawal were being reached at Moscow, a sharp clash occurred on the Amur River again.[2] Finally a definite settlement was reached between M. Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, and Litvinov, calling for mutual withdrawal from the disputed islands, and reserving the question of sovereignty for later negotiations.[3]

Again on July 29, 1938, the well-known Changkufeng incident occurred, which blazed up into a midget Russo-Japanese war. The region under dispute lay at the southern tip of the Soviet maritime provinces where Russia, Manchukuoan and Korean borders met, and was claimed by the U.S.S.R. as Russian territory according to the unpublished Hunchun Treaty

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[1] Inasmuch as this incident occurred hardly one month prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in July 1937, it is likely that Tokyo drew the conclusion from this incident that the Soviet Far Eastern Army would remain a passive spectator of any Sino-Japanese conflicts. This conclusion might have expedited the Japanese determination to launch a large-scale war on China. Cf. F. P. Chambers & others, "This Age of Conflict, 1914-1943", p. 519.

[2] New York Times, July 1, 2, 1937.

[3] Foreign Policy Report, vol. 14, February 1, 1939, p. 269.

of 1886 signed between Russia and China.[1] Synchronising their moves with the German pressure on Czechoslovakia, a Japanese force of several thousands, with all the panoply of modern mechanized war, smashed across the border line; and the ensuing intense hostilities lasted nearly two weeks. By August 10 the Soviet forces reported having driven out the Japanese troops from the heights of Changjufeng.[2] The upshot was another truce, agreed upon on August 10 at Moscow between Shigemitsu and Litvinov. According to the terms, both sides were to cease fire at noon on August 11, holding the positions occupied at midnight of August 10. The disputed sector of the frontier was to be re-demarcated by a mixed commission composed of two Japanese-Manchukuoan representatives and two Soviet representatives.

Since May 11, 1939 inconclusive hostilities again broke out on the Khalka River between Soviet-Mongolian troops and Japanese-Manchukuoan troops, with both sides reporting conflicting figures of casualties and boasting of victories.[3] This is the well-known Normanhan Incident. Once more an armistice was arranged in the same old fashion between Japanese Ambassador Togo and Premier and Foreign Commissar Molotov on September 15, without even consulting their

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[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, August 2, 1938; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 10, 1938.
[2] *New York Times*, August 11, 1938.
[3] *Newsweek*, vol. 14, July 17, 1939, p. 22; *Time*, vol. 341, May-September, 1939; *Far East Year Book, 1941*, p. 641.

respective puppets. According to the agreement their relative positions should remain as they were at 1 p.m., September 15, pending the organization of another mixed commission to define the border lines.[1]

The Soviet-Japanese relations were all the more rapidly deteriorating as a result of Japan's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in Berlin on November 25, 1936.[2] Although the Japanese statement of the same day's date, issued by the Foreign Office at Tokyo, emphasized that the Pact was directed solely against the "Comintern menace," and not against "the Soviet Union or any other specific country,"[3] yet from the Soviet point of view this Pact was construed as nothing else than a German-Japanese military alliance against the U.S.S.R.; and the existence of a real secret military agreement between the German and Japanese staffs was much in the air.[4] Bitter arraignment was loosened on Japan in the Moscow papers. The fall of Hirota Cabinet in January 1937 in no measure dispelled the Soviet misgivings.[5] Such being

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[1] *Newsweek*, vol. 14, September 25, 1936, p. 11. But the Joint boundary commission, after 16 meetings at Chita (Dec. 7-25, 1939) and Harbin(Jan. 7-30, 1940), proved unable to reach an agreement, and decided on January 30 to "close its business." However, an agreement demarcating the boundary in the disputed Normanhan area was signed in Moscow on June 9, 1940. *New York Times*, June 10, 1940.

[2] *Contemporary Japan*, December 1936, pp. 514-515.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Joseph C. Grew, "*Ten Years in Japan*," p. 191.

[5] For an analysis of the Japanese domestic political situation and the background of the fall of the Hirota Cabinet, cf. Joseph C. Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 194-196, 198-204.

the circumstances, talks of a final flare-up of a full-fledged Soviet-Japanese war were ever heard in both countries and other third powers during all these critical years. Given such lively tense and dangerously delicate situation, those who predicted a world war II starting from the far corner of the Far East were indeed not entirely without reason.

Therefore, as soon as the Sino-Japanese War was again ushered in by the Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937, Soviet Russia immediately signed a five-year Non-Aggression Pact with China on August 21.[1] A trickle of supplies flowed from Russia to China by the arduous Sinkiang Road. And immediately after Japan signed a treaty with the puppet regime at Nanking (headed by Wang Chin-wei) on November 31, 1940,[2] -- Article 3 of which treaty permitted the Japanese to retain her troops for an indefinite period in North China and Inner Mongolia for anti-Communist purposes, -- the Soviet Ambassador at Tokyo declared to the Japanese Government that the policy of the U.S.S.R. towards China remained unchanged. This act on the part of Russia was, of course calculated as a response to the anti-Soviet arrangement between Japan and her Nanking puppet.[3]

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[1] For text of the Pact, see *New York Times*, August 30, 1937. The Pact was announced on August 29, 1937.
[2] The so-called Wang-Japan Treaty.
[3] *The Chinese Year Book*, 1943, p. 270.

IV. The Soviet-Japanese Non-Agression Pact of 1941

In the hands of a statesman of the Machiavellian type there is always a magic wand. Morality in international dealings is alien to him and inconsistency becomes part and parcel of his credo. He can rise above everything in the world except the national interests of his native land. Therefore, just as the Anti-Comintern Pact did not prevent Stalin from concluding a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, when he wanted to have more time to prepare Russia for an all-out war, so it did not prevent him from concluding another Non-Aggression Pact with Japan on April 13, 1941, when he saw the zero hour of a German invasion was close at hand. And on the side of Japan, her failure to conclude the China Incident and the impulsive for a southward push had defeated her hope of battling Russia on the north. Already immediately after the conclusion of the German-Italo-Japanese Tripartite Alliance on September 27, 1940, by which Japan became a full-fledged Axis partner, speculations as to an eventual Soviet-Japanese pact of non-aggression to offset the unfavorable effect of the Alliance upon Soviet-Japanese relations were rife.[1] Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese Foreign Minister, who was on his way to Berlin via Moscow in March 1941, had lectured to Stalin, during their one-hour meeting,

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[1] Joseph C. Grew, op. cit., p. 333.

on Japanese ideology, emphasising that while the Japanese were not communists politically or economically, nevertheless, a close parallel existed between Communism and Japanese family life.[1] His suasion bore fruits: the Pact was signed in a few hours after their meeting. Upon his return to Japan, he found himself riding on the crest of his fame.

The Pact provided that,

1. Each power pledged itself to peace and friendship and to respect for "the territorial integrity and inviolability" of the other;

2. Should either "become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict."[2] The more noteworthy is an appended Declaration signed on the same day, which reads as follows:

> "In conformity with the spirit of the Neutrality Pact concluded on April 13th of 1941 between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Japan in the interests of ensuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Manchukuo, and *Japan pledges to*

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[1] Stalin was said thereupon to have remarked that he saw no reason why Russia and Japan could not be friends in spite of differences in ideology. Joseph C. Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-381.

[2] According to this provision Soviet Russia's declaration of war on Japan in August 1945 is a breach of her treaty obligation.

respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic."[1]

China was naturally put in distress. The Chinese Government, through Foreign Minister Dr. Wang Chung-hui, declared on the following day that the Pact in question violated the administrative and territorial integrity of China and was therefore regarded by the Chinese Government as devoid of all legality. The statement reads as follows:

> "At the time of the signature of the neutrality pact on April 13, the U.S.S.R. and Japan issued a joint declaration in which Japan undertook to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the so-called 'People's Republic of Mongolia' and the Soviet Union undertook to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the so-called 'Manchukuo'.
>
> "It is an indisputable fact that the four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are an integral part of the Republic of China and always remain Chinese territory.
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> "The Chinese Government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third parties which are derogatory to China's territorial and administrative integrity, and wishes to state that the Soviet-Japanese declaration just announced has no binding force whatsoever

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1. China Handbook, 1937-1943, published by the Chinese Ministry of Information, p. 170, note.

on China."[1]

Replying to the statement of the Chinese Foreign Minister, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Molotov, gave the assurances that these provisions were stipulated for no other purpose than to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and that they had no bearing on her relations with China, nor had anything to do with the Sino-Japanese hostilities. A similar expression was made by the Soviet Ambassador to China at the same time.[2] However, China was far from being satisfied.

This Pact, together with its appended Declaration, cannot but remind us of the Russo-Japanese rapprochement of 1907-1916, the only difference being that while on the one side Japan remained the same partner, on the other, Soviet Russia took the place of Czarist Russia. In spite of all the disclaimers that might have been put out by Russia, these provisions constituted virtually the Soviet recognition of Manchukuo and the Japanese recognition of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. It is obvious that China fell the only vicarious victim, and her vociferous protests were nothing more than phony words.

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[1] Chinese Year Book, 1943, pp. 270-271.
[2] Ibid.

on China."[1]

Replying to the statement of the Chinese Foreign Minister, the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, however, gave the assurance that these negotiations were stipulated for no other purpose than to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and that they had no bearing on her relations with China nor had anything to do with the Sino-Japanese hostilities. A similar representation was made by the Soviet Ambassador in China at the same time.[2] However, China was far from being satisfied.

This Soviet-Japanese pact, with its reputed implications, cannot but remind us of the Russo-Japanese rapprochement of 1907-1916, the only difference being that while on the one side Japan remained the same party, on the other, Soviet Russia took the place of Czarist Russia. In spite of all the disclaimers that might have been put out by Russia, these provisions constituted virtually the Soviet recognition of Manchukuo and the Japanese recognition of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. It is obvious that China was the only victim again, and her vociferous protests were nothing more than paper words.

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1. Chinese Year Book, 1940, pp. 370-371.
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER XV

THE SOLUTION

I. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the de jure Independence of Outer Mongolia

The Soviet policy during the inceptive years of the Sino-Japanese War, like that of Britain and the U.S., was designed to help China, to embarrass Japan, yet in a way calculated to avoid immediate war. Cordiality in Sino-Soviet relations, though not too satisfactory, was yet manifest at least on the surface. However, by the time the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact was signed in 1941, a change in the situation was very discernible. Russia and China had moved farther and farther from each other, owing, partly, to Russia's meticulosity not to offer any causus belli to the overweening Military of Japan, and partly to a renewed Communist-Nationalist rift within China herself. It may be said that by 1941 Russia and Japan stood seemingly no less close to each other than Russia and China.

The awareness, on the part of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people, that Russia's friendship was a condition precedent to the security and internal stability of China, in particular, and the Far Eastern and world peace, in general, gave rise to China's renewed efforts to improve the worsened

Sino-Soviet relations. And, on the part of Russia, the desire to improve her isolated position in the world also made desirable her coming into terms with the Chinese Republic. Thus, after some diplomatic demarches had been made between delegates of these two countries when the San Francisco Conference was meeting from April to June 1945, Dr. T.V. Soong, the newly-appointed Premier, or President of the Executive Yuan, as he is officially titled in China (concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, which office he had held prior to his promotion), flew to Moscow on June 30 with an imposing train of retinue.[1] Closely on his heel came Mr. Tsai Po-sen, Premier (President of the Council of Ministers) of the People's Republic of Mongolia. Judging from the Chinese Premier's pronouncement that "he was prepared to discuss all impending issues between China and Soviet Russia," and from the early arrival of the Outer Mongolian Premier, it is evident that the problem of Outer Mongolia had been previously agreed by both parties as an item on their comprehensive agenda. The negotiations, in which both Stalin and Soong personally participated, were conducted in the most cordial atmosphere, but the proceedings were kept sub rosa. Owing to the imminent opening of the Potsdam Conference at Berlin, the Moscow talk was suspended in mid-July, and Dr. Soong returned to Chungking to prepare for further discussion. He revisited Moscow on August 7, bringing

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1. The Chinese Nationalist Daily, July 2, 1945. This is the first visit to Moscow by Chinese leaders since 1940.

with him Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the new Chinese Foreign Minister, and the Soviet Ambassador at Chungking.[1] Negotiations were then immediately resumed.[2]

On the day after Premier Soong's arrival at Moscow, Russia, as expected by the whole world, declared war on Japan. The mighty Red Army smashed into Manchuria on August 9 from Manchuli on the northwest, and from Vladivostok in a westerly direction.[3] Hailar, the strategic point on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and a Japanese strongpost in the Hsingan Province, was captured on August 10, a push of 130 miles southward in forty eight hours.[4] Outer Mongolia also declared war on Japan in the wake of Russia, and Mongol cavaliers struck eastward from the Lake Buir region, one of the focal points of Soviet-Japanese hostilities in the late thirties. The Mongol army reached the Hsingan Mountains in swift actions,[5] and also fought southward into Inner Mongolia.[6]

Scarcely had the Red Army's march developed into full swing, when early in the morning of August 10 a message from Radio Tokyo was monitored that "in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace," the Japanese Government had decided to "accept the terms" laid down in the Potsdam Conference, with the string attached that "the

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[1] *Chinese Nationalist Daily*, August 8, 1945.
[2] *Ibid*, August 9, 1945.
[3] *Ibid*, August 9, 1945.
[4] *Chinese Nationalist Daily*, August 11, 1945.
[5] *Ibid*.
[6] *Chung Sai Yat Po*, October 16, 1945.

prerogatives of His Majesty as sovereign ruler of Japan be kpet."[1] On August 14, after four days' exasperating wait, Japan formally accepted the Allies' surrender terms.[2]

With Russia's full-bodied entry into the Pacific war, and her occupation of Japanese-held Manchuria, an agreement between China and Soviet Russia on the many problems which were bound to loom large after the cessation of hostilities became all the more urgent. As a result of frank exchange of views, accompanied naturally by mutual "gives and takes", a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, together with six other agreements, was finally signed at Moscow, on the very day of the Japanese surrender (August 14).[3] The agreements relevant to the subject of Mongolia and Manchurian Mongols are three, namely, the agreement on the occupation and restoration of the three eastern provinces of Manchuria, the exchange of notes on China's sovereignty in Manchuria, and the exchange of notes on Outer Mongolia.

In the agreement on the three eastern provinces of Manchuria, the following is provided:

> "(1) After the entry of Soviet troops as a result of hostilities into the territory of the three eastern provinces of China, supreme authority and responsibility

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[1] New York Times, August 11, 1945.
[2] Daily Record, Boston, August 15, 1945.
[3] For texts of the Treaty and accompanied agreements, see New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 4. The texts were published on August 27.

in the zone of hostilities in all questions relating to the prosecution of the war for the period necessary for operations shall rest with the commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces.

"(2) Representatives of the National Government of the Chinese Republic and the personnel shall be appointed for the restored territories who shall:

(A) Establish and direct in accordance with Chinese laws the administration on the territory clear of the enemy;...

(C) Insure active collaboration between the Chinese administration and the Soviet commander in chief and in particular issue instructions to local organs to this effect being guided by the requirements and wishes of the Soviet commander in chief.....

"(5) As soon as any part of the restored territory ceases to be a zone of direct hostilities the National Government of the Chinese Republic shall assume full authority as regards civilian affairs and shall render the Soviet commander in chief every assistance and support through its civil and military organ...."

In the exchange of notes on China's sovereignty in Manchuria, etc., the following is provided,

"(2) In the course of negotiations on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, also on the joint operation of the

Chinese-Changchun Railway (the former Chinese Eastern Railway), the Soviet Government regarded the three eastern Provinces as part of China and again confirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the three eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity...."

By the provisions of these two documents, Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty of China in Manchuria, and promised to restore the occupied territory to Chinese authorities as soon as any part of it "ceases to be a zone of direct hostilities." Thus, it is beyond doubt that the Mongol portion of Manchuria, i.e. the Hsingan Province of the defunct Manchukuo, will be restored to China's control in due course of time. At first anxiety was felt in many Chinese circles over the absence of a stipulation as to the time limit within which the Soviet troops were to withdraw.[1] However, an agreement between the Soviet and Chinese military representatives was reached at the end of October, which provided that the Soviet occupation troops would begin withdrawal as from November 3 and complete the process on December 3.[2]

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[1] However, in the unpublished Agreed Minutes, both parties had agreed that the Soviet troops were to withdraw completely from Manchuria in three months after the cessation of hostilities.

[2] Chinese Nationalist Daily, November 1, 1945. Later Soviet Russia, at the request of the Chinese Government, agreed to postpone her complete withdrawal for a month. Chinese Nationalist Daily, December 1, 1945.

On the subject of Outer Mongolia, the note from Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister, reads,

> "In view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government declared that after Japan's defeat, if a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognise the independence of Outer Mongolia in her existing boundaries.
>
> "The above statement will be binding after the ratification of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed by the Chinese Republic and the U.S.S.R. on August 14, 1945."

Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied,

> "Hereby I confirm receipt of your note in which you state that (the two paragraphs in the Chinese note inserted verbatim here).
>
> "The Soviet Government, with satisfaction, has taken note of the above note of the Government of the Chinese Republic and declares on its part that it will respect the state of independence and territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia)."

By these provisions, China undertook to "recognise", and Soviet Russia, to "respect", the independence of Outer Mongolia, if the proposed plebiscite confirmed the Mongols' will to achieve independence. The date for the plebiscite was

accordingly set for October 20, 1945, after consultation between Chungking and Ulan Bator. The Chinese Government sent Mr. Lei Fa-chung, Vice Minister of the Interior, to Outer Mongolia to supervise the balloting.[1] According to a last report from Moscow, the returns of the poll showed 400,074 (97.8% of the total eligible voters) for independence, and none against.[2] The Chinese Vice Minister reported to Chungking that "the plebiscite was conducted in complete conformity with democratic principles."[3] And on October 25 a delegate of Outer Mongolia was already on his way to Chungking to arrange for the final protocol to be concluded between China and Outer Mongolia, in which the Outer Mongolian independence of Outer Mongolia was to be formally granted by China.[4] Although there has been no report of the conclusion of the said protocol, yet it is certain that China will grant the independence of Outer Mongolia as she vouched for in the Sino-Soviet agreement.

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1. Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 1945; Chinese Nationalist Daily, October 20, 1945.
2. Chinese Nationalist Daily, October 23, 1945.
3. Ibid. But it must be noted that the plebiscite was held by means of open ballot. Chinese Nationalist Daily, October 23, 1945. It cannot be said that this method is in contravention with democratic principles; but it is certainly not the best method as adopted by other democratic countries. For a Chinese critique of this unsatisfying procedure, see Chinese Nationalist Daily, editorial, October 23, 1945, in which the writer dubbed the plebiscite as a "stark puppet show directed by the Soviets."
4. Chinese Nationalist Daily, October 26, 1945. According to a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Government is still "studying the results of the Mongolian plebiscite preparatory to the recognition of Mongolian independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations." Ibid, December 21, 1945. On January 5, 1946 a United Press dispatch from Chungking reported that the Chinese National Government had formally recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. Boston Traveller, Jan, 5, 1946.

II. The Restitution of Inner Mongolia to China

In the night of September 1, 1945, Japan formally surrendered to the Allies by signing the Articles of Capitulation in a solemn ceremony aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay.[1] In the surrender instrument, the scowling Japanese delegates agreed that

> "(6) We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration."[2]

Pursuant to the provisions of the surrender instrument and by order of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, "by direction of the Emperor," issued the General Order No. 1, by which

> "(a) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees North latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."[3]

On September 9 General Yasuji Okamura, Commander of Japanese forces in China, in compliance with the above General

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[1] New York Times, September 2, 1945.
[2] Ibid, p. 3.
[3] New York Times, September 2, 1945.

Order, signed the Act of Surrender at Nanking, with General Ho Yin-chin, Commander of Chinese ground forces, representing the Generalissimo, by which

> "All Japanese forces,...will be subject to the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Their movements and activities will be dictated by him and they will obey only orders and proclamations issued, or authorized, by him, or orders of their Japanese commanders based upon his instructions."[1]

From these documents it is crystal clear that the Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia were required to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and thus the land should be reverted to China. Japan, so far the only contender for the Chinese Inner Mongolia, thus quit. Soviet Russia, considered by many as a potent aspirant, has laid no claims in challenge of China's sovereignty in that vast area. She has even agreed to withdraw her troops in Jehol and Chahar as soon as the Chinese troops will arrive in these two provinces.[2] Therefore, the restitution of Inner Mongolia to China is practically as certain as a res judicata.

Yet, two factors from within China are threatening to make the restitution a difficult task. They are the Mongols and the Chinese Communists. After the Japanese surrender

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1. New York Times, September 10, 1945.
2. Chinese Nationalist Daily, October 27, 1945.

the Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia was quickly disbanded, and Prince Teh was captured and put under custody in Chungking.[1] But it has been rumoured that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, "supported by the Russians and the Chinese Communists," have organised a new independent government of Inner Mongolia at Shangtu, about 100 miles from Kalgan, with Prince Payen Dalai as the President.[2] It was also alleged that the Outer Mongolian army, which had pushed into Inner Mongolia after its declaring war on Japan, was also sponsoring such a movement. This allegation seems all the more likely when considered in the light of the report that a United Mongolian National Liberation Council was organized somewhere in Inner Mongolia,[3] with the apparent purpose, as its title suggest, of bringing the two Mongolias into unity.

More serious than this new version of Mongol nationalistic manoeuvre is the infiltration of the Chinese Communists into Inner Mongolia. Taking advantage of the state of vacuum of power in North China as a result of Japan's defeat and the absence of large regular forces of the National Government, the 8th Route Army (the Communist army), with its guerrilla auxiliaries, have occupied the key point of Kalgan early on August 25.[4] With this city as a base, the Communists

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1. *Chung Sai Yat Po*, October 16, 1945.
2. *Chinese Nationalist Daily*, October 16, 1945.
3. *Chung Sai Yat Po*, October 16, 1945.
4. *Chung Sai Yat Po*, October 16, 1945.

are spreading their influence in other localities of Chahar, Jehol and Suiyuan, while the Soviet troops posed quiescent. A dispatch from Kalgan reported that a Government of the Border Districts of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei was established by the Communists at that city, with "its jurisdiction covering the northeast Shansi, east Suiyuan, south Chahar and Jehol, inhabited by some 40,000,000 people.[1] In Suiyuan the Communists captured several cities along the vital Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, and threaten to take Kweisui, the provincial capital. In Shansi, a Communist force of 100,000 men began the attack on Tatung on the Tatung-Taiyuan Railway. Chengteh, capital of Jehol, was also wrested into the Communists' hands. What is still worse, the 8th Route Army not only augmented their strength by directly disarming the Japanese troops, but were also supplied with arms by the Soviet Red Army. It was also reported that they were using tanks, piloted by Outer Mongolian soldiers, in Shansi.[2] Therefore, with the Chinese Communists active in Inner Mongolia, further emboldened by Soviet and Outer Mongolian aid, it is most problematical that Inner Mongolia, in spite of the end of the Sino-Japanese War, will have its tranquil days in the nearest future. Although these are mere internal problems of China, yet in the course of developments they may readily turn into international complications.

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1. Chinese Nationalist Daily, November 1, 1945; Christian Science Monitor, November 3, 1945.
2. Ibid.

PART SIX

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XVI

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

From what we have discussed in the preceding chapters an overall picture of the international rivalries in Mongolia is presented clearly to our eyes. Described briefly, the picture is one in which Russia, Japan and China contended for supremacy over one another for the control of the Mongols in Mongolia and Manchuria. Inasmuch as Mongolia was legally a part of Chinese territory, China inevitably came head-on into conflict with both Russia and Japan; but owing to her deplorable weakness, China has ever remained, as compared with the other two, a passive, minor contender. What made the situation intricate and critical is really the rivalries, or potential rivalries, between Russia and Japan. As for the Mongols themselves, it is apparent that they were but pawns on the international chess board to be played according to the rules of power politics. Now, to explain this overall picture, several observations may be made in the following passages.

First, it is clear that both Russian and Japanese policies in Mongolia, so far as their motives and objectives are concerned, are essentially the same thing, that is, the aggrandizement of their respective influence and interests at the expense of China. Both countries acknowledged China's sovereignty in Mongolia, but both left no stone unturned to undermine and

eventually to obliterate that shady bogey called "sovereignty." To identify the policy of Czarist Russia with that of Japan, we have only to turn to the several agreements concluded between them in 1907-1916. We cannot, either, say that the Mongol policy of Soviet Russia differs per se from that of Czarist Russia, and, hence, that of Japan. History tells eloquently of the analogy. In 1919-1924 Soviet Russia did exactly what Czarist Russia had done in 1911-1915. Both sponsored a Mongol revolution, and both helped establish an independent Mongol government. Immediately after the puppet regimes were put on their seats, both, on all fours, signed a series of treaties and agreements with their respective proteges in order to tighten their stranglehold thereon and to squeeze out of them as much as possible. Both instigated, and took a positive part in, the Mongol antagonism against China, the legal suzerain in that territory. Just as Sazonov declared in 1912 that

> "Russian recognition of China's suzerainty would be merely juridical, and the establishment of Chinese power in its original form would be out of the question;"

so Chicherin echoed in 1926 by saying that

> "The Soviet Government recognises Mongolia as a part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with the internal affairs and establish independent relations of Mongolia."

This is but to give some examples; and every sober-minded neutral observer who has traced through the course of events re-capitulated in the previous chapters may further dwell upon the striking analogy between these two counterparts. Furthermore, it can even be said that the Soviets have gone a step further than the Czarist Government. The former superimposed communism, nilly-willy, upon a people whose widely different cultural background and physical capabilities do not permit of such identification; while the latter had refrained to obliterate the original Mongol identity. Whether this contention is tenable or not, it stands out conspicuously that the Soviet policy is just as bad as, if not worse then, the Czarist policy.

It would be ridiculous and childish to say that the Soviets are motivated by altruism, while the Czarist Government was by egoism and jingoism; for altruism, however lofty and noble an ideal it may be, has never been allowed its rightful place in international politics. Even if we grant that there were an iota of this ideal in the Soviets' original motives, it has also been more than offset and obscured by what they actually have done and still are doing.

Admitting this, we cannot but conclude by impeccable analogy that the Soviet policy is no less akin to the Japanese policy than that of Czarist Russia. Some apologists of the Soviet diplomacy have held out the argument that while Japan almost openly arrogated the government of Inner

Mongolia and the Hsingan Province to herself, the Soviets have only exercised a sort of remote control, in a moderate manner, over the People's Republic of Mongolia; and, therefore, the Soviet policy is not imperialism if the Japanese policy is.[1] This statement is untrue; for ostensibly the Japanese also allowed the Mongols a measure of self-government as a kind of window-dressing, and they also refrained, wherever desirable, from going above the head of their puppets directly to the subject people. Moreover, Japan did not, as the Soviets did, go to the extreme of destroying the Mongol tribal

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[1] Mr. O. Lattimore holds the view that

> "All of this has been done with Soviet *support and help* ...but without assertion of Soviet sovereignty or control....There is a great difference between Outer Mongolia and the puppet state of Manchukuo. From the moment they declared the 'independence' of Manchukuo in 1932, the Japanese put great pressure on China to recognize it...Tsarist Russia negotiated treaties prejudicial to China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, but Soviet Russia, though it has a treaty of alliance with Outer Mongolia, has never tried to force China to recognize Mongol independence and has even recognized China's claim to sovereignty over the Mongols...(therefore) Soviet policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism." See "*Solution in Asia*," pp. 142-144.

But the author fails to draw a clear line between "support and help" and "control". The many public and secret treaties which Soviet Russia has signed with Outer Mongolia, and the simple fact that the present Outer Mongolian Government was primarily a product under Soviet Russia's sponsorship, are enough evidences to show that what Soviet Russia has done is definitely more tha mere "support and help", as Mr. Lattimore will beready to admit. His view that the Soviet policy is not one of Red imperialism because it does not press for China's recognition of the Mongol independence is still more open to question. The pressing, or refraining from pressing, for China's recognition is only a tactical matter which has no important bearing on the problem of imperialism. Many powers in the past have pursued imperialistic policies without legally detaching territories from China, and sometimes such detachment would rather run counter their imperialistic interests.

organizations and their basic economic structure which the Mongols, by force of traditionalism, were most unwilling to surrender. In this sense, the Soviets are even more imperialistic than the Japanese.

To be fair to all, we can only put the Mongol policies of Czarist Russia, Soviet Russia and Japan in the one and same category -- that is, modern imperialism, -- no matter how they might be differentiated from one another in the art of empire-building.

Secondly, the very likeness of the Russian and Japanese policies in Mongolia predetermined their rivalries and conflicts in that area, for the path of empire is intrinsically one of clearing the coveted territory of all elements which may possess the same will-to-power. When the contenders' paths come to a cross, rivalries and even hostilities flare up. When they are confronted with threats from other sources, their paths go parallel and they may coalesce; but even so coalesced, they are still potential rivals. As Frederick Schuman put it,

> "On the chessboard of power politics, each Power is typically the potential enemy of its neighbors, and the potential ally of its neighbor's neighbors. States which are neighbors are 'friends' only when they both fear a third neighbor...Proximity otherwise breeds rivalry for control of border areas which, once controlled, will

give the controller superiority of power over his neighbor."[1]

Thus, Russia and Japan formed a bloc since 1907 in the face of the threatening intrusion of other powers into their common sphere; and, to reconcile their conflicting interests, they expediently carved out their respective rayon d'action. But, once they had firmly entrenched themselves and external menace had been considerably removed, they parted company, first clashing on the Manchukuoan-Mongolian borders in the thirties, and, then coming into open war in 1945. It may well be concluded that the Russo-Japanese relations in Mongolia ever since the beginning of the current century have always been characterized by deadly rivalries, either open, or masqueraded, not unlike the Anglo-French rivalries in North America and India in the 18th century.

Thirdly, as for China's policy toward Russia and Japan in regard to Mongolia, little more needs to be said than that her only desire was to preserve her sovereignty in Mongolia. But, because of her weakness, the part she played in the three-cornered rivalries in Mongolia has always been a passive and minor one. After some fait accompli had already been created by either Russia or Japan, she could only lodge protests denouncing such breach of faith and alleging her refusal to acknowledge such unlawful violation of her rights.

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[1] F. L. Schuman, "International Politics," p. 281.

Then she had to enter into negotiations with the aggressors. And at last she had to be content with a recognition of her nominal sovereignty or suzerainty in Mongolia in the hope that some time in the future, when she would be provided with a propitious opportunity, she might reassert her control there. But, alas, she never becomes strong enough for that task. This very weakness of China has led to the loss of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and the Mongol portion of Manchuria to her, but it is also a main factor conducive to the rising of the international rivalries in those areas.

Fourthly, although China has always played a passive and minor part in the three-cornered rivalries in Mongolia as against Russia and Japan, yet she cannot be entirely immune from opprobrium for her many misconducts in coping with the Mongol problems, and for her own internal chaos since the founding of the Republic of China. Before 1911 the Manchu Dynasty, however corrupt and impotent it might have been, was still in a better position to cope with the aggressive Russians, owing to the fact that China was then a unified nation. But, during the thirty four years of the Republic, factional strifes, internecine wars, and foreign aggression, have never ceased to exist for a moment. Under such circumstances, Mongolia became almost a forgotten land in the governmental circles. The Commission for Mongolia and Tibet in the National Government was sometimes filled by Chinese members who knew practically

nothing either of Mongolian language or of Mongolian affairs. There was never a positive, clear-cut Mongol policy capable of fitting into the cold realities, as was shown by the vacillation and contradiction of the government whenever a problem called for immediate decision.[1] Even when some decisions were made, they were also smothered to death in the course of execution. The provincial officials not only paid little heed to the welfare of the Mongols, but tried all means to exact their personal interests out of the Mongols. Mongol pastures were arbitrarily impounded in the name of national interests or by jockeying or bribing their tribal chieftains. Justice was not squarely meted out to those who suffered and those who illegally gained. Matters calling for swift action were constantly shuttled back and forth indefinitely between the provincial governments and the central authorities, and were, as a result of such dilatory, stultifying procedure, suffered to drift along at random. Such deplorable indifference on the part of the Chinese governmental authorities naturally tended to make the Mongols feel like a mass of forsaken children, and their only way out was then either to stand up on their own feet, as in the case of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement in 1933-1934, or to seek some other more dependable masters, as in the case of Outer Mongolian

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[1] Cf. Chen Han-seng, "A Critical Survey of Chinese Policy in Inner Mongolia," Pacific Affairs, vol. 10, December 1936, pp. 557-561.

independence both in 1911 and in 1921.

Even when the Chinese Government did awaken to the necessity of taking some steps to ameliorate the Mongol situation, it either adopted the wrong course of action, or picked the wrong men for the execution of its policies. A typical illustration is provided by the Government's efforts to bring Outer Mongolia back to Chinese administration in 1918-1921. The appointment of General Hsu Shu-cheng as Commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Frontier Defense Army was already a faux pas of the Government; and, as though this were not enough, the General alienated forever a people, who had been sincerely and voluntarily prepared to come back to China, by his unscrupulous act of forcing the Mongol princes to sign the dictated petition. Again, when General Chang Tso-lin was commissioned to lead his army to suppress the Mongol recalcitrants, he simply pocketed the fund appropriated for that purpose, and never sent his men to Outer Mongolian soil. These years between 1918 and 1921, the years when Russia was caught in the turmoil of her Revolution, offered the most propitious chance for China to reestablish her full control of Outer Mongolia, but she twice let the chance slip off, leaving the situation even worse than ever. To lay the whole weight of blame elsewhere would not only be unfair to others, but also to herself.

Fifthly, to understand the political developments of

Mongolia through the years under our discussion in this study, we must bear in mind that the problem of colonization has always been one of the most crucial factors in determining the attitude of the Mongols toward Russia, Japan and China. The Mongols are a nomad people, and, therefore, the pastures constitute their lifeline. The colonizing of these lands by other peoples, especially farmers, would mean the ruin of their lives. It is natural for them to fight for their right of existence against any country who undertook the task of colonization. Since the advent of the Manchu Dynasty in the middle of the 17th century Chinese colonization of Mongolia had been strictly prohibited. The Code of Tsiatsin further prescribed that "all Chinese....who are situated within the borders of China, are forbidden to cross over the border and to plow and farm Mongolian land." This anti-colonization policy of the Manchus partly accounted for their success in holding the Mongols quietly under the Manchu control for over two and a half centuries. But as soon as the Manchu Dynasty began to colonize the territory since the beginning of the present century, the Outer Mongols also began to shift their loyalty toward Russia, and the Inner Mongols began to stage a series of riots. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911 Czarist Russia, in her turn, followed a policy of colonization in Outer Mongolia. This again contributed to turning the Outer Mongols against Russia. Since 1921 Soviet Russia has

purposely refrained from colonizing Outer Mongolia, (it is even reported that the number of Russian agricultural settlers in Outer Mongolia has decreased[1]); this, perhaps, is one reason why Soviet Russia has been able to sway such a great power of attraction to the Outer Mongols. The importance of the non-colonization policy was also exemplified by Japan's creation of the Hsingan Provinces in Manchukuo and the United Leagues of Mongolia in Inner Mongolia. This vital point in Mongolian problems, around which have swivelled many political developments of Mongolia, was well grasped by Mansvetov when he said,

> "Whether Mongolia is pro-Chinese or pro-Russian, or becomes either in the future, depends upon the attitudes taken by the two powers on the subject of colonization. True independence will be most difficult for Mongolia, situated as she is between Russia and China. The Mongols have always been willing to accept help from any neighboring nation if that would ensure them against an influx of colonists. This is the basic factor on which hinges the settlement of all Mongolian problems."[2]

Sixthly, let us turn to the new Sino-Soviet Agreement and the *de jure* independence of Outer Mongolia. The problem

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[1] Fedor S. Mansevtov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, October 1945, p. 151.
[2] ~~Fedor S. Mansvetov, "Russia and China in Outer Mongolia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 24, October 1945~~, p. 145.
Ibid

whether Outer Mongolia *should or should not* be independent of China has been a subject of debate between the Chinese and the Mongols;[1] but whatever the validity of their respective argumentations, "the point," as Mr. Lattimore aptly put it, "is no more likely to be settled by academic discussion than was the claim to the right of secession of the Southern States of the American Union."[2] The cold fact is that Soviet Russia is now standing with her full force behind the Outer Mongols in their bid for independence, and China is in no position to defy the Russian power; and that should China come into conflict with Soviet Russia right now, not only Outer Mongolia will be immediately taken by the Red Army, but the far greater problem of China's security and national life will be involved. Under such circumstances, it is wiser for China to acknowledge the state of affairs long existing

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1. On the Chinese side, it is asserted that the political, economic and cultural relations between the Chinese and Mongol peoples have been long and intimate for many centuries. The Chinese Republic, by her legitimate succession to the Manchu Empire, inherited the sovereignty in Mongolia, and now Mongolia is still recognised by the whole family of nations as Chinese. But on the Mongol side, it is claimed that they have never been entirely conquered by the Chinese(?), and, conversely, they once conquered the whole of China in the 13th century, and again helped the Manchus conquer China in the 17th century. They came under the Chinese roof during the Manchu Dynasty only because they favored, of their own accord, a union with China; and even then they were always accorded special treatment. Now that the Manchu Court has been overthrown they have no further connections with the Chinese Republic. Some also hold the opinion that as one of the five races under the Manchu Empire, they are no less entitled to the right of revolution against the Manchu oppressors than the Hans.
2. O. Lattimore, "Political Conditions and Chinese Turkestan," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 152, November 1930, p. 319.

in Outer Mongolia and make friends with it, than to have an antagonistic partner beside herself, over which she has practically no control at all. It is also a sound, though not necessarily pleasant, policy from a realistic point of view, to let go a part of China's uncontrollable territory in exchange for Russia's friendship which may mean China's security and opportunity for national reconstruction. Politics is a practical thing, and should be planned with a realistic and long-range view. Outer Mongolia may be lost for the time being; but as China grows in strength, she still has a chance to restore the territory as a component part of a Chinese federation, or to bring about a pro-Chinese Outer Mongolia. This world is primarily a world of power politics, and it will remain so for generations to come. There is no reason why China should not be allowed to restore her lost territory taken away under duress if Russia might compel China to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence. It is natural for all patriotic Chinese to deplore and resent the blotting out of such a vast territory from their national map. But we should remember that Alsace-Lorraine did not remain in the German hands forever!

Beside the problem of Outer Mongolian independence, there is also the problem of Tannu Tuva, which was not touched upon specifically in the new Sino-Soviet exchange of notes. In the Chinese note it is declared that "if a plebiscite of

the people of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia in her existing boundaries." But in the Soviet reply the following words are added:

> "The Soviet Government...declares on its part that it will respect the state of independence and territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia)."

It is clear that on the part of Soviet Russia Outer Mongolia is taken to mean the People's Republic of Mongolia only. But no such identification is made in the Chinese note. Thus, the question comes up as to whether the Sino-Soviet agreement will apply to Tannu Tuva as a part of Outer Mongolia. This is, theoretically, a moot point susceptible of future controversy. Yet, in effect, perhaps no grave question in this regard will arise. China has persistently regarded Outer Mongolia as a territorial unit comprising the present area of both the People's Republic of Mongolia and the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva. Therefore, her promise to recognize Outer Mongolian independence may be interpreted as a promise to give up her sovereignty in both People's Republics. Furthermore, inasmuch as the land of Tannu Urianghai is surrounded by Siberia on the north and by the People's Republic of Mongolia on the south, and is thus separated from the rest of China, it will be impossible for her to reach it except through the

the people of Outer Mongolia confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia in her existing boundaries." But in the Soviet reply the following words are used:

> "The Soviet Government...declares on its part that it will respect the state of independence and territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia)."

It is clear that no attempt is made to define Outer Mongolia in order to make the People's Republic of Mongolia equal. But no such identification appears in the Chinese note. Thus, the question comes up as to whether the Sino-Soviet agreement will apply to Tannu Tuva as a part of Outer Mongolia. This is, theoretically, a most potent possibility of future controversy. Yet, in effect, perhaps no great question in this regard will arise. China has consistently regarded Outer Mongolia as a territorial unit comprising the present area of both the People's Republic of Mongolia and the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva. Therefore, her pledge to recognize Outer Mongolian independence may be interpreted as a promise to give up her sovereignty in both Mongolian republics. Tannu Tuva, however, as the land is hemmed in by Siberia on the north and by the People's Republic of Mongolia on the south, and is thus separated from the rest of China, it will be impossible for her to maintain it except through the territory of another independent country. This technical difficulty may be enough to defeat China's hope to claim this territory once after she has recognised the independence of the People's Republic of Mongolia. Even if some questions do happen in the future in regard to the status of Tannu Tuva, it is still a simple matter for Soviet Russia to direct a plebiscite in that Republic and have such returns turned out as she may desire, because the Russian population in Tannu Tuva has now exceeded the number of the Urianghai natives, as we have noted previously, and these Russian émigrés have acquired Tannu Tuva's citizenship.

Lastly, in the future Inner Mongolia and the Mongol portion of Manchuria will most likely become new trouble spots in the Sino-Soviet relations. The Communist campaigns against the National Government, and the renewed autonomy movement of the Inner Mongols are both momentous domestic problems of China which are beyond the compass of our present discussion. But the development of these internal problems may in time take on some international significance. The Communists are seeking Soviet aid to strengthen their positions in Inner Mongolia; the Inner Mongols are being indoctrinated by the Communists, and such indoctrination may lead them to seek union with their brethren in Outer Mongolia, with whom they have long been at odds; and in addition, the Outer Mongols, fresh from their success in winning China's recognition of

their independence, may aspire to push their boundaries to the fringing regions of Inner Mongolia. All these moving forces may tend to breed new complications involving China and Russia and even the world. We still cannot foretell in what direction and to what extent these forces will move, but undoubtedly these are questions which deserve our close attention and examination. For the time being, we can only assume that the first stage of international rivalries in Inner Mongolia has been concluded with the dénouement of the defeat of Japan and with the prospective inauguration of democracy in China, these Mongols will find their aspirations for autonomy fully satisfied under the new system of local self-government.[1]

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[1] See "The Final Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of China", passed by the Legislative Yuan of the National Government, April 30, 1937, and published by the National Government, May 18, 1937, Ch. V, Sec. 2, Arts. 103-110. According to the Draft, the District (or hsien) will be a unit of local self-government, all matters that are local in nature are within the scope of local self-government; citizens of the District shall, in accordance with law, exercise the powers of election and recall of the District Magistrate and other elective officials in the service of the District self-government. As soon as the Draft Constitution is adopted by the National Assembly to be convened in the near future, it will come into effect.

APPENDIX

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. CONCERNING OUTER MONGOLIA, TANNU URIANGHAI AND BARGA

For texts of the treaties, agreements, etc. listed herein, see MacMurray, J.V.A., Treaties & Agreements with & concerning China, 1894-1919, 1921; Hertslet, Sir Ernest, Treaties, etc. between Great Britain, and between China & Foreign Powers, etc., as in Force January 1896, 1896; China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China & Foreign States, 1908; Rockhill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions with & concerning China & Korea, 1894-1904; Carnegie Endowment, Outer Mongolia, Treaties & Agreements, 1921; Zen Rin Cho Kai, Mo Ko Tai Kang, (in Japanese), 1938, Appendix II; and Yu Nen-mo, et al, Chung Wai Tiao Yueh Hwei Pien, (in Chinese), 1935. Other references are: British Parliamentary Paper, China; British Foreign State Papers; British Treaty Series; British Year Book of International Law; American Journal of International Law; Recueil des Documents Diplomatiques concernant l'Extreme-Orient, 1894-1905; Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiajenii Pravitelstva, (Bulletin of Laws & Ordinances of the Russian Government); and Chung O Kuo Chi Yueh Chu, (in Chinese).

The following list includes only the treaties, agreements, etc. concerning Outer Mongolia, Tannu Urianghai, and Barga, and does not include those concerning Inner Mongolia. It should also be noted that the list does not include all those treaties, agreements, etc. concerning Outer Mongolia, Tannu Urianghai, and Barga, some less important ones being left out.

A. Treaties, Agreements, etc. concluded before 1911

Title	Date of Signature	Signatories
Treaty of Kiakhta	August 27, 1727	China, Russia
Additional Articles to Kiakhta Treaty	October 18, 1768	"
Treaty of Tientsin	May 16, 1858	"
Treaty of Peking	November 14, 1860	"
Agreement on Trade by Land	March 4, 1862	"
Revised Agreement on Trade by Land	April 27, 1869	"
Tarbahatai Boundary Agreement	October, 1864 (?)	"
Treaty of St. Petersburg, & Regulations on Trade	February 24, 1881	"

Exchange of Notes re Railway Interests in China	April 28, 1899	Britain, Russia
Exchange of Notes re Railway Construction to the North & East of Peking	June 1 & 17, 1899	China, Russia
Convention re Evacuation of Manchuria, etc.	April 8, 1902	"
Russo-Japanese Conventions	July 30, 1907	Russia, Japan
Russo-Japanese Conventions	July 4, 1910	"

B. Treaties, Agreements, etc. concluded 1912-1918

Title	Date of Signature	Signatories
Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty	July 8, 1912	Russia, Japan
Russo-Mongol Agreement & Protocol	November 3, 1912	Russia, Outer Mongolia
Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty	January 11, 1913	Outer Mongolia, Tibet
Russo-Mongol Agreement re Telegraph Lines	May 25, 1913	Russia, Outer Mongolia
Russo-Mongol Secret Military Agreement	1913	"
Russo-Chinese Declaration	November 5, 1913	Russia, China
Agreement re Junction of Russian & Chinese Telegraph Lines at Irkechtam	December 20, 1913	"
Russo-Mongol Agreement re Railway Construction in Outer Mongolia	September 30, 1914	Russia, Outer Mongolia
Agreement re Telegraph Line between Mouda & Uliassutai	September 30, 1914	"
Agreement re Purchase of Arms & Ammunitions	September, 1914	"
Loan Agreement	1914	2
Russo-Sino-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement, etc.	June 7, 1915	Russia, China, & Outer Mongolia
Agreement on Barga	November 6, 1915	Russia, China
Tripartite Agreement re Telegraph Lines in Outer Mongolia	January 24, 1916	Russia, China, & Outer Mongolia
Russo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, etc.	July 3, 1916	Russia, Japan

Russo-Mongol Agreement re Land Rights of Russian Nationals in Outer Mongolia	April 7, 1917	Russia, Outer Mongolia

C. Treaties, Agreements, etc. concluded 1918-1924

Title	Date of Signature	Signatories
Soviet-Mongol Treaty	November 5, 1921	Soviet Russia, Outer Mongolia
Agreement re Soviet-Mongol Company in Outer Mongolia	October, 1922	"
Soviet-Mongol Secret Agreement	February, 1923	"
Sino-Soviet Agreement	May 31, 1924	Soviet Russia, China

D. Treaties, Agreements, etc. concluded since 1924

Title	Date of Signature	Signatories
Economic Agreement	1924	Soviet Russia, Outer Mongolia
Agreement re Telegraphic Communication	October, 1924	"
Agreement re Naturalization of Soviet Nationals	October, 1924	"
Soviet-Tannu Tuvian Treaty of Friendship	1925	Soviet Russia, Tannu Tuva
Agreement re Navigation of on the Selenga River	June, 1926	Soviet Russia, Outer Mongolia
Outer Mongolian-Tannu Tuvian Treaty of Friendship	November, 1926	Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva
Secret Agreement of Common Defense	October, 1927	Soviet Russia, Outer Mongolia
Agreement re Sanitation	May, 1930	"
Agreement re Prevention of Animal Plague	May, 1930	"
Agreement re Frontier Traffic	May, 1930	"
Commercial Treaty	December, 1934	"
Protocol of Mutual Assistance	March 12, 1936	"
Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact	April 13, 1941	Soviet Russia, Japan

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship & Alliance, etc.	August 14, 1945	Soviet Russia, China

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship & Alliance, etc.	August 14, 1945	Soviet Russia, China

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Shun Po, Shanghai
Ta Kung Po, Tientsin
Times, The, London

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